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Abstract
This dissertation encompasses three papers. The first paper explores health outcomes in the United
States, measured by the obesity rate and the prevalence of Type 2 diabetes, which have been
worsening over calendar time. I extend the model by Grossman (1972a, 1972b) to derive how the
demand for preventive and reactive medical care is changing over calendar time and the impacts
these changes will have on the health of an individual. Assuming that reactive medical technology’s
effectiveness in curing individuals of illness has increased over time, I find results that are consistent
with observed health trends in America. Based on improvements in medical technology, I find
that the consumption of reactive care increases while time spent on preventive care decreases. The
result of higher reactive care and lower preventive care means consumers may choose higher obesity
and diabetes rates than what identical individuals chose in previous time periods, which explains
the higher prevalence of diseases that are largely preventable. This health stock decrease is more
pronounced for individuals who already spend large amounts of their budget on reactive care, who
are typically lower-income or already in ill health. Numerical illustrations support the findings of
an increase in the consumption of reactive care, a decrease in time spent on preventive care, and
a potential decrease in the health stock for an individual over calendar time, using a wide range
of values based on plausible assumptions. The numerical illustrations also show that my model
supports the well-established fact that richer individuals have better health and spend more on
health care.
In the second paper, I examine cross-country health care efficiency rankings using modern non-
parametric estimators. This paper re-examines the original analysis on cross country health care
efficiency by the WHO (2000) and Evans et al. (2000), extending the dataset to include 10 new
years and using non-parametric estimators to estimate efficiency rankings and Malmquist indices
to determine productivity change over the panel. This paper finds that cross-country heterogeneity
leads to different efficiency rankings across OECD countries when using different non-parametric
estimators from those used in earlier studies. Similarly, efficiency rankings are highly dependent on
the choice of input and output bundles, which may be heterogeneous across countries. This paper
finds that cross-country comparisons of health care efficiency are biased by choice of estimator and
input-output bundle and may lead to faulty policy conclusions. It also finds that there has been
productivity regression in all countries except for the United States, whose productivity improvement
ii
is not statistically different from no productivity change. Some of the factors leading to productivity
regression may be due to age demographics, lack of a recent exogenous technological shock in the
health care field, the costs of reactive (instead of preventive) medicine, and increased spending on
end-of-life care.
In the third paper, I examine cross-state health care efficiency rankings using modern non-
parametric estimators. This paper examines potential concerns raised in Gearhart (2013) about the
high variability in efficiency rankings from numerous cross-country health care efficiency rankings.
This paper finds the cross-state efficiency rankings are strongly positively correlated with each
other with minor modifications in the input-output combinations used for estimation. This means
that researchers have limited freedom to implement preferred theoretical or empirical input-output
combinations. Wholesale changes in input-output combinations or in the datasets used, however,
lead to highly variable efficiency rankings across states, similar to the cross-country results. This
paper finds that there is no general correlation between better efficiency rankings and per capita
health care costs, making reforms that target health care costs perhaps ineffective. It also finds that
Massachusetts, in one dataset, has shown significant productivity improvement over the time period
2005 to 2008, the time period during which its health care reform was launched. In a second dataset,
from 2002 to 2007, productivity regressed in Massachusetts. This highlights the need for more data
and further study of Massachusetts, given the decision to reform the American health care system
under the Affordable Care Act of 2010.
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1 Demand for Preventive and Reactive Medicine: A Theoret-
ical Analysis of Obesity and Diabetes Trends Over Time
1.1 Introduction
This paper provides a theoretical explanation for observed changes in American obesity and Type
2 diabetes rates.1 Some of the findings may also begin to explain obesity and diabetes trends
the developing world is experiencing, or help to understand expected future health trends in these
countries. I focus on obesity and diabetes since they can, in many cases, be curtailed ex ante using
preventive medicine to reduce their potency and prevalence.
Preventive medical care is medical care that is undertaken when in good health in an attempt to
remain in good health; it is typically viewed as a labor-intensive process.2 Reactive medical care is
medical care that is undertaken when in ill health in an attempt to return to good health.3 I extend
Grossman’s (1972a, 1972b) model to supplement the existing literature on possible explanations
for the observed health changes taking place in the United States (U.S.). Using empirical-based
assumptions on the productivity of preventive care and the productivity of reactive medical care,
my models lead to conclusions that may allow policy-makers to develop measures that can combat
these worsening health outcomes over time.4
The results suggest that as the efficacy of reactive medical care increases over time relative to
that of preventive medical care, individuals will spend less time trying to avoid obesity and diabetes
through preventive medical care and will instead use the more effective reactive medical care to
offset these largely preventable conditions after they occur. Floud et al. (2011) note that higher
BMI levels are associated with a greater risk of chronic disorders such as diabetes. They note that
medical technology has prolonged the lives of those at risk compared to identical individuals in
earlier time periods. Individuals rationally suffer from obesity and diabetes in the short-term, being
1From this point forward, for simplicity, I will refer to Type 2 diabetes as diabetes.
2For obesity and diabetes, preventive care is time spent on choosing proper diets, time spent on physical activity
(exercise), and education about proper long-term health choices.
3For obesity and diabetes, reactive care is any medical care used, after incurring diabetes and obesity, to negate
some of the negative health consequences. This care takes the form of cholesterol lowering statins, diabetes monitoring
systems, insulin pumps, etc.
4Although productivity changes can be caused by many factors, I use productivity of reactive and preventive
care to mean a specific type of change. Changes in the productivity of preventive care are changes in how effective
preventive care is in allowing an individual to maintain good health (no sickness). Changes in the productivity of
reactive care are changes in how effective reactive care is in allowing an individual to cure himself of illness (movement
from ill health to good health).
1
able to consume non-healthcare goods or leisure more, with the expectation that they will be able
to offset the negative consequences of these diseases in the long-term.5
My model complements existing studies, providing additional insight into proposed explanations
for the increase in American obesity rates (Bleich et al. 2008; Cutler et al. 2003; Philipson &
Posner 2003; Rashad & Markowitz 2007). This insight, improved effectiveness of reactive medical
technology, allows individuals to make the decisions postulated by previous authors without having
to worry about high future costs from obesity and diabetes. Individuals in developed countries
will choose to expend fewer calories on the job and not compensate for this by increased leisure-
time exercise activities, or will choose to consume more pre-packaged (and frequently less healthy)
foodstuffs, as they expect improved reactive medical technology in the future to largely offset the
health consequences of their choices.6
I first find that the consumption of reactive care will increase and time spent on preventive care
will decrease as the productivity of reactive care increases.7 This supports the finding by Pauly
(1986) that the two types of medical care are substitutes. Even though the model is simple, this has
powerful implications. For instance, for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), preventive medical
care is abstinence while reactive care is the use of anti-HIV drugs. This implies that individuals
will choose riskier sexual behaviors with the belief that future anti-HIV drugs will be able to better
offset their bad decisions (Bartholow et al., 2005).8
Second, as the consumption of reactive care increases while time spent on preventive care de-
creases, this may decrease the stock of health of a representative individual.9 If the representative
individual spends a large portion of his budget on reactive care relative to that spent on preventive
care, it is likelier that the individual will see his health worsen, represented by incurring higher body
mass index (BMI) rates or acquiring diabetes. An implication is that people who do consume large
5In other words, the reduction in life expectancy from incurring obesity or diabetes today is much smaller than it
was a century ago.
6The health consequences of their choices includes, largely, an increase in preventable disease burdens, such as
obesity and diabetes.
7The productivity of reactive care is measured as advancements in medical technology that make the medical care
we are using more effective and last over longer time periods.
8In Bartholow et al. (2005), although there was no statistically significant behavioral change for women in HIV
vaccine efficacy trials, perceived assignment to vaccines increased the probability of risky sexual behavior among
homosexual males. This has been a concern in some HIV studies. For instance, Whittington et al. (2006) reports that
sexual encounters with HIV-positive partners were partly accounted for by HIV vaccine use, meaning that individuals
engaged in riskier behavior when they assumed partners were engaged in antiretroviral treatments. Jackson et al.
(1995) find in Mombasa, Kenya, individuals believed that they would significantly increase risky behaviors if enrolled
in HIV vaccine trials. This result is not universal; some studies have found no increase in risky sexual behavior during
HIV vaccine trials (Lampinen et al., 2005; Gray et al., 2013).
9This will be represented by increasing obesity and diabetes rates
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quantities of reactive health care, who are less likely to be healthy, will suffer even further declines
in the stock of health as they continue to substitute away from preventive care.10 It also suggests
that preventing individuals from getting to this low level of health may alleviate some of the health
trends across the world.
This finding has other implications as well; namely, helping to explain why obesity and diabetes
are more prevalent in low income groups in developed countries, but more prevalent in high income
groups in developing countries. In America, obesity is a “poor-man’s” disease; obesity prevalence
is higher among lower income and lower educated groups (Singh et al., 2011). Obesity rates from
2000 to 2002 were 25.1-percent for individuals with less than $15,000 of income and 19.1-percent for
individuals with more than $50,000 of income. Likewise, diabetes rates from 2000 to 2002 were 12.5-
percent for individuals with less than $15,000 of income and only 3.8-percent for individuals with
more than $50,000 of income (CDC, 2002). Berenson et al. (2012) find that low-income individuals
are much less likely to have access to preventive care than high-income individuals.11 Therefore, low
income individuals are more likely to spend relatively more of their budget on reactive care than on
preventive care, making them more susceptible to increases in obesity and diabetes.
Third, my model is consistent with other observed explanations for worsening health outcomes in
the United States and worldwide, as measured by the obesity rate. My model complements existing
explanations for health trends observed around the world (Becker and Mulligan, 1997; Bleich et al.,
2008; Cutler et al., 2003; Komlos et al., 2004; Philipson and Posner, 2003). Consumers are willing
to make a tradeoff; higher non-healthcare consumption and leisure today, with the expectation that
medical technology advances will offset the accumulated health effects of their choices. My model
serves as additional insight for previous stories; it helps to explain that, with the belief of future
medical technology improvements, consumers are more willing to optimize over the short-run than
to make “healthier” long-run decisions.
Finally, numerical illustrations based on a wide variety of plausible assumptions about wage
inflation and the inflation rate of reactive medical care support the findings that the consumption
of reactive care increases while time spent on preventive care decreases. Depending on the specific
functional form of the gross investment production function, these can lead to declines in the stock
10The individuals may incur other preventable illnesses, such as hypertension, high cholesterol, or other cardiovas-
cular diseases.
11Kenney et al. (2005) find that children from low families were much less likely to receive dental care than children
from high-income families. In fact, more than half of children without dental health insurance benefits received no
preventive dental care.
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of health as well. The numerical illustrations highlight important trends; even with rapid changes
in the price of reactive care, an increase in the productivity of reactive care analogous to Moore’s
Law seems to be the dominant effect. Much more productive reactive care will induce individuals
to consume more reactive care, regardless of rapid increases or decreases in the price of reactive
care over calendar time. The numerical illustrations generated from my model are also consistent
with the well-established empirical facts that wealthier individuals live longer, show slower health
deterioration and spend more on health care (Case and Deaton, 2003; Deaton, 2002).
The findings point to important policy conclusions. First, changes in the structure of health
insurance to benefit individuals who invest more heavily in preventive care may reduce the decline
over time in the health stock of Americans by inducing more time spent on preventive care.12 Second,
large changes in the productivity of preventive medical care may offset some of the movements
towards more reactive care Americans have seen over the past several decades.13 These policy effects
suggest market-based incentives to manage increases in the prevalence of obesity and diabetes in
the United States. Private firms developing procedures that increase the productivity of preventive
care may provide an innovative and profitable solution to these trends.
1.2 Existing Literature
1.2.1 The Demand for Health and Medical Care
The development of the literature on the derived demand for health began with Grossman (1972a),
who argued that consumers do not demand medical services per se, but the end result of consumption
of these medical services.14 Grossman (1972a, 1972b) created the canonical model for the demand for
health, using a household production function model of consumer behavior based on Becker (1965).
A number of papers have since expanded on this model or attempted to refute its conclusions or
assertions.15
Grossman (1972a, 1972b) found a variety of interesting results. Among these is the finding that
12This would correspond to more use of health insurance providers providing discounts for members staying at
baseline health numbers, such as BMI, cholesterol readings, etc. These are sometimes referred to as Wellness Plans.
13This would correspond to increased use of genomic testing to determine, before an illness occurs, if an individual
has a proclivity towards that illness. This would allow treatments tailored to the individual before the disease occurs,
to perhaps minimize the chances of getting that disease, or reducing the burdens of that disease ex post.
14Such as longer time spent healthy.
15Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) and Galama (2011) are some of a number of papers expressing concern over features
of the model, such as the selection of a constant returns to scale (CRS) production function, to determine health
investment. Grossman (2000) addresses a number of the concerns about his original model.
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as age increases, consumers incur more time spent sick, which requires increased usage of time and
consumption of medical care. The health stock is an endogenous variable, so consumers determine
the time of their death, when they let their stock of health fall below some threshold. Better health
increases utility both directly and indirectly, through increased availability of time spent health for
market and non-market activity. There are also costs incurred in choosing to increase the health
stock, such as reduced leisure time.
Cropper (1972) expanded on Grossman’s model, assuming that illness is randomly distributed,
which occurs if the health stock falls below some threshold. Cropper stated that there were two
different types of medical expenditures based on an individual’s level of ill health: (i) preventive
expenditures, which decrease as age increases, and which are non-stochastic; and (ii) curative ex-
penditures, which likely increase as age increases, because the probability of an illness increases with
age, and which are stochastic. Cropper (1972) focused solely on gross investment in the stock of
health from preventive expenditures, where he found that investment in health decreases as death
approaches, because the costs significantly outweigh the benefits to increase the stock of health be-
yond the point where health shocks are felt. His model never dealt with curative expenditures, and
his model dealt solely with the stock of health over a life cycle and not over calendar time.
Several authors have since looked at the difference between preventive and reactive medical
expenditures by individuals. Meier (2000) assumed that preventive expenditures on health reduce
the probability of becoming ill, and help to reduce the costs of reactive care when incurred. He
found that the equilibrium stock of health capital declines as the price of reactive care falls. This
occurs because more reactive care is used and, as a result, since reactive care affects health after a
negative health shock is felt, we observe lower equilibrium health stocks before it is used. Rappange
et al. (2010) found that preventive lifestyle interventions targeted at life-style related risk factors,
such as smoking or obesity, have the possibility of increasing public health. Hey and Patel (1983)
determined the optimal allocation of expenditures, per period, on preventive and reactive care.16
Using a state-dependent two-period model where the efficacy of reactive and preventive care affect the
probability of sickness, they found that individuals will consume both types of medical expenditures.
The conclusion is that negative health shocks are not fully avoided (if all time and money was spent
on preventive care) and that the negative health shocks, when incurred, are not fully remedied (if
16Instead of focusing solely on the consequences of changes in the productivity of reactive care, they focus on how
the consumption of reactive care and preventive care will change across a number of exogenous parameters. They also
neglect the impacts of this change on the health stock of an individual.
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all time and money was spent on reactive care). While they found that as the efficacy of reactive
care increases, consumers may choose to consume more reactive care, they also uncovered a puzzling
result; that as the price of reactive care increases, consumers may choose to consume more reactive
care.17 Hey and Patel (1983) did not generate conclusions about how the health stock will change
from these results.
Pauly (1986) assumed that preventive care is used solely to avoid the future costs of reactive
care. He finds that as the price of reactive care increases, the demand for preventive care increases,
meaning that the two goods are substitutes. Ehrlich and Becker (1972) state that there is an ex ante
moral hazard problem in health insurance, and that pooled insurance coverage creates a disincentive
for insured individuals to invest in self-protective activities. Bhattacharya and Packalen (2008)
found that this moral hazard problem induces, in a country with a population with a given chronic
condition, research development by firms to create products to treat the diseases caused by the
chronic condition.18 This expectation of innovation to forestall the progression of the disease may
lead individuals to expect that medical technology will increase in the future to offset the impacts
of this disease.19
Several authors have attempted to identify factors, other than induced innovation, that might
explain changes in health stocks over time. Philipson (2001) and Philipson and Posner (2003) argue
that the growth in obesity is a function of technological change.20 Philipson and Posner (2003)
argue that, in developed countries, obesity increases with a modest rise in caloric consumption and
with a substantial increase in self-reported dieting and recreational exercise.21 Philipson and Posner
(2003) state that the technological change from industrial to service production decreases the cost
of consuming calories while increases the cost of expending calories.22 Even though self-reported
measures of time spent dieting and exercising has increased, total physical activity in developed
17My model, while introducing assumptions of its own, reduces some of the strong assumptions in Hey and Patel
(1983): (i) that the efficacy of reactive and preventive care will not change across the life cycle of an individual and (ii)
that the efficacy of reactive care depends on the quantity purchased of reactive care and that the efficacy of preventive
care depends on the quantity of preventive care purchased.
18This is a way of stating that there is induced innovation in the health care market, given the prevalence of certain
disease conditions in a population.
19This becomes the focal point of my assumption; that people expect reactive medical technology to improve in the
future, either because of the advance of science or because of the induced innovation hypothesis.
20This technological change in Philipson and Posner (2003) is encapsulated by the movement from an agrarian-
based economy to an industrial manufacturing economy to a service-oriented economy, and the change in the caloric
expenditure in the average job in these economies. In essence, caloric expenditures on the job should decrease as
countries move from the developing to developed.
21Sturm (2004) found that, between 1990 and 2000, there was an increase in the median reported physical activity
of 20 minutes per week.
22Industrial production typically involves work that is physically strenuous and leads to large expenditures in
calories. Service production is typically viewed as “desk jobs” with minimal caloric expenditures.
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countries has decreased as on-the-job caloric expenditures have decreased. Philipson and Posner
(2003) also argue that there may be a natural limit to the obesity effects of cheaper food, as the
dis-utility of added weight outweighs the joy of eating.
Bleich et al. (2008) and Cutler et al. (2003) argue that growth in obesity can be linked with im-
provements in technology for foodstuffs, decreasing the price of food while increasing the availability
(in both quantity and type) of foodstuffs. Cutler et al. (2003) state that pre-packaged foods have
decreased the time cost of food for many families, reducing the leisure time lost from preparing food.
It is unlikely, however, that caloric consumption from changes in the time cost and price of food
primarily drives the long-run growth in obesity. Goldman, Lakdawalla, and Zheng (2011) find that
a 10-percent permanent reduction in the price per calorie is associated with an increase in the BMI
of 1.05 units within 10 years. The maximum long-run effect of this 10-percent permanent reduction
in the price would be an increase in the BMI of 2.2 units. Ford and Dietz (2013) also found that,
although average daily energy intake rose by a total of 314 calories from 1971 to 2003, it has fallen
by 74 calories between 2003 and 2010. Ford and Dietz expect that this result would have caused
obesity rates to level off. They note that as Americans alter their eating habits, they may not be
getting enough exercise to burn the increased calories that they are consuming.
Becker and Mulligan (1997) argue that differences in health are due to differences in the rate of
time preference. They argue that the rate of time preference is lower for healthy individuals than
for sick individuals, as obesity decreases an individual’s life expectancy. Komlos et al. (2004) state
that the inter-temporal discount rate has decreased over time. Exercise requires an expenditure of
time and effort today for the sake of future health benefits; a higher rate of time preference leads
to less investment in these activities and worse health outcomes. They also argue that technological
change plays a significant role in the change of obesity rates over time in developed countries.
1.2.2 Evidence of Changes in Health Stocks
Over the past several decades, Americans have become less healthy with increases in obesity and
diabetes rates. In 2000, 27.5-percent of men and 33.4-percent of women were considered obese
(Ogden et al., 2012).23 In 2010, however, 35.5-percent of men and 35.8-percent of women were
considered obese. These trends also occurred for children aged 2 to 19 during the same time frame.
23These figures include adults aged 20 and older at the time of the survey.
7
Obesity rates for male children increased from 14.0-percent in 2000 to 18.9-percent in 2010, while
obesity rates for female children increased from 13.8-percent to 15.0-percent (Ogden et al., 2012).
Looking at a longer time frame, around 20-percent of the 18 to 29 year old cohort was overweight
(but not obese) from 1971 to 1974, while around 8-percent of this same cohort was considered obese.
In 2005-2006, around 27-percent of the 18 to 29 year old cohort was considered overweight (but not
obese), while around 23-percent of this cohort was considered obese. Over the three decade time
span, obesity rates nearly tripled, while individuals considered overweight increased by 7 percentage
points. These same trends hold for other age cohorts as well (NIH, 2010).
Obesity is but one measure of the changing health stock in America over time. Table 1.1 and
Figure 1.1 summarize the results for the prevalence of diabetes. In 1980, 2.7-percent of males and
2.9-percent of females were diagnosed with diabetes. Three decades later, in 2010, the prevalence
rates for diabetes diagnoses were 7.1-percent for males and 5.9-percent for females. This increase
is not all linked to increasing levels of genetic factors that make the disease unavoidable for many
individuals, nor is it due to better detection and diagnosing by medical individuals (Malach and
Baumol, 2012). Increases in the incidence of Type 2 diabetes explains a large portion of the increase
in all diabetes diagnoses (CDC, 2011).24 Diabetes, similar to obesity, can be linked in part to
failures on the part of individuals to take steps to avoid these negative health outcomes before
they are incurred. The onset of Type 2 diabetes is correlated, in part, with failures on the part of
individuals to take preventive measures to avoid these health outcomes.25
This demonstrates that Americans are increasingly subject to disease burdens that are, in large
part, preventable ex ante. DeVol and Bedroussian (2007) estimate that widespread adoption of
healthy living guidelines could save more than $2 trillion in medical costs by 2023. Redmon et al.
(2010) find that diabetes patients assigned to intensive lifestyle intervention groups to promote more
preventive care reduce medication and medical care costs by nearly 20-percent.
In the next section I develop a dynamic model, using the assumption of an increase in the
productivity of reactive care relative to the productivity of preventive care, to analyze how the
consumption of reactive care relative to time spent on preventive care changes, as well as to determine
24Type 2 diabetes, also known as adult-onset diabetes, accounts for about 90-percent to 95-percent of all diagnosed
cases of diabetes. Type 2 diabetes is associated with older age, obesity, family history of diabetes, history of gestational
diabetes, impaired glucose metabolism, physical inactivity, and race/ethnicity. A significant risk factor in acquiring
this type of diabetes is through lack of preventive care to offset potential risk factors. Many people with type 2
diabetes can control their blood glucose by following a healthy meal plan and exercise program, losing excess weight,
and taking oral medication. This highlights the preventive care nature of this disease burden (CDC 2011).
25Likewise, obesity is a significant factor in the prevalence of diabetes. As obesity rates increase, the prevalence of
Type 2 diabetes will naturally increase as well (Golay & Ybarra, 2005).
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the path of the optimal level of the health stock as consumers alter their decisions.
1.3 Dynamic Model
1.3.1 Model Set-up
I extend the canonical model of Grossman (1972a, 1972b), modeling the commodity “good health”
to supplement existing theories of Becker and Mulligan (1997), Bleich et al. (2008), Cutler et al.
(2003), Komlos et al. (2004), Philipson and Posner (2003), and Rashad and Markowitz (2007) on the
causes of increased prevalence of preventable health outcomes such as obesity and diabetes. Health
is a durable good where individuals are endowed with an initial stock of health that depreciates over
time, which can be delayed or offset by preventive or reactive medical care. Death occurs when the
stock of health falls below a threshold level.
Precise definitions for reactive care and preventive care are needed.26 Preventive care is defined
to be one hour of time spent on a bundle of goods that reduces the probability of incurring diabetes
or obesity by τ -percent.27 Reactive care is defined to be the percent of the health stock restored, ε,
by the bundle of goods provided during 1 unit of medical services after illness occurs.28 Simply put,
preventive care is the medical care and services used to attempt to remain healthy while reactive
care is the medical care and services used to attempt to return to good health after illness occurs.
Individuals choose to invest in the stock of health in two ways: (i) time spent on preventive
medical care
￿
TP
￿
and (ii) consumption of reactive medical care
￿
CR
￿
, both of which affect the
stock of health. In period 0 an individual can: (i) spend time on preventive medical care, which will
affect his health starting in period 1 and in future periods; (ii) consume reactive medical care, which
will affect his health starting in period 1 and in future periods; (iii) spend time on preventive care
and consume reactive care; or (iv) choose neither type.29
26I will choose to follow how the urban housing literature defines housing services. In hedonic pricing models,
arbitrary units of measurement are defined to normalize a housing service, which allows researchers to compare
different houses based on common services or features that they provide.
27The bundle of goods that an individual spends time on includes time spent going to the doctor, time spent dieting
and exercising, and time spent on education to reduce bad behaviors that lead to these illnesses.
28This bundle of goods includes diagnostic treatments for diabetes, statins and insulin used, and other medical
services used to reduce the health impacts of diabetes and obesity.
29I will assume that the possibility in (iv), of consuming neither reactive care nor spending any time on preventive
care, will not happen. This will eliminate boundary conditions.
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The lifetime inter-temporal utility function of a representative consumer is given by
U =
n￿
t=0
U (Ht, Xt)
(1 + r)t
, (1.1)
where H0 is the initial stock of health, Ht is the stock of health at age t, Xt is total consumption
of an aggregate of all other commodities besides the health stock, and r is the discount rate.30
Net investment in the stock of health equals gross investment at age t, It, which is a function of
preventive care and reactive care minus depreciation of the health stock at age t, φtHt:
Ht+1 −Ht = It
￿
TPt , C
R
t
￿− φtHt, (1.2)
where φt is the rate of depreciation of health at age t.31 The rate of depreciation is assumed to be
exogenous but will change as an individual ages.32 Note that the length of life, n, is endogenous
and depends on the quantities of Ht that are chosen to maximize utility subject to production
and resource constraints. Death occurs when an individual allows his health stock to fall below a
minimum level, Hdeath. Since φ increases as an individual ages, this helps preclude the possibility of
an individual choosing to live forever. The time of death is not known, since the rate of depreciation
increase with age for the individual.
For simplicity, I assume the production function for gross investment is homogeneous of degree
1 in all inputs.33 This means the gross investment production function can be re-written as
It(T
P
t , C
R
t ) = C
R
t It
￿
TPt
CRt
, 1
￿
≡ CRt g
￿
TPt
CRt
￿
. (1.3)
The marginal products of preventive medical care and reactive medical care in the production of
gross investment in health are
∂It
∂TPt
= g
￿
P
￿
TPt
CRt
￿
(1.4)
30I differ from Grossman (1972a, 1972b) in that I include in the utility function only the stock of health (Ht),
and not the number of healthy days as a function of the health stock (ht [Ht]). This will yield slight differences in
the first-order conditions when compared to the original model. Solutions for (ht [Ht]) being included in the utility
function are provided in Appendix D.
31The rate of depreciation, φt, may be a function of time spent on preventive care, φt
￿
TPt
￿
, where ∂φt
∂TPt
< 0. This
adds complexity to the model while not significantly changing the results. I relegate this discussion to the .
32Assume that φ increases linearly as an individual ages.
33Other works have modified the baseline Grossman model so that the gross investment production function exhibits
decreasing returns to scale (DRS). I will choose to forgo this treatment at this time. It is likely that the gross production
function may exhibit DRS over some ranges, but it is likely not globally true.
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for preventive care, and
∂It
∂CRt
= g
￿
TPt
CRt
￿
− T
P
t
CRt
g
￿
R
￿
TPt
CRt
￿
(1.5)
for reactive care, where g
￿
P is the marginal product of preventive care in the production of gross
investment and g
￿
R is the marginal product of reactive care in the production of gross investment.
Both income and time are scarce resources to the consumer. Let PR denote the per-period price
of reactive care, TWt denote time spent working at age t, W t denote the wage rate at age t, and A0
denote the discounted initial assets for an individual. The market goods budget constraint equates
the present value of spending on goods to the present value of income earnings over the life cycle
plus initial assets:
n￿
t=0
￿
Xt + PRt C
R
t
(1 + r)t
￿
=
n￿
t=0
￿
WtTWt
(1 + r)t
￿
+A0. (1.6)
The aggregate market good, Xt, is the numeraire commodity.
The time constraint requires the total amount of time, T , be allocated between leisure time (Lt),
time lost due to ill health
￿
TLt (Ht)
￿
, time spent on preventive medical care
￿
TPt
￿
, and time spent
working; i.e.,
T = Lt + T
L
t (Ht) + T
P
t + T
W
t . (1.7)
Assume that time lost due to ill health at age t is inversely related to the health stock at age t so
that ∂T
L
t
∂Ht
< 0. This means that reactive medical care is costly in terms of expenditures on medical
care, while preventive medical care is costly in terms of time, and therefore lost wages.34 Re-arrange
(1.7) in terms of time spent working
￿
TWt = T − Lt − TPt − TLt (Ht)
￿
and substitute this into (1.6)
yielding, after simplification, the full wealth constraint
n￿
t=0
￿
Xt + PRt C
R
t +Wt
￿
Lt + TPt + T
L
t
￿
(1 + r)t
￿
=
n￿
t=0
￿
WtT
(1 + r)t
￿
+A0. (1.8)
Equation (1.8) shows that full wealth equals the present value of the earnings an individual would
obtain if he were to spend all available time working, plus initial assets. Define C = PRt CRt +WtTPt
as total spending on gross investment in health and R =
￿n
t=0
￿
WtT
(1+r)t
￿
+ A0 as total wealth.
34In this formulation, preventive care is costly in terms of lost time but not in terms of a monetary cost. I use this
formulation for several reasons: (i) preventive care can be thought of us exercise and time spent shopping for healthy
meals, or the waiting time to use a preventive check-up, and (ii) the monetary costs of most forms of preventive care
pale in comparison to the monetary costs of most forms of reactive care.
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Equation (1.8) can be re-written as
n￿
t=0
￿
Xt + C +Wt
￿
Lt + TLt
￿
(1 + r)t
￿
= R. (1.9)
Individuals maximize the utility function given by (1.1), subject to the constraint in (1.9), by
optimizing the Lagrangian
L =
n￿
t=0
U (Ht, Xt)
(1 + r)t
+ λ
￿
R−
n￿
t=0
￿
Xt + C +Wt
￿
Lt + TLt
￿
(1 + r)t
￿￿
, (1.10)
where λ represents the marginal utility of full wealth. Since H0 and the rates of depreciation are
given, the optimal quantities of time spent on preventive care and consumption of reactive care
determine the optimal quantity of health capital.
1.3.2 Equilibrium Conditions
At each age an individual maximizes (1.10), which involves choosing preventive medical care and
reactive medical care to offset, in part or fully, the depreciation in the stock of health.35
1.3.2.1 Preventive Care Like physical capital, the benefits of preventive medical care on an
individual’s health may last over multiple periods, though its effects will depreciate as an individual
ages. The depreciation rate of time spent on preventive care at age t on the stock of health at age
(t+ 1) is denoted by ρt+1. These depreciation rates may vary as an individual ages; ρt+2 represents
the depreciation rate of time spent on preventive medical care at age t on the stock of health at
age (t+ 2). The term (1− ρt+1) represents how much the time spent on preventive care at age t
affects the stock of health at age (t + 1); this is the productivity of preventive care.36 Specifically,
the productivities of preventive medical care, across age years, are given by
∂Ht+1
∂It
￿￿￿￿
TPt changes
= (1− ρt+1) , . . . , ∂Hn
∂It
￿￿￿￿
TPt changes
=
n￿
j=t+1
(1− ρj) . (1.11)
35The full derivations of all equilibrium conditions can be found in Appendix D.
36The productivity of preventive care is defined to be how long 1 unit of preventive care at age t lasts into the
future.
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Equation (1.11) highlights that the effects on the stock of health of time spent on preventive care
at age t decrease as an individual ages. An hour of exercise today may have a large impact on an
individual’s health over the next week. Three months from now, however, the hour of exercise today
has a much smaller (perhaps zero) impact on the health of an individual.
Denote the decrease in lost work time from ill health by a unit increase in the stock of health as
Gt+1 = − ∂T
L
t+1
∂Ht+1
, also termed the marginal product of health capital at age (t+1). Similarly, denote
the marginal utility of health at age (t + 1) by ∂U∂Ht+1 = U
￿
t+1.The first-order condition (FOC) for
time spent on preventive medical care at age t is given by
πt
(1 + r)t
=
￿
Wt+1Gt+1 (1− ρt+1)
(1 + r)t+1
+ ...+
WnGn (1− ρt+1) · · · (1− ρn)
(1 + r)n
￿
+
1
λ
￿
U
￿
t+1 (1− ρt+1)
(1 + r)t+1
+ ...+
U
￿
n (1− ρt+1) · · · (1− ρn)
(1 + r)n
￿
, (1.12)
where πt is the marginal cost of gross investment at age t. Equation (1.12) states that the marginal
cost of gross investment must equal the present value of marginal benefits of preventive medical care.
There are two types of benefits of spending more time on preventive care: (i) an indirect effect on
utility, where consumers will be healthier and will have more time to work and earn wages and (ii)
a direct effect, where the utility of consumers increases from being in better health.
Assuming gross investment at age (t+ 1) is positive, bump (1.12) forward one year, so that
πt+1
(1 + r)t+1
=
￿
Wt+2Gt+2 (1− ρt+2)
(1 + r)t+2
+ ...+
WnGn (1− ρt+2) · · · (1− ρn)
(1 + r)n
￿
+
1
λ
￿
U
￿
t+2 (1− ρt+2)
(1 + r)t+2
+ ...+
U
￿
n (1− ρt+2) · · · (1− ρn)
(1 + r)n
￿
. (1.13)
Substituting (1.13) into (1.12) yields, after some algebra,
πt
(1 + r)t
=
Wt+1Gt+1 (1− ρt+1)
(1 + r)t+1
+
U
￿
t+1 (1− ρt+1)
λ (1 + r)t+1
+
(1− ρt+1)πt+1
(1 + r)t+1
. (1.14)
It can be shown that
πt [r − π¯t + ρt+1] = (1− ρt+1)
￿
Gt+1Wt+1 +
U
￿
t+1
λ
￿
, (1.15)
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where πt is the percentage rate of change in the marginal cost of gross investment between ages t
and (t+ 1). Equation (1.15) is analogous to the first-order condition found in Grossman for health
care (1972a, 1972b).37 Unlike Grossman (1972a, 1972b), by distinguishing between preventive and
reactive medical care, I find separate conditions for preventive and reactive care that take into
account their distinct productivities that affect the stock of health of an individual.
Equation (1.15) states that the undiscounted value of the marginal product of the optimal stock of
health due to time spent on preventive medical care must equal the lifetime supply price of preventive
medical capital, πt [r − π¯t + ρt+1].38 The benefits of time spent on preventive medical care are
represented by the right-hand side of (1.15). All else constant, an increase in time spent on preventive
care will decrease the amount of time spent in ill health at future ages, increasing the amount of
time an individual is able to work or leisure. This is represented by the term (1− ρt+1)Wt+1Gt+1,
which is the marginal monetary rate of return to preventive care in health. Likewise, decreasing
the amount of time spent in ill health will increase the utility of that individual; (1−ρt+1)U
￿
t+1
λ is the
psychic rate of return to preventive care in health.
Note that the left-hand side of equation (1.15), the lifetime supply price of preventive care, does
not contain the “price” of preventive care, i.e., the foregone wage. This will influence the decision of
how much time to spend on preventive care. To capture this effect, (1.15) can be re-written as
πt
￿
r − W¯t + ρt+1
￿
= (1− ρt+1)
￿
Gt+1Wt+1 +
U
￿
t+1
λ
￿
, (1.16)
where W¯t is the percentage rate of change in the wage between ages t and (t+ 1).
1.3.2.2 Reactive Care Like physical capital and preventive medical care, the benefits of reactive
medical care on an individual’s health may last over multiple periods, though its effects will also
depreciate as an individual ages. Denote the depreciation rate of reactive care consumed at age t
on the stock of health at age (t + 1) by νt+1. These depreciation rates may vary as an individual
37The main difference comes from the fact that I have separated health care into two different sub-groups; preventive
and reactive.
38For simplicity, I follow Grossman and others in terming this the lifetime supply price. This “price” of preventive
medical care represents a dynamic choice made by consumers; they must take into account changes in the depreciation
rate of time spent on preventive medical care, the discount rate, and changes in the marginal cost of gross investment.
This means that individuals will not solely look at the current market price (the foregone wage) to determine how
much time they should spent on preventive care.
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ages; νt+2 represents the depreciation rate of reactive medical care consumed at age t on the stock
of health at age (t+ 2). The term (1− νt+1) represents how much the time spent on reactive care at
age t affects the stock of health at age (t+1); this is the productivity of reactive care.39 Specifically,
the productivities of reactive medical care, across age years, are given by
∂Ht+1
∂It
￿￿￿￿
CRt changes
= (1− νt+1) , . . . , ∂Hn
∂It
￿￿￿￿
CRt changes
=
n￿
j=t+1
(1− νj) . (1.17)
Time spent on reactive medical care at age t increases the stock of health in future periods. Equation
(1.17) highlights that the effects on the stock of health of the consumption of reactive care decrease
as an individual ages. A pacemaker installed today may have a large impact on the health of an
individual over the next several months. Eight years from now, however, the pacemaker has a much
smaller impact on that individuals health, as it will need to be serviced and perhaps replaced.
It can be shown that there is a solution similar to that for preventive care
πt [r − π¯t + νt+1] = (1− νt+1)
￿
Gt+1Wt+1 +
U
￿
t+1
λ
￿
. (1.18)
Equation (1.18) states that the undiscounted value of the marginal product of the optimal stock in
health capital due to reactive medical care must equal the lifetime supply price of reactive medical
capital, πt+1 [r − π¯t+1 + νt+1]. The benefits of the consumption of reactive medical care are repre-
sented by the right-hand side of (1.18). All else constant, an increase in the consumption of reactive
care will decrease the amount of time spent sick at future ages, increasing the amount of time an
individual is able to work or leisure. This is represented by the term (1− νt+1)Wt+1Gt+1, which is
the marginal monetary rate of return to reactive care in health. Likewise, decreasing the amount of
time spent in ill health will increase the utility of that individual; (1−νt+1)U
￿
t+1
λ is the psychic rate of
return to reactive care in health.
The left-hand side of equation (1.18), the lifetime supply price of reactive care, does not contain
the market price of reactive care. This term will influence the consumption decision of reactive care.
39The productivity of reactive care is defined to be how long 1 unit of reactive care at age t lasts into the future.
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To capture this, (1.18) can be re-written as
πt
￿
r − P¯Rt + νt+1
￿
= (1− νt+1)
￿
Gt+1Wt+1 +
U
￿
t+1
λ
￿
, (1.19)
where P¯Rt is the percentage rate of change in the price of reactive care between ages t and (t + 1).
Equation (1.19) allows an analysis of changes in the lifetime supply price of reactive care as the per-
period price of reactive care changes as an individual ages. This will help determine the conditions
where an individual chooses to consume more reactive care as the per-period price of reactive care
increases.40
1.3.2.3 Cost-Minimization Condition The final equilibrium condition for producing a given
quantity of gross investment from time spent on preventive care and the consumption of reactive
care at age t is the cost-minimization condition
πt =
PRt￿
g − TPt
CRi
g
￿
R
￿ = Wt
g
￿
P
. (1.20)
Total cost is minimized when the change in gross investment at age t from spending an additional
dollar on reactive medical care at age t equals the change in gross investment from foregoing an
additional dollar of wages to spend time on preventive care at age t. This follows from the assumption
of a linearly homogeneous gross investment production function in (1.4) and (1.5).
1.3.3 Pure Investment Model
For simplicity, in the rest of this paper I use what Grossman (1972a, 1972b) terms the pure investment
model, where an individual receives no utility from being healthy or dis-utility from being in ill health
so that U
￿
t+1 = 0.41 Increasing an individual’s health stock is similar to an investment good; an
individual will be able to increase wage earnings, due to increased time spent healthy, in future
40This means that changes in the relative price of reactive care over time can be offset by the technology effect of
more productive reactive care.
41This simplification was derived by Grossman (1972a) and has been followed by other authors who have modified
his original model (Cropper, 1977; Galama, 2011; Grossman, 1998; Grossman, 1999; Kenkel, 1994). I continue to use
this convention to allow my model to be easily compared to others, as well as for mathematical simplicity. Note that
this simplification will not alter the comparative statics derived later.
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periods. This means that (1.16) reduces to
πt
￿
r − W¯t + ρt+1
￿
= γPt , (1.21)
where γPt = (1− ρt+1)Wt+1Gt+1. Likewise, (1.19) reduces to
πt
￿
r − P¯Rt + νt+1
￿
= γRt , (1.22)
where γRt = (1− νt+1)Wt+1Gt+1. In (1.21) and (1.22), the only benefits to preventive and reactive
medical care are potential increased wage earnings from spending less time in ill health.
In the pure investment model, the marginal efficiency of reactive health capital (MERC) shows
the relationship between the stock of health of an individual (Ht) and the rate of return from the
consumption of reactive care, γRt .42 If I assume that r, νt+1, Wt+1, and πt do not depend on the
stock of health, then the MERC curve is downward sloping if
dγRt
dHt+1
=
dGt+1
dHt+1
< 0, (1.23)
i.e., if the marginal product of health capital (Gt+1) is decreasing. Figure 1.2 depicts a situation
where the marginal product of health capital is decreasing, and how the optimal level of health stock
is determined. The downward-sloping MERC curve is reasonable. Additional investment in health
will increase the amount of healthy days available to work, but at a decreasing rate.43 There are
exogenous factors, such as the health of co-workers, that limit the effectiveness of large-scale health
investments, making the assumption that dGt+1dHt+1 < 0 reasonable.
44
1.3.4 Changes in Preventive and Reactive Medical Care Over Calendar Time
Empirical evidence suggests that reactive medical technology has improved over calendar time while
preventive medical technology has changed very little over calendar time.45 For instance, Cutler and
42The rate of return is the potential increase in wage earnings.
43Investment in health is the consumption of reactive care and time spent on preventive care.
44Time spent cooking the first 500 calories of a healthy meal on a daily basis should have a large impact on the
stock of health. The time spent cooking the 1300th through 1700th calorie will have a smaller impact, as you are
pushing up against the daily recommended caloric intake.
45One method of purely preventive care for sexually transmitted diseases (STD’s) is abstinence. The productivity
of abstinence has not changed over the course of human history
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Meara (2000) present evidence that the decrease in mortality for low-birthweight infants, as well as
the overall increase in life expectancy at birth, is due to medical technology improvements. Similarly,
Jena and Philipson (2008) have found that each patient with HIV now lives 15 years longer than
they would have in the 1980s.46 The productivity of time spent on preventive care, however, has
rarely changed over calendar time.
For example, while expensive gym equipment can be purchased today, physical activity today is
not fundamentally different from physical activity 50 years ago.47 There has been no fundamental
change that allows an identical individual to burn more energy in an hour of strenuous physical
exercise in 2000 than in 1900. Durnin and Passmore (1967), the FAO/WHO/UNO (1981), and
Floud et al. (2011) estimate the energy requirements for various physical activities. The estimates
assume that an hour of strenuous physical activity in the 18th century is the same, for an identical
individual (same body weight, height, and BMI), in the 21st century. The authors assume that the
efficacy of physical activity, which is preventive care, has not changed in over three centuries.48
This suggests that, in general, technology improvements in preventive care occur over much
longer time spans than technology improvements in reactive care. Subsequently, I conclude that the
productivity of reactive care relative to preventive care, (1−ν)(1−ρ) , has increased over calendar time.
Denote t∗j as calendar year j where t∗j < t∗k ∀j < k.49 Suppose now that the productivity of
reactive care, (1− νt+1), increases over calendar time, so that [1− νt+1]t∗1990 < [1− νt+1]t∗2000 .50
The lifetime supply price of reactive medical care, πt
￿
r − P¯Rt + νt+1
￿
, decreases over calendar time,
which yields ￿
πt
￿
r − P¯Rt + νt+1
￿￿
t∗2000
<
￿
πt
￿
r − P¯Rt + νt+1
￿￿
t∗1990
. (1.24)
while the marginal monetary rate of return to reactive care in health
￿
γRt
￿
increases, so that
[(1− νt+1)Wt+1Gt+1]t∗2000 > [(1− νt+1)Wt+1Gt+1]t∗1990 . (1.25)
46Other evidence of technological improvements in reactive care can be found for antibiotics and cancer treatments,
to name a few.
47The types of physical activity may have changed. In the 18th and 19th centuries, physical activity was typically
accomplished through work tasks. Today, physical activity is typically accomplished as an alternative to sedentary
leisure activities.
48They assume that only characteristics of the individuals themselves, such as height and weight due to nutritional
changes, affect the caloric intake needed to perform the same levels of physical activity. For example, the average
individual in 1785 needed 2,600 calories to perform 3 hours of strenuous manual activity; the average individual in
1995 needed 3,200 calories to perform the same strenuous exercise, as he was taller and had a higher body weight.
49I refer to calendar year j as 1990
￿
t∗j = t
∗
1990
￿
while I refer to calendar year k as 2000
￿
t∗k = t
∗
2000
￿
.
50Suppose that this is an unexpected change by individuals. If this is the short-run, individuals will not have had
enough time to change their consumption of reactive care or time spent on preventive care. This means that the price
of reactive care will not have changed yet.
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As shown in Figure 1.3, both of these movements serve to augment the optimal health stock in any
period. Note that this is a partial equilibrium result; there will likely be changes in not only the
price of reactive care but changes in time spent on preventive care as well.
Based on empirical evidence, I assume the productivity of reactive medical care increases over
calendar time, i.e.,
[1− νt+1]t∗2000 > [1− νt+1]t∗1990 , (1.26)
which means that [νt+1]t∗2000 < [νt+1]t∗1990 . Likewise, I assume that the productivity of preventive
medical care has remained constant over calendar time, i.e.,
[1− ρt]t∗2000 ≈ [1− ρt]t∗1990 , (1.27)
implying that [ρt]t∗1990 ≈ [ρt]t∗2000 . I use the pure investment model, developed in (1.24) and (1.25), to
analyze how these changes in the productivity of reactive care relative to preventive care will affect
the consumption of reactive care relative to time spent on preventive care.
Proposition 1: the lifetime supply price of reactive medical care relative to preventive medical care
decreases between calendar periods.
Proof: see Appendix B.
Proposition 2: the consumption of reactive medical care relative to time spent on preventive
medical care will increase.
Proof: see Appendix B.
The result that the consumption of reactive care relative to time spent on preventive care increases
has important implications. It suggests that medical technology improvements will shift individuals
towards treating obesity and diabetes after they occur through higher consumption of reactive care,
rather than taking actions to prevent them from occurring. Proposition 2 can also help to explain
the result found in Hey and Patel (1983), that increasing the price of reactive care may increase
consumption of reactive care. I explain this counter-intuitive result by noting that the increase
in the productivity of reactive care may outweigh the percent increase in the per-period price of
reactive care.51 Then the per-period price of reactive care may increase but the lifetime supply price
51The explanation in Hey and Patel (1983) relies on a “utility gap” explanation, the difference between utility
experienced in a healthy period and that experienced in a sick period.
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of reactive care will decrease at the same time, leading to higher consumption of reactive care as it
becomes more effective.
Empirical anecdotes suggest that there has been increased consumption of reactive care over
time. Cholesterol lowering drugs, known as statins, are used to reduce high low density lipoprotein
(LDL) cholesterol levels as a reactive measure.52 Between 1988 and 1994, 5-percent of American
adults aged 40 to 74 used statins. This number increased to 23-percent of adults from 2007 to
2010, an 18 percentage point increase. For older Americans, aged 65 to 74, the increased was more
dramatic during this time frame; an increase of 29 percentage points (Kuklina et al., 2013).
More evidence suggests that the consumption of reactive care has increased relative to time
spent on preventive care. Barnes and Schoenborn (2012) found that between 2000 and 2010, the
percentage of adults aged 18 and over who were at a healthy weight, according to their BMI, who
were urged by their physicians to begin (or continue) exercise increased by 6.3 percentage points,
from 16.3-percent to 22.6-percent. For overweight adults, the increase was 8.6 percentage points,
from 21.9-percent of overweight adults to 30.5-percent of overweight adults. The increase was 12.1
percentage points for obese adults; an increase from 34.8-percent to 46.9-percent. Over the 10 year
time span, consumption of reactive care, in response to the negative health outcomes caused by
obesity, increased relative to time spent on preventive care (Barnes and Schoenborn, 2012).53 This
highlights the changing trends in reactive and preventive care shown in Proposition 2. To determine
the composition of this shift requires the use of comparative statics.
1.3.5 Comparative Statics
1.3.5.1 Changes in Reactive and Preventive Medical Care I analyze simultaneous changes
in time spent on preventive care and the consumption of reactive care at age t as the depreciation
rate of reactive care changes. Totally differentiate (1.2) and (1.20) with respect to the percentage
52Statins are almost never prescribed before a person suffers from normal cholesterol levels. They are typically
prescribed after diet, exercise, and other lifestyle measures have failed to impact cholesterol levels. Several factors
along with high cholesterol increase the chances of being prescribed a statin: inactive lifestyles, high blood pressure,
having diabetes, being overweight or obese, and smoking (Sweetman, 2009).
53Note that I am assuming that all of the healthy weight adults are exercising as preventive care, instead of being
urged to exercise in response to a preventable negative health outcome. This means that the result is likely an upper
bound. Regardless, this result helps to show that the consumption of reactive care, exercise in response to a health
outcome, namely obesity, has increased relative to time spent on preventive care.
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change in the depreciation rate of reactive medical capital, ∂ ln νt, which yields
￿
g
￿
P
￿
TPt (g)C
R
t −
￿
g
￿
R
￿
TPt
g
￿￿
PP −g
￿￿
RP

 ∂ lnTPt∂ ln νt
∂ lnCRt
∂ ln νt
 =
 Ht+1 ∂ lnHt+1∂ ln νt
0
 . (1.28)
Using Cramer’s Rule, I solve for the changes in preventive and reactive care to changes in the
depreciation rate of reactive care.54
Solving for ∂ lnC
R
t
∂ ln νt
yields, after some algebra,
∂ lnCRt
∂ ln νt
=
￿
g
￿￿
PP
￿
Ht+1
∂ lnHt+1
∂ ln νt
TPt
￿￿
g
￿
P
￿ ￿
g
￿￿
RP
￿− ￿g￿R￿ ￿g￿￿PP ￿￿+ CRt (g) ￿g￿￿PP ￿ ￿ 0, (1.29)
where, because of the linearly homogeneous gross investment production function, g
￿￿
PP < 0 and
g
￿￿
RP > 0. It can be shown that the solution for
d lnTPt
d ln νt
is
∂ lnTPt
∂ ln νt
=
￿
g
￿￿
RP
￿
Ht+1
∂ lnHt+1
∂ ln νt
TPt
￿￿
g
￿
P
￿ ￿
g
￿￿
RP
￿− ￿g￿R￿ ￿g￿￿PP ￿￿+ CRt (g) ￿g￿￿PP ￿ ￿ 0. (1.30)
Although the signs of (1.29) and 1.(30) are indeterminate, it is apparent that they will have opposite
signs. Similar to the findings in Pauly (1986), the consumption of reactive care at age t and time
spent on preventive care at age t are technological substitutes. Intuition suggests that ∂ lnC
R
t
∂ ln(1−νt) > 0;
as the productivity of reactive care increases, individuals are more willing to treat obesity and
diabetes after they occur. They anticipate that better medical technology will allow them to negate
the more serious health consequences of obesity and diabetes.55 Intuition also suggests ∂ lnT
P
t
∂ ln(1−νt) < 0;
prevention is no longer as necessary to maintain a long life when suffering from obesity and diabetes.
If I couple this finding with Proposition 2 then the consumption of reactive care must increase while
time spent on preventive care must decrease.56 This is one of the results of technological change on
reactive and preventive care envisioned in Hey and Patel (1983).57 Results in (1.29) and (1.30) are
the technology effect
This looks only at the technological effect of reactive care; there is also likely to be a price
54The full math derivation is located in Appendix D.
55Probably the most serious health consequence is a shortened life span.
56In other words, this corresponds to ∂ lnT
P
t
∂ ln(1−νt) < 0 and
∂ lnCRt
∂ ln(1−νt) > 0. As the productivity of reactive care
increases, consumption of reactive care increases while time spent on preventive care decreases.
57This is the result from a rotation in their function q (·), where q (·) is the effectiveness of reactive care; the
probability that, given that you are sick this period, you will be healthy next period.
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effect. As the demand for reactive medical care changes, the price of reactive medical care will likely
change.58 Allowing the price of reactive care to change means that (1.29) will change to
∂ lnCRt
∂ ln νt
=
∂ lnCRt
∂ lnPRt
∂ lnPRt
∂ ln νt
￿
TPt
￿￿
g
￿
P
￿￿
g
￿￿
RP
￿
−
￿
g
￿
R
￿￿
g
￿￿
PP
￿￿
+ CRt
￿
(g)
￿
g
￿￿
PP
￿￿￿
TPt
￿￿
g
￿
R
￿ ￿
g
￿￿
PP
￿− ￿g￿P ￿ ￿g￿￿RP ￿￿− CRt (g) ￿g￿￿PP ￿
−
￿
g
￿￿
PP
￿
Ht+1
∂ lnHt+1
∂ ln νt
TPt
￿￿
g
￿
R
￿ ￿
g
￿￿
PP
￿− ￿g￿P ￿ ￿g￿￿RP ￿￿− CRt (g) ￿g￿￿PP ￿ ￿ 0. (1.31)
This result suggests that the price effect can complement the technology effect or can offset it.
Similarly, (1.30) becomes
∂ lnTPt
∂ ln νt
=
g
￿￿
PP
∂ lnTPt
∂ lnPRt
∂ lnPRt
∂ ln νt
￿
g
￿
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P
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￿￿
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￿
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￿ ￿
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￿￿
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− Ht+1g
￿￿
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∂ lnHt+1
∂ ln νt
TPt
￿￿
g
￿
R
￿ ￿
g
￿￿
PP
￿− ￿g￿P ￿ ￿g￿￿RP ￿￿− CRt (g) ￿g￿￿PP ￿ ￿ 0. (1.32)
It becomes apparent in (1.31) and (1.32) that time spent on preventive care and the consumption
of reactive care may not move in opposite directions. It is possible that, if the growth in technology
is not sufficiently large, a large enough increase in the price of reactive care can decrease the con-
sumption of reactive care.59In other words, (1.31) and (1.32) state that the impact on reactive care
of a change in the productivity of reactive care is both the technology effect and an own price effect
ΞRTotal = Ξ
R
Own Price − ΞRTechnology, (1.33)
while the impact on preventive care of a change in the productivity of reactive care is both a
technology and a cross-price effect
ΞPTotal = Ξ
P
Cross Price − ΞPTechnology. (1.34)
The result that time spent on preventive care decreases while the consumption of reactive care
increases as the productivity of reactive care increases has important implications for rates of obesity
58Appendix D derives this; I will present only the results.
59This is supported in certain numerical illustrations. At times, the consumption of reactive care and time spent
on preventive care will both decrease. This will occur when the price effect for reactive care outweighs the technology
effect for reactive care. Note, however, that Propositions 1 and 2 will not change; these will still hold, regardless of
the magnitude of the price effect relative to the technology effect.
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and diabetes. It suggests that medical technology improvements will shift consumers away from
ex ante attempts to prevent obesity and diabetes towards ex post treatments using reactive care
to maintain life expectancy. Individuals will allow themselves to suffer from ill health with the
anticipation that they will be able to cure it later with more effective medical care.
Diabetes can be prevented ex ante through diet and exercise, or can be managed ex post through
diet, exercise, or medication. Table 1.3 shows that there was a 0.1-percent increase in the prevalence
of diabetes among both men and women between 2005 and 2006. Between 2005 and 2006, however,
spending on diabetes treatments increased by 14.5-percent, caused, in part, by a 5.1-percent increase
in the use of diabetes drugs during this same time period (Medco Health Solutions, 2007).60 This
suggests that reactive medical care is being used to treat the illness ex post.61 Over a longer time
frame, the incidence of diabetes has increased from 4.5 individuals per 1,000 population in 1996
to 8.1 individuals per 1,000 population in 2010 (CDC, 2013).62 This short-term rise in a largely
preventable illness suggests that the consumption of reactive care increased while time spent on
preventive care decreased.
Likewise, in 1997, 77.3-percent of Americans with diabetes used medication or pills to treat the
condition; this number increased by 3.7 percentage points, to 81.0-percent of Americans, by 2011.63
More significantly, 42.1-percent of Americans with diabetes used diabetic medication in 1997; this
number increased by 8.2 percentage points, to 50.3-percent of Americans, by 2011 (CDC, 2013). This
suggests a rapid increase in the use of diabetic medication, as the efficacy of diabetic medication
improves.64 Though Bolen et al. (2007) have found that not all new diabetic medications are more
effective than older medications, Modi (2007) finds that there has been technological progress in
home blood testing and insulin pumps, the technological advances most visible to individuals. This
suggests that individuals expect diabetes medical technology to continue to improve, driving changes
in the consumption of reactive care.
This evidence suggests that medical technology advances, which are readily observed by con-
sumers, induce consumers to substitute reactive care for preventive care. Individuals are more
60The relevant URL for this citation is found at http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/0706
/0706.news_diabetessurge.html.
61This increase in diabetic medication usage is not all due to new diagnoses in diabetes.
62The CDC (2013) presents estimates for both crude incidence and age-adjusted incidence. Results suggest that
the increase in the incidence over this time frame was not due to an aging population.
63Note that diabetes medication cannot be used as a way to prevent the onset of diabetes.
64For instance, second generation sulfonylureas, for diabetes treatment, are more potent and have better safety
profiles than first generation sulfonylureas. Likewise, there have been advances in home blood monitoring and insulin
pumps over time for diabetics (Modi, 2007).
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willing to suffer adverse health outcomes, such as obesity and diabetes, and to consume more reac-
tive care at greater expense in the future, while expecting that newer medicines and technology will
be more effective in negating some of the larger problems that these diseases cause. The next section
derives comparative statics on how these changes will affect the stock of health of an individual.
1.3.5.2 Changes in the Health Stock Affecting Obesity and Diabetes Using (1.2), I am
able to ascertain what happens to the stock of health in period (t+1) as the productivity of reactive
medical care in period t changes, given that time spent on preventive care and the consumption of
reactive care will change.65 Differentiating (1.2) and taking advantage of the identities in (1.4) and
(1.5) yields
∂Ht+1
∂ ln νt
=
￿
g − T
P
t
CRt
g
￿
R
￿
CRt
∂ lnCRt
∂ ln νt
+ g
￿
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P
t
∂ lnTPt
∂ ln νt
. (1.35)
Denote ΞRTechnology ≡ ∂ lnC
R
t
∂ ln νt
as the own-depreciation elasticity of reactive care (reactive care technol-
ogy effect) and ΞPTechnology ≡ ∂ lnT
P
t
∂ ln νt
as the cross-depreciation elasticity of preventive care (preventive
care technology effect). Using the cost-minimization condition in (1.20), (1.35) can be re-written as
∂Ht+1
∂ ln νt
=
1
πt
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ΞRTechnology
￿
PRt C
R
t
R
￿
+ ΞPTechnology
￿
WtTPt
R
￿￿
￿ 0, (1.36)
where R is wealth. Using the result that consumption of reactive care increases while time spent on
preventive care decreases, ΞRTechnology < 0 and ΞPTechnology > 0. The health stock will decrease as the
productivity of reactive care increases, ∂Ht+1∂ ln(1−νt) < 0, if
PRt C
R
t
R
WtTPt
R
> −Ξ
P
Technology
ΞRTechnology
, (1.37)
or the budget share on reactive care is large enough relative to the “budget share” spent on preventive
care, or when P
R
t C
R
t
R is much bigger than
WtT
P
t
R .
66 These worse health outcomes manifest themselves
as becoming obese or diabetic or suffering from more severe complications from obesity (e.g., heart
disease) and diabetes (e.g., amputation).
65Note that I initially assume that there is no reactive care price effect.
66Alternatively, ∂Ht+1∂ ln(1−νt) < 0 is likely when the consumption of reactive care is more responsive to changes in the
productivity of reactive care than the response of time spent on preventive care to changes in the productivity of
reactive care.
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If I assume that there is a price effect for reactive and preventive care, then (1.36) becomes
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∂ ln νt
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This allows the possibility for the health stock to increase if the consumption of reactive care and
time spent on preventive care move in the same direction.67
The decision to allow the health stock to decrease based on changes in the consumption of reactive
care and time spent on preventive care is a rational choice. Individuals sacrifice some of their health
stock and free additional time for leisure and work. This choice makes some individuals better off
and increases their utility. Consumers are willing to make a tradeoff between higher obesity and
more free time today, with the anticipation that more productive reactive care in the future will
allow them to cure their illness (at the very least, halt the progression of their illness and minimize
impacts on life expectancy).68
Individuals who are already in poor health, such as being overweight or moderately obese, or
who are low-income are likely to consume a large amount of their budget in terms of reactive care
relative to that spent on preventive care and satisfy (1.37).69 These individuals will exhibit ever-
worsening health outcomes over time, including obesity- and diabetes-related complications. For
example, trends in severe obesity, a BMI of at least 35, in youths aged 2 to 19 have increased from
1.2-percent of the population between 1976 and 1980 to 4.9-percent of of the population between
67This was not possible under (1.37); if both time spent on preventive care and consumption of reactive care increase,
then the health stock would decrease. Equation (1.39) allows for a price effect where both can increase and the stock
of health will increase. If the price effect works against the technology effect, however, (1.39) is much more restrictive
than (1.37), and it is less likely that the stock of health declines as the consumption of reactive care increases while
time spent on preventive care decreases.
68For the rare case of individuals having a discount rate of 0 (e.g., an individual who knows he will die soon and
has no heirs or friends to leave money or belongings to), this result will likely not hold.
69Quesenberry et al. (1998) find that obese individuals use more inpatient hospital services and have more outpatient
visits than those with a BMI between 20 and 24.9. Fontaine and Bartlett (2012) similarly find that obese individuals
utilize medical services more frequently than their non-obese or non-overweight counterparts.
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1999 and 2004, using the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES).70 This
suggests a rapid movement from being obese to being severely obese (Kelly et al., 2013). The
impacts of higher rates of severe obesity include the potential for other obesity-related diseases;
clogged arteries, cardiovascular disease, and diabetes (Kelly et al., 2013). Most importantly, over
this 30-year time span, youths who are in poor health are increasingly seeing worse health outcomes
in terms of higher obesity levels and the subsequent diseases that follow.71
The result in (1.37) also helps explain the difference in the prevalence of obesity, based on income,
in developed versus developing countries. In developed countries, obesity and diabetes are a “poor
man’s” diseases. Cutler et al. (2003), Finkelstein et al. (2005), and Singh et al. (2011) note that
obesity prevalence is higher among lower income and lower education groups in the United States.72
Obesity and diabetes are a “poor man’s disease” in developed countries, in part, due to low preventive
resources available to these individuals. Many low income individuals feel unsafe about exercising
outside in their neighborhoods, as high crime rates can limit the amount of time individuals will
spend exercising (Sallis et al., 1997).73 Humpel et al. (2002) found that neighborhood safety had
positive associations with physical activity in some studies and no statistical association in others,
though no negative associations were found. Sen et al. (2011) find that if a mother believes there
is a lack of police protection in an area, this has a positive impact on childhood BMI as she will
not let them play by themselves. This lack of perceived safety is coupled with reduced availability
of sports areas, parks and green spaces, and bike paths (Gordon-Larsen at al., 2006; Powell et al.,
2004).74 McInnes and Shinogle (2011) note that physical activity is less likely when there are less
parks per capita in a county, which is a concern in lower-income areas. There appears to be evidence
in developed countries that preventive care opportunities may be more difficult to take part in for
low income individuals.75 To maintain health, low income individuals must rely more on reactive
care, offsetting the burden of obesity and diabetes after they occur.76
Low income individuals show trends, over calendar time, of spending less time on preventive
70Other studies cited by Kelly et al. (2013) suggest that around 8-percent of youths are severely obese.
71This occurs because these poor health individuals are more likely to spent a large portion of their budget on
reactive care relative to that spent on preventive care.
72For Americans aged 20-64 from 1997-2006, 12.45-percent below the poverty line had diabetes, compared to 9.12-
percent for those above the poverty line. Likewise, individuals below the poverty line were on average shorter with
higher BMI (Floud et al., 2011).
73Note that the cost of gyms may not be feasible as an alternative to exercising outside for low income individuals.
74A movement from a high-poverty area to a low-poverty area is associated with a 50-percent increase in the overall
availability of these physical activity opportunities.
75Again, preventive medical care is time spent on a proper diet, time spent exercising, etc.
76This means that we should see a decline in time spent on preventive care coupled with an increase in obesity and
diabetes rates. Note that this does not mean that low-income individuals have adequate medical care coverage.
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medicine and consuming more reactive care. In 2001, 61.4-percent of individuals with income less
than $15,000 had spent time on physical activity. In 2010, only 61.0-percent of these low-income
individuals performed any physical activity. While exercise has declined, similar trends emerge for
the proper nutrition of low-income individuals. In 2001, 22.3-percent of these individuals consumed
at least five servings of fruits and vegetables, while the fraction declined to 20.6-percent in 2009
(CDC 2010). Miech et al. (2006) found that the percent of caloric intake from sweetened beverages
increased by 6.2 percentage points for teens in poverty aged 15 to 17 between 1988-1994 and 1999-
2002.77 Similarly, breakfast skipping has become associated with poverty.78 Between 1988-1994
and 1999-2002, the prevalence of adolescents aged 15-17 skipping breakfast increased 32.7-percent
to 45.6-percent for those in poverty; for adolescents whose family is not in poverty, the prevalence
decreased from 31.7-percent to 29.4-percent.
While time spent on preventive care for the poor has decreased, their health stock has similarly
decreased, even as the productivity of reactive care has increased. In 2004, 12.5-percent of poor
individuals had ever been told they had diabetes, increasing to 15.5-percent by 2009. Similar trends
hold for obesity; in 1995, 51.8-percent of the poor were considered overweight or obese; this number
increased to 66.1-percent in 2010 (CDC 2010). This helps explain some of the growing health
differentials, in developed countries, between the richest and poorest segments of the population.
Perhaps noting that their quality of life is not significantly affected by suffering these adverse health
outcomes, such as obesity, they may be willing to suffer marginal declines in the stock of health today,
to increase consumption of non-healthcare goods and leisure, to take advantage of more productive
reactive care in the future.
1.4 Numerical Illustration
I present numerical illustrations of the effects of continued increases in the productivity of reactive
care over calendar time on the consumption of reactive care and time spent on preventive care, using
(1.21) and (1.22). I then illustrate the effects on the stock of health, using (1.2), of a representative
individual over calendar time.79 The main assumption is that the productivity of reactive care
exhibits growth trends analogous to those found in Moore’s Law.80 I derive five scenarios; they
77Teens not in poverty had a 1.5-percent increase.
78Preventive care includes time spent eating meals at home.
79Descriptions of the values of the parameters used in the numerical illustration are given in Appendix C.
80This assumption is represented in Figure C.1.
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differ with respect to the change in the price of reactive care relative to the wage rate over time.81
Results are presented in Table 1.2 and Figures 1.4-1.12. All of the numerical illustrations find
that the consumption of reactive care relative to time spent on preventive care increases.82 Only
the first three numerical illustrations find that the consumption of reactive care increases while time
spent on preventive care decreases.83 The consumption of reactive care increases and time spent
on preventive care decreases only if individuals become poorer over time (reactive price inflation
outweighs wage inflation) or if individuals cannot predict how reactive care inflation will change.84
Note, in Figures 1.4-1.6, that the consumption of reactive care decreases initially. A likely
explanation is that, because this trend occurs early on, the productivity increases in reactive care,
based on Moore’s Law, are not enough to outweigh the increases in the price of reactive care.85 The
technology effect of more productive reactive care is not enough to offset the increases in price, the
price effect, from medical care inflation.
Note that when individuals do become poorer, as in the 1st and 2nd numerical illustrations, the
health stock decreases over calendar time.86 From calendar year 18 and beyond, the consumption
of reactive care increases while time spent on preventive care decreases. This is largely due to the
drastic decrease in time spent on preventive care while the increase in the consumption of reactive
care is smaller, year-on-year. This supports the findings that obesity, or a decline in the stock of
health, is a poor-man’s disease in the developed world.
The trends in the 1st and 2nd numerical illustrations seem to mirror the real world.87 In early
calendar years, the rapid productivity increases found in Moore’s Law have not occurred. As the
price of reactive care increases at an increasing rate, there is a decrease in the consumption of reactive
care, as the more productive reactive care is not yet worth it. However, at a certain calendar date,
society has hit the exponential growth trend for the productivity of reactive care as found in Moore’s
Law. These rapid productivity increases outweigh continued increases in the price of reactive care,
making it attractive for individuals to choose to consume more reactive care even as it is relatively
81A description of how the price of reactive care changes relative to the wage is found in Appendix C.
82This is the result found in Proposition 2.
83This signifies that the technology effect outweighs the own-price and cross-price effects.
84In this case, the price of reactive care does not have a set pattern (it is variable).
85I view these early calendar years as medical care in its infancy. This mild increase in the productivity of reactive
care, coupled with an increase in the price of reactive care, would not lead to individuals choosing to consume more
of it. Only after reactive care gets more and more effective do consumers increase consumption of reactive care, even
as the per-period price increases. This is when the price effect outweighs the technology effect.
86The consumption of reactive care and time spent on preventive care using the 1st and 2nd numerical illustrations
are found in Figures 1.4 and 1.5. The changes in the stock of health are found in Figure 1.12.
87This is where reactive care price inflation outweighs wage inflation, and where the consumption of reactive increases
while time spent on preventive care decreases.
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more expensive. This will lead to the expected health decrease society is witnessing as calendar time
increases.88
The 3rd numerical illustration presents results with varying reactive medical inflation rates and
constant wage inflation. On average, over the 30 calendar years, reactive medical inflation is 5.1-
percent.89 Importantly, I still generate the same trends; though both time spent on preventive
care and the consumption of reactive care initially decrease, after calendar year 18, the higher
productivity from Moore’s Law outweighs the oscillations in the inflation rate of reactive care, and
the consumption of reactive care uniformly increases at an increasing rate. Note the stock of health
starts to increase several calendar years after the consumption of reactive care starts to increase,
but only if reactive care is the major determinant for the stock of health.90 Note the implication;
at a certain point, as reactive care becomes exponentially more productive, the rapid increases in
the consumption of reactive care may positively affect the stock of health. The ability to cure
most sicknesses provides immediate, though potentially not long-lasting, health benefits. A relevant
feature of the fifth numerical simulation is providing evidence that the consumption of reactive care
will still increase even with a decrease in the inflation rate of reactive medical care. In this simulation,
between calendar years 18 and 22, the inflation rate of reactive medical care declines uniformly from
6.5-percent to 3.5-percent. The consumption of reactive medical care increases by 5.5-percent over
this time period. Even with this slowdown in medical care inflation, the consumption of the ever
more productive reactive care continues to increase.
Overall, the first three numerical illustrations support the conjecture that as the consumption of
reactive care increases and time spent on preventive care decreases, these may have negative effects
on the stock of health of an individual over calendar time. The 4th and 5th numerical illustrations,
in Figures 1.7 and 1.8, demonstrate what happens if an individual become relatively richer or if his
relative income does not change over calendar time. In these situations, both the consumption of
reactive care and time spent on preventive care will increase over calendar time, though C
R
t
TPt
increases.
As shown in Figure 1.12, this will increase the stock of health of an individual over calendar time.
These illustrations may be representative of two scenarios. The first likely represents the transi-
tion of developed countries from their agricultural origins.91 During this time, because of relatively
88For example, as we move from the 1950’s to the 2010’s.
89The inflation rate of medical care, over the 30 year time span, was never negative.
90If the consumption of reactive care and time spent on preventive care affect the stock of health equally, then the
health stock declines continuously over the calendar year range.
91In other words, the 4th and 5th numerical illustrations represent the changes in the Western world from 1800 to
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obsolete medical technology, it is likely that ￿P
R
t
￿Wt ≤ 0. As food supplies increased average caloric
intake in the U.S., individuals were able to perform more strenuous physical activity (Floud et al.,
2011). This, coupled with increasing usage of reactive medical care, increased the stock of health of
a representative individual.92 This explanation is likely only to hold before the exponential growth
trends in medical technology occur. The second scenario represents what is happening at the upper
income decile. From 1993-2012, the top 1-percent of income earners in the U.S. had real income
growth of 57.5-percent (Saez, 2013). Considering that medical inflation is rising at roughly double
the rate as the consumer price index (CPI), these top 1-percent of income earners would still have
significant real income growth of about 25-percent. Individuals at the upper end of the income
spectrum are willing to increase consumption of reactive care and time spent on preventive care to
capture these large income increases as long as possible. Though the 1st and 2nd numerical illus-
trations predict what happens to the majority of individuals in developed countries (ever-worsening
health trends), for a minority of the population (the rich who have remained rich over time through
wealth bequests), the 4th and 5th numerical illustrations seem more apt.
The numerical illustrations generated from my model also support widely established empirical
facts. Deaton (2002) finds that wealthier individuals live longer and have better health. Using
Table 1.2, compare the stock of health from the 4th numerical simulation (where the individual
becomes richer over calendar time) to the stock of health from the 1st numerical simulation (where
the individual becomes poorer over calendar time). An identical individual who becomes richer will
then have a higher stock of health and be able to live longer because he is wealthier; he is more
able to prolong his life.93 Similarly, Case and Deaton (2003) find that wealthier individuals spend
more on healthcare. Using Table 1.2 again, it is apparent that total spending on both preventive
and reactive medical care from the 4th numerical illustration will be higher than total spending on
both preventive and reactive medical care from the 1st numerical illustration. This supports the
empirical finding; wealthier individuals have incentives, over calendar time, to live longer. They will
consume more medical care to achieve this.
1950.
92In 1800, the life expectancy of the average male in the U.S. was 47 years; in 2009, it was 75.65 years.
93This will hold for any calendar year between the 1st and 4th numerical illustration.
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1.5 Conclusion
I extend Grossman’s dynamic model (1972a, b) to supplement existing theories to describe trends
over time in preventable health outcomes, such as obesity and diabetes. My model explains these
disease trends by improved reactive medical technology that reduces the costs of using reactive
medical care relative to preventive care. This suggests that individuals choose to mitigate problems
ex post with more productive care instead of preventing them ex ante. This means that individuals
will choose to offset health conditions as they occur, rather than engage in activities to prevent
health conditions from occurring.
The dynamic model assumes that the productivity of reactive medical care has improved, while
the productivity of preventive medical care has not changed over calendar time, an assumption
supported by empirical evidence. As noted in Proposition 1, the relative lifetime supply price of
reactive medical care to preventive medical care has decreased over calendar time. Using Proposition
2, this results in an increase in the consumption of reactive care relative to time spent on preventive
care. Using comparative statics, I find that Proposition 2 is supported; the consumption of reactive
care increases and time spent on preventive care decreases.
These changes have an effect on the stock of health of an individual. As the consumption of
reactive care increases while the time spent on preventive care decreases, an individual will be in
worse health when he spends a large amount of his budget on reactive care relative to preventive
care, or when P
R
t C
R
t
R is much larger than
WtT
P
t
R . This has important implications; in developed
countries, those who are in ill health (already obese) or who are low-income tend to spend more of
their budget on reactive care relative to that spent on preventive care. This may help explain some
of the growing health differentials between the richer and poorer segments in developed countries.
Individuals who are overweight may eschew preventive care and allow themselves to become obese,
in the anticipation that they can offset their choices in the future with more productive reactive
care. Although these populations will be more vulnerable to death from negative health shocks, this
possibility is outweighed by the increase in leisure time available by not engaging in preventive care.
Note that my model can also incorporate changes in the economic environment and their subse-
quent impact on an individual’s health. For instance, there has been a rapid increase in the amount
of sugar (or sugar-like) products placed in foodstuffs. These environmental changes can be measured
as changing the age-specific depreciation rate of the health stock, φt.94 By using this dynamic model,
94Other environmental changes may include pollution levels, war, or environmental disasters such as Chernobyl.
31
I am able to capture a wide variety of salient features that help capture the many ways that the
health stock of an individual can be impacted.
My model also acts as the mechanism by which previous explanations for observed health trends
can work; it complements existing studies. Previous explanations include the increased availability
of foodstuffs and decreased on-the-job caloric expenditures. Eating more pre-packaged foods today
may lead to lower health outcomes in the future, such as higher BMI levels or diabetes. Individuals
will choose to engage in less time spent on preventive care (in the case of other models, this is less
caloric expenditures on the job or increasing use of pre-packaged foods) because they understand
that they can offset the impacts of their decisions with more productive reactive care in the future.
Medical technology improvements allow individuals to take actions that reduce their short-term
health.
Previous explanations for the worse health trends in America fit neatly into my model. Individ-
uals realize that the future costs of their decisions will be lower as medical technology continues to
advance. Individuals are able to engage in more reactive care and are able to place less weight on
the long-term ramifications of their decisions. They expect that more productive reactive care in
the future will be better able to mitigate the consequences of their decisions. They can spend less
time on preventive care because they know that the reactive care in the future will be better able
to restore them to health.95
Numerical illustrations support my findings that the consumption of reactive care increases while
time spent on preventive care decreases. The stock of health may also decline, depending on the
specific functional form of the gross investment production function in (1.2); so long as reactive
care is not the major determinant in the production function, health will typically decrease across
calendar time.96 Though the numerical illustrations do not uniformly support my findings (such
as the 4th and 5th numerical illustration), they can be interpreted in a historical context or can
represent what happens to a small fraction of the population in the U.S. The numerical illustrations
also support well-established findings from Case and Deaton (2003) and Deaton (2002) that wealthy
individuals live longer and spend more on medical care.
95For instance, increased use of pre-packaged foodstuffs is a decrease in time spent on preventive care, as is decreased
caloric expenditures on the job not compensated by increased exercise expenditures. Changes in the rate of time
preference simply follow the notion that the long-term health impacts of decisions made today are lessened as reactive
care becomes more and more able to offset higher illness burdens. Individuals can choose to consume more of the
lower-priced food because the long-term impacts of higher obesity levels can be mitigated in the future.
96This simply means that, if the gross investment production function in (1.2) is Cobb-Douglas, that the exponent
for reactive care is not much higher than 0.75.
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Policy recommendations can be made to offset the declines in the health stock of the average
individual. Efforts may be made to increase the consumption of preventive medical care to offset
the increase in preventable illnesses. Certain medical technology innovations, such as widespread
genomic testing for traits that may signal future occurrences of illnesses, may allow individuals
to alter their behavior ex ante, through diet and exercise, and avert these future health shocks.97
Although medical innovation for reactive care should not be halted, increases in the productivity of
preventive care, such as improvements in genomic testing, can slow U.S. obesity and diabetes trends.
To counteract the increase in the availability of pre-packaged foodstuffs and a change in the
composition of the diets of Americans (away from natural foods to processed foods), some have
proposed sin taxes on sugar and fats. However, research by Goldman, Lakdawalla, and Zheng
(2009) shows that there are minimal short-run effects of a sin tax. McInness and Shinogle (2011)
find that sin taxes have no effect on the likelihood of any exercise, and have negative effects on
moderate to vigorous exercise. This means that people who are forced to become healthier in one
dimension from a sin tax, by eating healthier foods, likely reduce their behaviors in other areas to
keep the health stock at a target level. This means that any adopted policy to increase preventive
care in one area may simply be met by reductions in preventive care in other areas, yielding no net
health benefit to the individual.
97For instance, genetic tests signaling the presence of celiac disease may allow individuals to tailor diet and exercise
today in anticipation of the outbreak of future symptoms. This will allow individuals to not incur negative health
shocks or reduce the severity of negative health shocks when they occur, through a mis-managed diet system, if the
individual had little warning of future symptoms. Other applications may be for cancers, heart disease, and other
potentially fatal illnesses when they strike.
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Table 1.1: Prevalence of Diabetes over Time
Year Prevalence in Males Prevalence in Females
1980 2.7 2.9
1981 2.6 2.9
1982 2.6 2.9
1983 2.6 2.9
1984 2.6 2.9
1985 2.8 3
1986 3 2.9
1987 3 2.9
1988 2.9 2.8
1989 2.7 2.8
1990 2.8 3
1991 2.8 3.1
1992 3.1 3.2
1993 3.1 3.2
1994 3.3 3.4
1995 3.3 3.3
1996 3.5 3.6
1997 3.7 3.7
1998 4.1 4
1999 4.4 4.1
2000 4.7 4.3
2001 5.1 4.4
2002 5.3 4.6
2003 5.4 4.7
2004 5.5 4.9
2005 5.7 5.3
2006 5.8 5.4
2007 5.9 5.6
2008 6.3 5.7
2009 6.8 5.9
2010 7.1 5.9
NOTE: The prevalence of males and females with diagnosed
diabetes is the percentage of adults, aged 18+, who have been
diagnosed with either Type 1 or Type 2 diabetes.
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Figure 1.1: Prevalence of Type 2 Diabetes, U.S., 1980-2010
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Figure 1.2: Market for Reactive Medical Care
NOTE: This is the demand and supply for reactive medical care. The intersection of the curves
yields the optimal health stock.
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Figure 1.3: Changes in the Market for Reactive Medical Care
NOTE: The shifts in the demand and supply for reactive medical care are caused by an increase
in the productivity of reactive medical care, which decreases the depreciation rate of reactive
medical care (ν decreases). This highlights what happens as the supply of reactive care decreases
while the demand for reactive care increases, and the changes in the optimal stock of health.
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Figure 1.4: Numerical Illustration 1
NOTE: This uses numerical illustration assumption 1. An individual becomes relatively poorer
(price of reactive care increases relative to wage).
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Figure 1.5: Numerical Illustration 2
NOTE: This uses numerical illustration assumption 2. An individual becomes relatively poorer
(price of reactive care increases relative to wage).
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Figure 1.6: Numerical Illustration 3
NOTE: This uses numerical illustration assumption 3. The relative income of the individual
fluctuates (price of reactive care is volatile relative to wage).
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Figure 1.7: Numerical Illustration 4
NOTE: This uses numerical illustration assumption 4. An individual becomes relatively richer
(price of reactive care decreases relative to wage).
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Figure 1.8: Numerical Illustration 5
NOTE: This uses numerical illustration assumption 5. The relative income of individual remains
the same (price of reactive care remains constant relative to wage).
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Figure 1.9: Summary of Numerical Illustrations
NOTE: This figure plots all the changes in the consumption of reactive care and time spent on
preventive care using all five numerical illustration assumptions.
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Figure 1.10: Changes in the Consumption of Reactive Care over Calendar Time
NOTE: This figure plots all the changes in the consumption of reactive care using all five
numerical illustration assumptions. Reactive k refers to the consumption of reactive care based on
the kth numerical illustration assumption.
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Figure 1.11: Changes in Time Spent on Preventive Care over Calendar Time
NOTE: This figure plots all the changes in the time spent on preventive care using all five
numerical illustration assumptions. Preventive k refers to the time spent on preventive care based
on the kth numerical illustration assumption.
47
Figure 1.12: Changes in the Stock of Health over Calendar Time
NOTE: This figure plots all the changes in the stock of health as consumption of reactive care and
time spent on preventive care change, using all five numerical illustration assumptions. Health k
refers to the stock of health based on the kth numerical illustration assumption. This is based on
the health stock equation Ht+1 = (1− φt)Ht +
￿
CRt
￿0.75 ￿
TPt
￿0.25.
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2 Non-parametric Frontier Estimation of Health Care Effi-
ciency Among OECD Countries, 1993-2006
2.1 Introduction
According to Garber and Skinner (2008), the efficiency cost of the U.S. health system has been
estimated at 20 to 30-percent of healthcare spending, or 3 to 5-percent of GDP. America also faces
steadily rising health care costs as a percent of GDP per capita. According to the Kaiser Family
Foundation (2009), in 1970 U.S. health care spending was about $356 per resident and accounted
for 7.2-percent of GDP. According to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Studies (CMS, 2012), in
2011 U.S. health care spending was about $8,648.50 per resident and accounted for 17.7-percent of
GDP. CMS also forecasts that national health expenditures will increase to 19.8% of GDP by 2020,
where each citizen would spend over $13,000. Increasing health care costs over time could highlight
growing inefficiency within the American health care system. They could also highlight structural
changes within America (a worsening general health level, measured by such things as the obesity
rate), technological changes within the health care system (the increased usage of MRI machines), or
even behavioral changes within the American health care system itself (reactive instead of preventive
care).
The debate over the relative efficiency of the U.S. healthcare system is still not settled. According
to the Institute of Medicine (2013), even though America is one of the wealthiest countries in the
world, it is far from the healthiest. The report notes that life expectancy for men and women in
America is near the worst among developed countries, and the prevalence of certain diseases, such
as heart disease and diabetes, is much higher (Institute of Medicine, 2013). These rankings can be
misleading, as these health outcomes are determined by factors outside of health care. For instance,
a comparatively high rate of fatal car accidents and murders in the U.S. bias the life expectancy
number when compared to other developed countries (Pipes, 2013). Pipes (2013) notes how the
report from the Institute of Medicine states that the percentage of pre-term births is exceptionally
high when compared to developed European countries.98 The aggressiveness of U.S. doctors in
trying to save pre-term babies biases certain measures of health outcomes and can lead to observed
98The percent of pre-term births in America is 65-percent higher than that of Great Britain, and about double the
rates in Finland and Greece.
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differences in health trends across countries (Pipes, 2013).99 The debate about the relative merits of
U.S. health care compared to the rest of the developed world is still unsettled. This leads to the need
for reliable efficiency rankings to drive health care policy. Without the ability to derive consistent
efficiency rankings across estimators or datasets, policy may lead to more inefficient systems or
unanticipated results, which can lead to different health care delivery system outcomes from the ex
ante objectives for initiating change. This can also lead to method-searching, where policymakers
will choose the set of results that best support their stated goals.
This paper is motivated as (i) a re-examination of the original World Health Organization (WHO)
dataset using newly available non-parametric estimation methods that were not available to Greene
(2004), Evans et al. (2000), and Hollingsworth and Wildman (2003), to allow for comparisons of
efficiency rankings, (ii) an empirical analysis, using non-parametric estimation methods, to Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries only over a broader time span,
and (iii) a robustness check of minimal alterations in outputs used, with the same non-parametric
estimators, on efficiency rankings across countries.100 I find several results that extend the current
literature. First, compared to American efficiency rankings in previous studies, the efficiency rank-
ings obtained using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and hyperbolic order-α estimators differ
from those found using other parametric and non-parametric estimators.101 In fact, the estimators
used lead to ordinal rankings, based on efficiency estimates, for the U.S. that are better ranked than
in previous studies. Ordinal rankings using the DEA estimator between 1997 and 2005 leads to an
American efficiency ranking from 1st to 21st. The same data lead to ordinal rankings using the
hyperbolic order-α estimators from 4th to 7th.
Second, ordinal efficiency rankings may be biased by the inclusion of notions of equity. One
of the output measures used in previous studies (Evans et al. 2000; Greene 2004; Hollingsworth
and Wildman 2003; WHO 2000) incorporated equity into the measure. When looking at efficiency
measurements, the inclusion of equity will likely bias the results, since there is a known tradeoff
between equity and efficiency. Some of the output measures that I use have no equity components
99This occurs even though the U.S. neo-natal mortality rate has dropped from almost 95-percent in the 1960s to
about 5-percent today.
100I will expound upon why I use non-parametric estimation methods, compared to parametric estimation methods,
in the Literature section.
101As will be discussed in the literature and methods sections of the paper, there are benefits to using order-
α estimators when compared to parametric estimators: (i) both types of estimators have the same convergence
rates, which means that sample size limitations will have the same impact with both parametric and non-parametric
estimators; (ii) non-parametric estimators do not impose a functional form on the data like parametric estimators
do; and (iii) non-parametric estimators are able to use multiple outputs in the estimation, where many parametric
estimators are limited to one output.
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and therefore do not suffer from this tradeoff. It is important to disentangle the effects of equity
and efficiency, which will help minimize efficiency losses due to alterations of the health care delivery
system. Higher efficiency of the health care delivery system can then be used to redistribute resources
across individuals, using some notion of equity desired by policymakers.
Third, the 95-percent confidence interval for the efficiency estimates increases when we increase
the sample size to include all 191 countries and not just the 30 OECD countries only. This provides
evidence for the notion that countries not in the OECD are quite heterogenenous from the OECD
countries, and supports the idea that an analysis of health care efficiency (for the United States)
should use data from OECD countries only.
Fourth, I find that there is a general positive correlation in efficiency rankings across models
(if a country is more efficient in one model, there is a higher likelihood that it is more efficient in
another model). However, there is quite a bit of variation in this trend, which highlights potential
mis-interpretations of the rankings. This highlights a lack of robustness between efficiency rankings
in slightly differentiated models. Slight alterations between efficiency measurements (such as using
OECD countries only compared with all countries in the world) can lead to highly variable rank-
ings; this in turn can limit the effectiveness of any changes in the health care delivery system, as
policymakers can alter the underlying assessment to mold the results to fit their desired outcomes.102
Last, I find that productivity has regressed or stayed constant over the 1997 to 2005 time frame
for the OECD countries. Using a Malmquist Index decomposition to determine changes in produc-
tivity over this time span, the only country that showed no productivity regression was the United
States.103 This result (overall productivity stagnation or regression over the sample) mirrors the
results in Hollingsworth and Wildman (2003), who measured productivity changes from 1993 to
1997. In the former Soviet countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia) I also find significant
productivity regression. This highlights possible costs of structural changes that must be made due
to large-scale transitions in the economy and in the underlying institutions. These high levels of
productivity regression for former Soviet countries may be important for the United States in help-
102For instance, if the goal is to show how the United States health care delivery system is unfairly criticized, a
policymaker could estimate efficiency rankings, using a sample of 191 countries, to show that the U.S. is ranked 1st,
in terms of efficiency rankings (shown in Table 2).
103 The United States actually showed mild productivity improvement over the time frame. This result, however, is
not statistically different from no productivity change over the same time period.
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ing to understand possible shifts in costs due to any large-scale change in the health care delivery
system. The finding of general productivity regression may play a part in rising health care costs
around the world, due to various structural or behavioral characteristics of technology and actors,
Baumol’s cost disease, and each country’s population demographics.
2.2 Literature
The World Health Report 2000 (WHO, 2000) defines three intrinsic goals of the health system of a
nation to be: (i) to improve health, (ii) to be responsive to the legitimate demands of the population,
and (iii) to ensure that no one is at risk of serious financial losses because of ill health. Evans et al.
(2000) used this to present a rankings-based comparison of the productive efficiency of the health
care system of 191 countries. Non-parametric DEA estimators were criticized for their inability
to accommodate random variation in the data (2000). The preferred methodology by Evans et
al. (2000) was a fixed effects linear regression model, where the country-specific constants embody
technical efficiency, which remain constant over time.
Greene (2004) proposed several different alternative methodologies, including a stochastic frontier
model and a random effects model. Based on his estimates, Greene (2004) noted the large effects
that cross-country heterogeneity played in the rankings, and a large disparity in efficiency estimate
rankings among OECD and non-OECD countries. Hollingsworth and Wildsman (2003) likewise
extended the original WHO study, using both a parametric stochastic frontier estimator and a DEA
estimator to account for heterogeneity in the data.
Richardson et al. (2003) criticized the output measures selected by the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO), and the weights assigned to the output measures. The first output measure, Disability
Adjusted Life Expectancy (DALE), is a measure of healthy life expectancy, based on morbidity
(Mathers et al. 2000; Richardson et al. 2003). The second output measure, Composite Measure of
Health Care Delivery (COMP), is composed of multiple components. The five components for the
COMP output criterion are: (i) Maximizing population health (DALE), (ii) Reducing inequalities
in population health, (iii) Maximizing health system responsiveness, (iv) Reducing inequalities in
health system responsiveness, and (v) Financing health care equitably. Each of these measures was
given a weight, with (i), (ii), and (v) receiving weights of 0.25, while (iii) and (iv) received weights of
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0.125. Williams (2001) criticized the DALE and COMP measures for relying heavily on speculative
assumptions made throughout the survey and pointed out that many of the health care statistics
were interpolated (for the U.S., the only statistic that was not interpolated was child mortality).
Garber and Skinner (2008) note that cross-country comparisons of the efficiency estimates suffer
from structural differences in the countries themselves (i.e., obesity rates due to food consumption
patterns).
Greene (2004) noted that the OECD countries as a whole are significantly different from non-
OECD countries, and suggests looking at OECD countries solely. Kotzian (2009) found that, even
among the relatively homogeneous sample of OECD countries, differences in health care efficiency
were small. Berger and Messer (2002) constructed an analysis similar to that of the WHO, but
looked solely at OECD countries. They focused on a much narrower base of health care inputs and
outputs. The overall mortality rate was used as the proxy for health outcomes in a given year,
and aggregate health care expenditures per capita were used as an input. They included dummy
variables to control for country and year fixed effects, but their work solely focused on parametric
regression analysis. Berger and Messer (2002) argue that one of the most basic ways to alter health
care delivery systems is to change public funding of health care expenditures. It is important to
have more reliable and valid efficiency results so that policy implications of a reduced (or expanded)
public influence in the health sector can be more accurately analyzed.
2.3 Data
Data for this study include data used by Greene (2004), as well as data from the OECD and World
Bank websites, and from the Barro-Lee “Educational Attainment in the World from 1950-2010”
website.104 The data include observations from 191 countries from the years 1993-1997 and 30
OECD countries from 1997-2006. There are some initial problems with the data, and assumptions
must be made to make the analysis tractable.
I use two main assumptions for the data. Barro and Lee only observe data in five year intervals
for the average years of schooling found from the Barro-Lee dataset on educational attainment.
Thus, there are data from 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010. The first assumption is that the 1995 value
104The dataset is located on the internet at http://www.barrolee.com/
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will be the same as the 1997 value, and that the 2010 value will be the same as the 2007 value. The
other annual observations are linearly interpolated values of how educational attainment changes.
The unobserved values of other inputs and the infant survival rate are interpolated using the same
methodology as used for average educational attainment.105
The second assumption is that although two of the inputs are related (health care expenditures
per capita and percent of health care expenditures that are publicly financed), both should be
included in the efficiency analysis, which has not been done in the literature to this point. I find
that there is no evidence of a linear relationship between the two inputs if all data are included, and
a weakly linear relationship when the U.S. is excluded.106
I extend the original WHO analysis (Evans et al. 2000, Greene 2004), using the same input
(health care expenditures per capita, educational attainment) and output (DALE, COMP) measures,
but include one more input measure (percent of health care expenditures publicly financed). I
estimate hyperbolic order-α frontier efficiency scores for both output measures (COMP and DALE).
I also extend the analysis, using an expanded dataset with more years (1997 to 2006), using
different output measures and an additional input measure, using only OECD countries in the
dataset and estimators that were unavailable to Evans et al. (2000). The output measures I use
are the infant survival rate (infants who survive per 1,000 live births) and the fraction of years that
are spent without disease, disability, or premature death (1−DALY ) , where DALY represents
Disability Adjusted Life Years.107 DALY is a measure of both morbidity and mortality, a measure of
overall disease burden, expressed as the fraction of years lost (per 100 year life span) due to ill health,
disability, or premature death. This measure is an alternative measure of average life expectancy,
conditional on the disease or disability burden of a country (whereas average life expectancy is an
unconditional measure).108 Proposed inputs are health care expenditures per capita, educational
105This assumption is based upon the realization that, if we were to delete all observations which had missing values
(a non-interpolated data set), the efficiency estimates of both the interpolated data and non-interpolated data would
lie around the 45 degree line, which means that we can use either interpolated data or non-interpolated data. To
provide more data points, we use interpolated data. The figure to support this assumption is available upon request
from the author.
106These figures are available upon request from the author.
107Note that, instead of solely using DALY as an output measure, I also estimate efficiency rankings using life
expectancy (LE), eliminating some of the criticisms aimed at the DALE and DALY health measures. However,
including LE, as discussed earlier, leads to other inference limitations.
108This is analogous to looking at the survival rates of patients across hospitals, but not controlling for the types
of patients that enter the hospital for treatment. Thus, a hospital that is a cancer center will have a lower survival
rate than a hospital that specializes in GI disorders (due to the nature of the patients that come to the hospital).
Thus, what may seem to be differences in efficiency (due to differences in the survival rates) may simply be due to
heterogeneity among the patients, which any output measure (such as the survival rate) needs to be conditioned on.
This measure has its own limitations discussed earlier.
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attainment levels, and the percent of health care expenditures that are publicly financed.
I estimate efficiency for each country using the DEA and hyperbolic order-α estimators. I then
compare estimated efficiency (for any country) between any 2 years, decomposing changes in pro-
ductivity using a Malmquist Index. I cannot simply use the difference between efficiency scores in
adjacent years as a measure of technological growth, because the change in efficiency scores could be
due to a number of causes. It could be that there is the same input-output combination but different
technologies; the same technology but different input-output combinations; or some combinations of
different technologies and different input-output combinations.
One problem with the data is that, with at most 30 observations per year, and using two output
and three input measures, this will lead to perhaps substantial estimation error in the estimates.
The convergence rate of the DEA estimator will be slower than the convergence rate of parametric
estimators (Kneip et al., 1998). From Kneip et al. (1998), the convergence rate of the DEA estimator
is n−
2
(p+q+1) , where p is the number of inputs and q is the number of outputs, while the convergence
rate of parametric estimators is n− 12 .109 A second problem with the data is measurement error.
Much of the data obtained from the OECD is obtained from analyses conducted by individual
governments. Methodological differences exist and can lead to faulty conclusions when comparing
raw numbers.110
2.4 Estimators
Parametric estimators, like those used by Evans et al. (2000) require potentially untenable specifica-
tion assumptions or have other serious drawbacks. Stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), a parametric
estimator based on the ideas of Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and von den Broeck (1977),
involves estimation of a function with a composite error term. This composite error term consists of
both inefficiency and noise components, making empirical distinction between the two quite hard.
Likewise, use of SFA estimators require assumptions about the distribution of this composite error
term, often by a half-normal or truncated normal distribution.
109The convergence rate of my DEA estimator is n−
1
3 . With 30 observations per year, this is analogous to having
30−
1
3 = m−
1
2 observations, or m = 9.65 observations per year with a parametric estimator with normal root-n
convergence.
110The United States counts an infant exhibiting any sign of life as alive, no matter the month of gestation or size.
France, Ireland, and the Netherlands (among others) do not report live births of babies under 500 grams and/or 22
weeks of gestation (MacDorman and Mathews, 2009).
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Non-parametric estimators are often used by researchers because they do not require an a priori
specification of the functional relationship that is being estimated. Certain non-parametric esti-
mators, such as the DEA estimator, suffer from well-known problems. First, DEA estimators are
sensitive to outliers in the data. Second, DEA estimators suffer from the curse of dimensionality,
where the number of observations required to obtain meaningful estimates increases with the number
of production inputs and outputs used in the estimation.111 Alternatives to DEA estimators have
been developed which alleviate many of these problems. Aragon et al. (2005) and Daouia and Simar
(2007) estimate input- and output-oriented conditional quantiles of order-α. This involves estimat-
ing a partial frontier lying “close” to the true production frontier. The order-α estimator is not only
robust to outliers, as it allows some observations to lie above the estimated partial frontier, but it
achieves the classical, parametric root-n rate of convergence, even though it is a fully non-parametric
estimator (Wheelock and Wilson, 2009).
Unfortunately, having to choose between an input-orientation and an output-orientation leads
to an issue surrounding the order-α estimator. Relative efficiencies can be different when viewed
from either the input-orientation or the output-orientation and, as noted in Wheelock and Wilson
(2009), the choice between input- or output-orientation is often arbitrary. Wheelock and Wilson
(2008) offer a way out of this dilemma. They describe an unconditional hyperbolic order-α quantile
estimator that shares the advantages of the estimators described in Aragon et al. (2005) and Daouia
and Simar (2007), but which avoids the third problem of choosing the orientation of the estimator.
Using newly created weighted measures of health output, the estimates in Evans et al. (2000)
were roundly criticized for problems in the methodology and in the data beyond the choice of
estimator. For instance, 51 countries had only one observation for the five year period the study
measured, leading to probable bias in the estimates. Several authors (Greene 2004; Hollingsworth
and Wildsman 2003; Williams 2001) attempted to re-create the studies, using different estimators,
or by attempting to reduce the data problems inherent in the sample.
Since I am outside the context of a regression framework, the choice of direction function (input,
output, or hyperbolic) does not have behavioral implications as it does in regression analysis; I
thus use the hyperbolic distance function. This allows for input contraction at a given output level,
output expansion at a given input level, or a combination of input contraction and output expansion.
I have a vector of inputs, x ∈ Rp+ , and a vector of outputs, y ∈ R q+ , and define the production
111The curse of dimensionality is a well-known phenomenon suffered by most non-parametric estimators.
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set P as
P =
￿
(x, y) ∈ Rp+q+ |x can produce y
￿
(2.1)
However, in practice, P , the true production set, as defined in equation (2.1), is unknown, and so has
to be estimated from a random sample of production units, the observed data points Sn = {(xi, yi)}ni=1 ,
using the convex hull of the free disposal hull (Daouia and Simar, 2007). This estimate is defined to
be
￿PDEA,n = ￿(x,y)∈ Rp+q+ |y ≤ n￿
i=1
δiyi, x ≥
n￿
i=1
δixi,
n￿
i=1
δi = 1, δi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, ..., n
￿
(2.2)
The hyperbolic distance function is defined as
γ (x, y|P ) = sup￿γ| ￿γ−1x, γy￿ ∈ P￿ ≥ 1 (2.3)
where γ ≥ 1 . Since the true production set P in equation (2.1) is unknown, we replace P by
PˆDEA,n in equation (2.3), which yields
￿γDEA ￿x, y| ￿PDEA,n￿ = sup￿γ| ￿γ−1x, γy￿ ∈ ￿PDEA,n￿ ≥ 1 (2.4)
which is the hyperbolic DEA estimator (Wilson 2011). Consult Wilson (2011) for an in-depth
discussion of the properties, algorithm, and other features of the hyperbolic DEA estimator.
The efficiency scores that are obtained can take a range of values in the hyperbolic direction. If
γˆDEA > 1 the firms are inefficient, and could either expand output at the current level of inputs,
contract inputs at the current level of output, or both contract inputs and expand outputs. If
γˆDEA = 1 , the firms are efficient and cannot expand output production without increasing input
usage or cannot contract input usage without decreasing output production.
The hyperbolic DEA estimator in equation (2.4) is a full frontier estimator, which means the
estimator envelopes all data points in the study. The DEA estimator incorporates an assumption
of convexity of the production set (it is the convex hull of the production set). DEA is an extreme
point method, which means that each data point is compared to a “best” producer, which is termed
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the efficient producer. There are problems with the DEA estimator that make validity and inference
a problem. The problems include the DEA estimator having less than root-n convergence due to the
curse of dimensionality, the estimator having estimation error, and the estimator being sensitive to
outliers (Kneip et al., 1998).
A second non-parametric estimator that I use is the order-α estimator. The input and out-
put order-α estimator and its properties were developed by Aragon et al. (2005) and Daouia and
Simar (2007), while the hyperbolic order-α estimator and its properties was developed by Wheelock
and Wilson (2008). The hyperbolic order-α estimator is a partial frontier estimator. The order-α
estimator was developed as an alternative to the order-m frontier estimator, where α ∈ (0, 1] corre-
sponds to the level of an appropriate non-standard conditional quantile frontier. The choice of α is
continuous on the interval (0, 1] .
Wheelock and Wilson (2008) define the hyperbolic order-α estimator as
γα (x, y) = sup
￿
γ > 0|H ￿γ−1x, γy￿ > (1− α)￿ (2.5)
using the Shephard (1970) metric, where H(x, y) = Pr(X ≤ x, Y ≥ y) , which represents the prob-
ability that a unit operating at (x, y) is dominated (producing more output with the same level of
inputs; producing the same level of output with less inputs; or producing more outputs using less
inputs). I estimate H(x, y) by Hˆ (x, y) =
￿n
i=1
￿
I(Xi≤x,Yi≥y)
n
￿
, where I (·) represents the indicator
function. I estimate γα by
γˆα,n (x, y) = sup
￿
γ > 0|Hˆ ￿γ−1x, γy￿ > (1− α)￿ (2.6)
Wheelock & Wilson (2008) establish the consistency of the hyperbolic order-α estimator.
If γα (x, y) = 1 , the point is said to lie on the hyperbolic order-α quantile and is dominated
by firms with a probability of (1− α) (Simar and Wilson, 2008). Figure 2.1 illustrates an order-α
estimator. A firm at point A could contract inputs, expand outputs, and move to point B, and
only have a ((1− α) 100)% chance of being dominated. This is represented by the shaded area in
Figure 2.1. I also create a 95% confidence interval for each hyperbolic order-α efficiency point
estimate using a smooth bootstrap (Wheelock & Wilson, 2008). Some important properties of the
order-α estimator include the estimator having an asymptotic normal distribution and exhibiting
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root-n convergence, the same rate as parametric estimators (Wheelock & Wilson, 2008).
I use the Malmquist Index decomposition proposed in Wheelock and Wilson (1999), which helps
to determine changes in productivity, efficiency, scale, and technology over time. Malmquist Indices
are estimated using the DEA Shephard (1970) hyperbolic, output, or input distance functions. I use
the hyperbolic distance function because of problems caused when calculating a Malmquist Index in
the input or output direction. The problem is that the Malmquist Indices are calculated using DEA
estimates and, because of the way that they are constructed, the estimates may not have values.
This happens when, due to a technological shock that shifts the production frontier, the observed
data point may lie outside of the estimated frontier. When this happens, the DEA estimate will be
indeterminate and cannot be calculated. This problem occurs in the input or output directions, and
is eliminated through the use of the Shephard (1970) hyperbolic distance function.
The Malmquist Index decomposition proposed by Wheelock & Wilson (1999), between any two
years t1 and t2 , where t1 < t2 , is found to be
M (t1, t2) =
￿
Dt2|t2i
Dt1|t1i
￿
·
￿
Dt2|t2i,CRS
Dt2|t2i
· D
t1|t1
i
Dt1|t1i,CRS
￿
·
￿
Dt2|t1i
Dt2|t2i
· D
t1|t1
i
Dt1|t2i
￿ 1
2
·
￿
Dt2|t1i,CRS
Dt2|t1i
Dt2|t2i
Dt2|t2i,CRS
· D
t1|t1
i,CRS
Dt1|t1i
Dt1|t2i
Dt1|t2i,CRS
￿ 1
2
(2.7)
I define Dtj |tki ∀ j, k to be the hyperbolic distance function from the i th country’s position in
the input/output space at time tj to the boundary of the production set at time tk , while defin-
ing Dtj |tki,CRS ∀ j, k to be the hyperbolic distance function from the i th country’s position in the
input/output space at time tj to the convex cone of the production set at time tk.
Thus, the total value M = Mi (t1, t2) represents the change in productivity for the i th coun-
try between any two years; the value PE =
￿
D
t2|t2
i
D
t1|t1
i
￿
represents the change in pure efficiency for
the i th country between any two years (captures how the production input-output combination
changes); the value S =
￿
D
t2|t2
i,CRS
D
t2|t2
i
· D
t1|t1
i
D
t1|t1
i,CRS
￿
represents the change in scale for the i th country be-
tween any two years; the value PT =
￿
D
t2|t1
i
D
t2|t2
i
· D
t1|t1
i
D
t1|t2
i
￿ 1
2
represents the change in pure technology
for the i th country between any two years (captures how the production frontier changes); and the
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value ST =
￿
D
t2|t1
i,CRS
D
t2|t1
i
· D
t2|t2
i
D
t2|t2
i,CRS
· D
t1|t1
i,CRS
D
t1|t1
i
· D
t1|t2
i
D
t1|t2
i,CRS
￿ 1
2
represents the change in the scale of technology for
the i th country between any two years (captures how technology becomes flatter, i.e., the produc-
tion frontier exhibits more CRS, or becomes more curved, i.e., the production frontier exhibits more
VRS). I define M to be the Malmquist Index (productivity), PE to be pure efficiency, S to be
scale, PT to be pure technology, and ST to be scale technology. In the hyperbolic direction, when
the measures (M,PE, S, PT, ST ) take the range of values < (=, >) 1 this indicates improvement
(no change, regression) in the measurement. One problem with the inference of the Malmquist Index
is that, because it uses a kernel density estimator when bootstrapping values, it suffers from the
curse of dimensionality (Simar and Wilson, 1999).
2.5 Results
In Table 2.1, I highlight the different models I use to estimate the results. In empirical applications,
for the hyperbolic order-α estimator, a value for α much be chosen. Efficiency estimates seem to
be robust to the choice of α , as shown in Figure 2.2. Figure 2.2 plots the hyperbolic α -quantile
efficiency estimates for three values of α–0.8 , 0.85 , and 0.9–against each other; each panel compares
estimates of a pair of values for α . There is a similar ranking of countries across different values of
α due to the fact that most points fall on (or near) a straight line. I thus use a value of α = 0.90.
That these results seems to be robust with respect to the choice of α is seen in other studies (Daouia
and Simar 2007; Wheelock and Wilson 2004, 2008, 2009).
I compute order-α efficiency estimates for the countries from the dataset used in Greene (2004),
for each year 1993 to 1997. I present the results for 1997 in Table 2.2.112 The efficiency rankings
differ on which output measure I use and if the data are a more heterogeneous sample (use 191
countries instead of OECD countries only). My rankings diverge from those in Evans et al. (2000)
and Greene (2004). This shows that careful selection of the input-output bundles and estimators
used to measure the frontier is imperative.
In Table 2.3, I provide the point estimates and corresponding 95-percent confidence intervals for
Models 2 and 4.113 The 95-percent confidence intervals for Model 2 are nested within the confidence
112Efficiency estimates for all other years available upon request from the author.
113Point estimates and the corresponding 95-percent confidence intervals for Models 1 and 3 are available upon
request from the author.
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intervals for Model 4 in Table 2.3. Even though the rankings between these two estimates differ,
the results indicate that using Model 2 (OECD countries only) narrows the confidence intervals
of the efficiency estimates. This appears counter-intuitive, as more data should provide narrower
confidence intervals. OECD and non-OECD countries are likely to be two distinct heterogeneous
subsamples, however, and adding the non-OECD subsample to the OECD subsample enlarges the
confidence intervals for the efficiency estimates of Model 2. As Greene (2004) and Hollingsworth
and Wildman (2003) suggest, looking at the OECD countries only seems to provide a more accurate
depiction of efficiency rankings among those countries, by looking at a more homogeneous sample.
In Table 2.4, I provide the point estimates for Models 5 through 8. My estimates reveal no con-
siderable variation in estimated efficiency rankings across countries for the DEA estimates (Models
5 and 7), while, for the order−α estimates (Models 6 and 8), there is much more variability across
efficiency rankings. For the United States in Model 8, my results indicate that it used 84 -percent of
the inputs and produced
￿
100
0.84659
￿
= 118-percent more output than a country (perhaps hypothetical)
located on the α = 0.90 quantile frontier along the hyperbolic path from the United States.
The results in Table 2.5 indicate that the United States ranks 5th in efficiency in 1997 from the
efficiency estimate using Model 8, while, in 2005, the United States ranks 4th. In fact, the worst
ranking achieved by the United States in Models 6 and 8, is the ranking in 2000, when it ranked 7th
(out of 27 OECD countries that had observable data points), using 92.7 -percent of the inputs and
producing
￿
100
0.927
￿
= 107.9-percent more output than a country (perhaps hypothetical) located on
the α = 0.90 quantile frontier along the hyperbolic path from the United States. Thus, the results
indicate that the United States efficiency ranking, in terms of the hyperbolic order-α estimator, is
relatively stable across the time period observed.
I find that the efficiency rankings for the United States remain relatively stable over the time
period 1993 to 2005 using all models that estimate efficiency rankings with the hyperbolic order-
α estimator using OECD countries only. In general, the U.S. is in the top third for health care
delivery system efficiency among OECD countries. Note that the inclusion of non-OECD countries
significantly worsens the efficiency rankings of the United States (by inspection, it significantly
worsens the efficiency rankings of all OECD countries as well). This confirms the findings in Greene
(2004); there are large differences between OECD and non-OECD countries, and comparisons should
be limited.
Figure 2.3 shows a comparison of all order−α efficiency rankings in 1997, including those found
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in Greene (2004) and Evans et al. (2000). The efficiency rankings are from Models 1 through 4,
Model 6, Model 8, and Greene (2004) and Evans et al. (2000), but re-ranking estimates in the latter
two without the inclusion of non-OECD countries. What Figure 2.3 shows is that there is a general
upward trend in efficiency rankings. More efficient countries from one model tend to be more efficient
countries in another model. The spread of individual scatterplots are high, which does suggest that
there is still quite a high degree of variation in rankings across models, especially the scatterplots
comparing my results with those of Greene (2004) and Evans et al. (2000). This highlights my
earlier assertion that variability in rankings across countries may bias policy conclusions
In Table 2.6 I present the Malmquist Index for the United States using Model 9, between the
years 1997 and 2005. The results from the Malmquist scores I obtain support the findings from
Hollingsworth and Wildman (2003), who observed that productivity regressed during the years 1993
to 1997. For all OECD countries observed but the United States, productivity regressed from 1997
until 2005 (and even the United States’ productivity improvement was not statistically different from
1.0 , which implies no improvement in productivity). Consistent with Hollingsworth and Wildman’s
(2003) findings, productivity regressed across the entire panel of OECD countries by around 5 -
percent.
An interesting result seems to be the amount of productivity regression in the Eastern European
countries (Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia). The Czech Republic experienced regression of
11 -percent, while Slovakia experienced regression of 21 -percent. This may have occurred due to
the switch from a Communist-based economy to a “free market” based economy, which may have
led to higher costs in those countries in most (if not all) sectors. This may highlight the high levels
of productive inefficiency that are caused by significant structural changes within a country. This
result may be useful when examining any proposed changes to the health care delivery system in
the United States.
2.6 Conclusions
I examine the technical efficiency of health care delivery systems in OECD countries based on two
datasets. These results suggest that cross-country comparisons of health care delivery systems may
not be particularly robust, due to differences in ordinal efficiency rankings when using different
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estimators and different input-output bundles. Changes in health care delivery systems are based
on looking at differences between the systems, and choosing the more desirable aspects of other
systems.114 These policy proposals are meant to address inefficiencies within health care delivery
systems. Due to the variability in efficiency rankings in cross-country comparisons, policy proposals
should be derived based on results from an analysis of health care delivery systems within a country
(i.e., between states or different types of hospitals within a country).115 Though there may be
heterogeneity within a country, it will be less than the heterogeneity of political systems, cultures,
and behaviors in different countries. This suggests that efficiency rankings may be more robust
when looking within a country, and may provide a more stable platform on which to build policy
recommendations to alter the health care delivery system.116 It is likely that adopting specific
programs implemented in other states will yield results with minimal unintended consequences, when
compared to adopting programs from other countries. This suggests further research: to address the
notion that health care in the United States is uniquely inefficient, by looking at American health
care efficiency at the state level.
I find that there was general productivity regression across all of the countries observed, from
1997 to 2005, except for the United States, which is found to have no productivity change over the
relevant time period. There seem to be several potential explanations for this phenomenon. The
first is the age demographics in the countries. Due to the baby boomer generation, there is a much
larger percentage of the population that is older. The marginal life expectancy for an additional
dollar in expenditures is much lower than what you would see in a younger population. The second is
the increased spending on end-of-life care in developed countries. In many cases, end-of-life medical
procedures and care that are proposed are costly and will not significantly improve a country’s health
outcomes. It seems as if economic considerations of cost-benefit analyses are not met, meaning more
weight is attached to the moral imperatives of end-of-life care.
A third explanation is that there have been no large medical technology breakthroughs during
the observed time period (like penicillin or open heart surgery) that significantly increase health
outcomes, while providing cheaper alternatives (and sometimes replacing more expensive existing
114For instance, it is popular for policymakers to point to drug acceptance reciprocity in other countries but the
lack of it in the United States. They argue that this could reduce costs by “outsourcing” some of the acceptances to
regulatory institutions in other countries.
115Squires (2011) suggests that cross-national health care comparisons can guide policy. He uses a variety of summary
statistics to compare health outcomes and resources used to deliver health care within a country.
116In other words, if efficiency rankings within a country are more robust to changes in input-output bundles and
estimators, this provides more validity for the rankings and where policy makers should begin to address changes in
the underlying health care delivery system.
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technologies).117 A fourth explanation (which may be more unique to the United States) seems to
be the costs of healthcare providers protecting themselves from litigation (i.e., medical malpractice
insurance in the United States). This includes ordering multiple tests for a condition (such as both
an MRI and a CAT scan), which may not be needed, as a measure taken by physicians to limit their
exposure to litigation should the patient experience complications. A fifth explanation is the shift
from preventive medicine (exercise, diets, etc.) to reactive medicine (medical care after acquiring
an illness/injury, etc.) due to time preferences and reduced depreciation rates. This leads to worse
short- and long-term health outcomes, which means higher future health care costs. All of these
seem to be plausible explanations for the productivity regression that this study has shown. A
problem is that the higher health care costs do not seem to be compensated for by markedly better
health outcomes.
Note that, unlike the original WHO (2000) study, I incorporate no measure of equity into the
measurement. In the original study, equity was measured as part of the COMP output measure.
However, these equity notions are based upon subjective measurements which are both person and
state dependent. A country’s pure efficiency should be measured first and, only afterward, if the
estimated rankings indicate a high level of efficiency, should the notion of equity be discussed (as
there will be a tradeoff of efficiency for any level of equity). Another problem with the notion of
equity and fairness is that, since it is person and state dependent, there will likely be no consensus
in describing such a notion for any aggregated (national, state, local) health care delivery system. It
should be noted that the efficiency measured here are only efficiency scores, and say nothing about
the equity or fairness of any health care system.
I also find that, as shown in Figure 2.3, there is a general upward trend in efficiency rankings,
although there is considerable variation in each individual scatterplot. More efficient countries in
one model tend to be more efficient countries in other models. This means that, although there is
general agreement across models as to which grouping of countries are more efficient, due to the
variation in the cross-model rankings, it may lead to mis-interpretations as to which countries are
most efficient, and ones that other countries should model their health care delivery systems on.
Efficiency rankings across slightly differentiated models are not as robust as they could be, which
may lead to wrong policy conclusions.
117Advances in cancer and AIDS research, along with the introduction of genomic testing, may be a sufficient
technological advance in the coming years to forestall some of this productivity regression.
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Further research seems to point to the need for a study of efficiency within a country to reduce the
variation found in Figure 2.3. Such research can then be used to provide policy recommendations, to
pinpoint geographical areas or types of institutions (i.e., types of hospitals) that seem to be inefficient.
Likewise, further studies can be done to look at the possible explanations for the productivity
regression found in the panel, and see the validity of the conclusions drawn here. Further research
can also be attempted to measure the equity-efficiency tradeoff of healthcare, such as different
costs due to expanded healthcare insurance coverage in America. These can point to the social
costs incurred from reducing efficiency (to increase equity), and allow for more meaningful policy
discussions.
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Table 2.1: Explanation of Models Used
Model Outputs Estimator Countries
Model 1 COMP Hyperbolic Order-α Estimator OECD only
Model 2 DALE Hyperbolic Order-α Estimator OECD only
Model 3 COMP Hyperbolic Order-α Estimator All 191
Model 4 DALE Hyperbolic Order-α Estimator All 191
Model 5 LE, Infant Survival Rate DEA OECD only
Model 6 LE, Infant Survival Rate Hyperbolic Order-α Estimator OECD only
Model 7 DALY, Infant Survival Rate DEA OECD only
Model 8 DALY, Infant Survival Rate Hyperbolic Order-α Estimator OECD only
Model 9 DALY, Infant Survival Rate Malmquist Index OECD only
NOTE: All models use the same three input meauses: health care expenditures per capita; educational
attainment; percent of health care expenditures that are publicly financed.
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Table 2.2: Hyperbolic Quantile Efficiency Estimates, Greene Data, 1997
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Country Estimate Rank Estimate Rank Estimate Rank Estimate Rank
Australia 0.99590 16 1.01106 20 0.94149 9 0.95773 11
Austria 0.99808 18 1.00000 13 0.93073 7 0.93814 7
Belgium 1.00000 19 1.01201 21 0.97075 22 0.97151 18
Canada 0.99587 15 1.00886 19 0.96983 21 0.97156 19
Czech Republic 0.98116 9 0.97832 9 0.94448 10 0.97231 20
Denmark 1.01467 27 1.04918 27 1.00100 27 1.02087 27
Finland 1.00000 19 1.02899 25 0.94721 11 0.95343 9
France 0.99314 13 0.99450 11 0.92081 6 0.92081 5
Germany 1.00372 25 1.03257 26 0.98847 25 1.00000 24
Greece 0.90988 2 0.90988 2 0.91171 3 0.90988 3
Hungary 0.94974 5 0.97829 8 0.96760 20 0.99846 23
Iceland 1.00000 19 1.01433 22 0.96661 19 0.98045 21
Ireland 1.00000 19 1.00000 13 0.94083 8 0.96149 14
Italy 0.96087 6 0.95386 6 0.88978 2 0.89445 1
Japan 0.97805 8 0.97542 7 0.96032 18 0.94493 8
South Korea 0.92195 3 0.92195 3 0.98767 24 1.01903 26
Luxembourg 1.00217 24 1.02275 24 0.98898 26 1.00700 25
Netherlands 0.99640 17 1.00687 18 0.95796 16 0.96277 15
New Zealand 1.00452 26 1.01558 23 0.95180 14 0.97039 17
Norway 0.98653 10 1.00000 13 0.95145 12 0.96112 13
Portugal 0.83893 1 0.83893 1 0.91402 4 0.90563 2
Slovakia 1.00000 19 0.99386 10 0.95931 17 0.98933 22
Spain 0.96444 7 0.95318 5 0.91640 5 0.91569 4
Sweden 0.99579 14 0.99664 12 0.98358 23 0.96548 16
Switzerland 0.99156 12 1.00021 17 0.95147 13 0.95675 10
UK 0.98810 11 1.00000 13 0.95755 15 0.95834 12
United States 0.94177 4 0.93003 4 0.88791 1 0.92841 6
NOTE: The 1st 4 columns reflect the efficiency estimates and rankings for the Greene dataset using OECD
countries to estimate the frontier. The last 4 columns reflect the efficiency estimates and rankings for the
Greene dataset using all 191 countries to estimate the frontier. Efficiency rankings use the value α = 0.90 .
67
Table 2.3: Hyperbolic Quantile Efficiency and CI Estimates, Greene Data, 1997
Model 2 Model 4
Country Estimate Lower CI Upper CI Estimate Lower CI Upper CI
Australia 1.01106 0.95281 1.11681 0.95773 0.71070 1.35944
Austria 1.00000 0.92654 1.09998 0.93814 0.67284 1.30346
Belgium 1.01201 0.95415 1.12149 0.97151 0.75720 1.35403
Canada 1.00886 0.94530 1.11419 0.97156 0.74338 1.37031
Czech Republic 0.97832 0.88605 1.05448 0.97231 0.73720 1.38746
Denmark 1.04918 1.02613 1.19947 1.02087 0.85003 1.47591
Finland 1.02899 0.98433 1.16036 0.95343 0.69149 1.35085
France 0.99450 0.91795 1.08886 0.92081 0.64329 1.28512
Germany 1.03257 0.99195 1.16587 1.00000 0.79408 1.44062
Greece 0.90988 0.74673 0.92609 0.90988 0.60447 1.27458
Hungary 0.97829 0.88613 1.05552 0.99846 0.76455 1.47872
Iceland 1.01433 0.95973 1.12180 0.98045 0.76122 1.39680
Ireland 1.00000 0.92881 1.09601 0.96149 0.71779 1.37031
Italy 0.95386 0.83560 1.00942 0.89445 0.59152 1.20246
Japan 0.97542 0.87832 1.05077 0.94493 0.68851 1.32022
South Korea 0.92195 0.77416 0.94130 1.01903 0.84362 1.46699
Luxembourg 1.02275 0.97452 1.14328 1.00700 0.81813 1.43180
Netherlands 1.00687 0.94122 1.11472 0.96277 0.72089 1.35562
New Zealand 1.01558 0.95864 1.13328 0.97039 0.74067 1.37299
Norway 1.00000 0.92884 1.09993 0.96112 0.73657 1.33849
Portugal 0.83893 0.60724 0.77406 0.90563 0.60526 1.24729
Slovakia 0.99386 0.91675 1.08369 0.98933 0.78146 1.41378
Spain 0.95318 0.83376 1.00999 0.91569 0.62806 1.27359
Sweden 0.99664 0.92086 1.09395 0.96548 0.73233 1.36129
Switzerland 1.00021 0.92735 1.10112 0.95675 0.71192 1.36065
UK 1.00000 0.92978 1.09737 0.95834 0.70153 1.38395
United States 0.93003 0.78891 0.95488 0.92841 0.63297 1.30851
NOTE: The first 3 columns reflect the efficiency estimates and 95% confidence interval (CI) bounds for the
Greene dataset, for the DALE output measure only, using OECD countries to estimate the frontier. The
last 3 columns reflect the efficiency estimates and 95% confidence interval bounds for the Greene dataset,
for the DALE output measure only, using all 191 countries to estimate the frontier. Efficiency rankings use
the value α = 0.90 .
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Table 2.4: Hyperbolic Quantile and DEA Efficiency Estimates, OECD Data, 1997
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Country Estimate Rank Estimate Rank Estimate Rank Estimate Rank
Australia 1.00088 18 0.99618 11 1.00087 19 0.98605 13
Austria 1.00019 12 0.99970 16 1.00008 12 0.99910 21
Belgium 1.00155 24 1.00000 21 1.00155 24 0.99980 26
Canada 1.00140 22 0.99872 14 1.00137 22 0.99910 21
Czech Rep. 1.00040 15 0.99970 16 1.00040 15 0.98473 12
Denmark 1.00141 23 1.00020 27 1.00141 23 1.00000 27
Finland 1.00000 1 0.99749 12 1.00000 1 0.99586 17
France 1.00027 13 0.99990 18 1.00037 14 0.99930 23
Germany 1.00100 19 1.00000 21 1.00085 18 0.99938 24
Greece 1.00000 1 0.82592 2 1.00000 1 0.80365 3
Hungary 1.00383 27 0.98770 10 1.00383 27 0.88659 6
Iceland 1.00113 20 0.99990 18 1.00000 1 0.99491 16
Ireland 1.00165 25 1.00000 21 1.00165 25 0.99970 25
Italy 1.00000 1 0.97655 7 1.00000 1 0.97655 9
Japan 1.00000 1 0.98012 8 1.00000 1 0.99092 14
South Korea 1.00000 1 0.53747 1 1.00000 1 0.51168 1
Luxembourg 1.00033 14 1.00000 21 1.00013 13 0.99589 20
Netherlands 1.00079 17 0.99859 13 1.00055 17 0.98327 11
New Zealand 1.00231 26 1.00000 21 1.00231 26 0.99852 19
Norway 1.00040 15 0.99920 15 1.00040 15 0.99834 18
Portugal 1.00000 1 0.85018 3 1.00000 1 0.79954 2
Slovakia 1.00000 1 0.90385 4 1.00000 1 0.83186 4
Spain 1.00000 1 0.96066 5 1.00000 1 0.94043 8
Sweden 1.00000 1 0.99990 18 1.00000 1 0.99265 15
Switzerland 1.00000 1 0.98613 9 1.00000 1 0.90445 7
UK 1.00124 21 1.00000 21 1.00093 20 0.98134 10
United States 1.00000 1 0.97255 6 1.00130 21 0.84659 5
NOTE: The 1st 4 columns represent efficiency estimates and rankings for the OECD dataset, using output
measures infant survival rate and life expectancy (LE). The last 4 columns represent efficiency estimates
and rankings for the OECD dataset, using output measures infant survival rate and disability adjusted life
years (DALY). Efficiency rankings use the value α = 0.90 .
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Table 2.5: Hyperbolic Quantile Efficiency Ranks, U.S. only
Year Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 6 Model 8Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank
1993 8 6 - - - -
1994 6 6 - - - -
1995 6 5 - - - -
1996 6 6 - - - -
1997 7 6 69 98 6 5
1998 - - - - 4 6
1999 - - - - 5 5
2000 - - - - 4 7
2001 - - - - 6 5
2002 - - - - 5 6
2003 - - - - 5 6
2004 - - - - 4 5
2005 - - - - 6 4
NOTE: The U.S. does not have an observation for the year 2006. Rankings are based upon efficiency
estimates of all observed OECD countries within a year. Efficiency rankings use the value α = 0.90 .
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Table 2.6: Hyperbolic Malmquist Index, OECD Data, 1997/2005
Individual Components of the Malmquist Index
Country M PE S PT ST
Australia - - - - -
Austria 1.02908 0.99992 0.95732 1.00775 1.06678
Belgium - - - - -
Canada - - - - -
Czech Rep. 1.10871 0.99960 1.11356 0.99990 0.99614
Denmark 1.00528 1.00025 0.93500 0.99967 1.07526
Finland 1.02871 1.00000 0.97852 1.00235 1.04883
France 1.05073 1.00069 0.97251 1.00705 1.07214
Germany 1.09218 1.00043 1.04244 1.00043 1.04683
Greece 1.06182 1.00000 1.06554 1.00742 0.98917
Hungary 1.17740 0.99804 1.15510 1.04033 0.98171
Iceland 1.03262 1.00000 0.95986 0.99933 1.07652
Ireland 1.01962 0.99966 0.99847 0.99960 1.02193
Italy - - - - -
Japan 1.02496 1.00000 0.98123 1.00067 1.04386
South Korea 1.11049 1.00000 1.05870 1.08030 0.97096
Luxembourg 1.02485 0.99987 0.93241 1.00076 1.09845
Mexico - - - - -
Netherlands 1.00011 1.00052 1.00238 0.99691 1.00031
New Zealand 1.01455 0.99953 1.01482 0.99950 1.00071
Norway 1.04492 1.00041 1.01424 0.99862 1.03125
Poland - - - - -
Portugal - - - - -
Slovakia 1.21275 1.00212 1.13925 1.13852 0.93303
Spain 1.05906 1.00000 0.99935 1.01301 1.04613
Sweden 1.01725 1.00000 0.97418 0.99873 1.04554
Switzerland 1.00900 1.00000 1.01767 0.99765 0.99382
Turkey - - - - -
UK 1.03377 0.99907 0.94478 1.01094 1.08336
United States 0.99825 0.99870 0.96547 1.00285 1.03236
NOTE: The Malmquist Index (M) is defined for the OECD dataset, between the years 1997 and 2005,
using output measures disability adjusted life years (DALY) and infant survival rate. PE refers to pure
efficiency; S refers to scale; PT refers to pure technology; ST refers to scale technology.
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Figure 2.1: Graphical Representation of Hyperbolic Order-α Estimator
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Figure 2.2: Comparison of Different Values of α, Model 8, 1997
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Figure 2.3: Comparison of Hyperbolic Order-α Efficiency Rankings, 1997
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3 Non-parametric Frontier Estimation of Health Care Effi-
ciency Among US States, 2002-2008
3.1 Introduction
According to Garber and Skinner (2008), the efficiency cost of the U.S. health system has been
estimated at 20 to 30-percent of healthcare spending, or 3 to 5-percent of GDP. America also faces
steadily rising health care costs as a percent of GDP per capita. According to the Kaiser Family
Foundation (2009), in 1970 U.S. health care spending was about $75 billion, or $356 per resident,
and accounted for 7.2-percent of GDP. According to the Center for Medicaid Studies (CMS, 2012),
in 2011 U.S. health care spending was about $2.75 trillion, or $8,648.50 per resident, and accounted
for 17.7-percent of GDP. CMS also forecasts that national health expenditures will increase to 19.8-
percent of GDP by 2020, where each citizen would spend over $13,000. These numbers highlight
the fact that health care costs have increased dramatically since 1970. In part, this could highlight
growing inefficiency within the American health care system. It could also highlight structural
changes within America (a worsening general health level, measured by such things as the obesity
rate) or even behavioral changes within the American health care system itself (reactive instead of
preventive care).
This leads to the need for reliable efficiency rankings to drive health care policy. Without the
ability to derive consistent efficiency rankings across estimators or datasets, policy may lead to
unanticipated results.
This paper is motivated as an extension of one of the conclusions of Gearhart (2013a), namely
that health care efficiency should be driven on the intensive margin (within a country) rather than
on the extensive margin (across countries), using non-parametric estimators to determine efficiency
rankings across U.S. states from 2002 to 2008. Using both hyperbolic Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA) and hyperbolic order−α estimators, I determine efficiency rankings across U.S. states across
a broad range of input and output combinations.
I find several results that extend the current literature. First, I find that efficiency rankings are
robust with respect to minor alterations in the input-output combination (taking out one input,
adding one output that was previously an input, etc.), and less robust with respect to wholesale
changes in the input-output bundles used. This means that policy driven by state-level health care
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efficiency rankings may not be sensitive to limited model choice changes by the researcher. This
supports the conclusion of Gearhart (2013a), that health care reform should be driven based on
results from the intensive margin rather than on the extensive margin. Due to the variability of the
efficiency rankings that can exist based on large changes in input-output bundles, care should be
taken to find an optimal input-output bundle that satisfies theoretical considerations and allows for
widespread empirical testing. This may mean using widely available statistics that are collected, for
each state, for each year.118
Second, I find that, in certain specifications, Massachusetts has shown significant productivity
improvement from 2005 to 2008. Over this period, there was an exogenous change in the structure
health care sector, due to health care reform in 2006.119 This established a system to require
individuals (with few exceptions) to obtain health insurance. It also included other key provisions
that changed the composition of the sector in Massachusetts. This could highlight the benefits to
be gained by reforming our current health care delivery system or it could represent ex ante changes
by individuals in Massachusetts.
Third, I find that, in certain specifications, most states in the United States show productivity
improvement from 2005 to 2008. This corresponds to the results in Gearhart (2013a), who found no
productivity regression in the United States in a cross-country comparison of health care delivery
system. In other specifications, over the 2002 to 2007 time period, most states showed productivity
regression , which does not correspond to the results in Gearhart (2013a). It seems as if careful
specification of the input-output bundles used must be taken into consideration when looking at
changes of productivity over time to develop policy.
Fourth, I find that there is no general correlation between efficiency rankings and per capita
health care expenditures in the same year. States are more likely to have more efficient health care
delivery systems with lower per capita health care expenditures in models (a) and (c); in models
(b) and (e), states are more likely to have less efficient health care delivery systems with lower per
capita health care expenditures. Since health care reform in the U.S. has been predicated on cost
containment, it is not clear that cost containment will improve efficiency outcomes. In certain cases,
118This may mean using average life expectancy instead of using a life expectancy measure that incorporates mor-
bidity and ill health, which may not be as widely available across state, or which may be calculated based on different
data collection systems.
119 This was Chapter 58 of the Acts of 2006 in Massachusetts.
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cost containment may worsen health care efficiency.
I also find that other policy concerns may affect state health care efficiency. In models (a)-(c),
higher obesity rates and lower self-reported exercise rates lead to less efficient health care delivery
systems. Model (e) finds the opposite; higher obesity rates and lower self-reported exercise rates
leads to more efficient health care delivery systems. Both outcomes have plausible interpretations,
maximizing the importance to derive an unambiguous preferred model to drive state health care
efficiency rankings.120
3.2 Literature
The World Health Report 2000 (WHO, 2000) defines three intrinsic goals of the health system of a
nation to be: (i) to improve health, (ii) to be responsive to the legitimate demands of the population,
and (iii) to ensure that no one is at risk of serious financial losses because of ill health. Evans et al.
(2000) used this to present a rankings-based comparison of the productive efficiency of the health
care system of 191 countries. Non-parametric DEA estimators were criticized for their inability
to accommodate random variation in the data (2000). The preferred methodology by Evans et
al. (2000) was a fixed effects linear regression model, where the country-specific constants embody
technical efficiency, which remain constant over time.
Using newly created weighted measures of health output, the estimates in Evans et al. (2000)
were roundly criticized for problems in the methodology and in the data. For instance, 51 countries
had only one observation for the five year period the study measured, leading to probable bias in
the estimates. Several authors (Greene 2004; Hollingsworth and Wildsman 2003; Williams 2001)
attempted to re-create the studies, using different estimators, or by attempting to reduce the data
problems inherent in the sample.
Greene (2004) proposed several different alternative methodologies, including a stochastic frontier
model and a random effects model. Based on his estimates, Greene (2004) noted the large effects
120For instance, higher obesity rates and lower self-reported exercise rates would lead to less efficient health care
delivery systems because it would require residents to utilize more medical care to obtain the same level of health.
Higher obesity rates and lower self-reported exercise rates would lead to more efficient health care delivery systems
using a story similar to Gearhart (2013b). Residents are more willing to exercise less and accumulate higher rates
of obesity, with all the attendant health outcomes, because the health care delivery system in that state is widely
recognized as having state-of-the-art medical technology; it is able to cure these ailments using relatively few resources
(highly efficient).
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that cross-country heterogeneity played in the rankings, and a large disparity in efficiency estimate
rankings among OECD and non-OECD countries. Hollingsworth and Wildsman (2003) likewise
extended the original WHO study, using both a parametric stochastic frontier estimator and a
DEA estimator to account for heterogeneity in the data. Gearhart (2013) further extended the
results using newer non-parametric estimators and an extended dataset, focusing on a longer time
frame and on OECD countries only. He found that efficiency rankings differed from those found in
earlier studies. In fact, the United States ranked first in several years, providing more evidence that
efficiency rankings across countries are sensitive to the choice of estimator used.
There were other methodological criticisms of the original WHO (2000) study. Richardson et
al. (2003) criticized the output measures selected by the World Health Organization (WHO), and
the weights assigned to the output measures. The first output measure, Disability Adjusted Life
Expectancy (DALE), is a measure of healthy life expectancy, based on morbidity (Mathers et al.
2000; Richardson et al. 2003). The second output measure, Composite Measure of Health Care
Delivery (COMP), is composed of multiple components. The five components for the COMP output
criterion are: (i) Maximizing population health (DALE), (ii) Reducing inequalities in population
health, (iii) Maximizing health system responsiveness, (iv) Reducing inequalities in health system
responsiveness, and (v) Financing health care equitably. Each of these measures was given a weight,
with (i), (ii), and (v) receiving weights of 0.25, while (iii) and (iv) received weights of 0.125. Williams
(2001) criticized the DALE and COMPmeasures for relying heavily on speculative assumptions made
throughout the survey and pointed out that many of the health care statistics were interpolated (for
the U.S., the only statistic that was not interpolated was child mortality). Garber and Skinner (2008)
note that cross-country comparisons of the efficiency estimates suffer from structural differences in
the countries themselves (i.e., obesity rates due to food consumption patterns).
Greene (2004) noted that the OECD countries as a whole are significantly different from non-
OECD countries, and suggests looking at OECD countries solely. Kotzian (2009) found that, even
among the relatively homogeneous sample of OECD countries, differences in health care efficiency
were small. Berger and Messer (2002) constructed an analysis similar to that of the WHO, but
looked solely at OECD countries. They focused on a much narrower base of health care inputs and
outputs. The overall mortality rate was used as the proxy for health outcomes in a given year,
and aggregate health care expenditures per capita were used as an input. They included dummy
variables to control for country and year fixed effects, but their work solely focused on parametric
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regression analysis. Berger and Messer (2002) argue that one of the most basic ways to alter health
care delivery systems is to change the public funding of health care expenditures.
Gearhart (2013a) hypothesized that cross-country health care efficiency rankings should not
be used as the primary tool to drive reform and policy. Efficiency rankings across countries are
sensitive to the choice of input-output combinations and estimator used, which can lead to differing
policy prescriptions if the rankings are used to reform the health care sector. He also hypothesized
that differences in data collection across countries (for example, how infant mortality rates are
calculated in the United States compared with France) may bias the results, supported by findings
in MacDorman and Mathews (2009). Gearhart (2013a) argued that, for policy prescriptions based
on efficiency rankings, one should look within a country, by looking at efficiency rankings between
individual states or localities, instead across countries. This has been done on a limited basis; each
year since 1990 the United Health Foundation publishes a report on the rankings of U.S. states, called
America’s Health Rankings, based on 24 measures. This comprises sixteen determinants (inputs)
and eight outcomes (outputs). Each of the 24 measures has a weight attached to it that measures its
significance in the health of a state.121 This report has helped create a baseline for the discussion of
health care rankings in the United States, though it is not a statistical analysis. Erwin et al. (2011)
find that some state health officials take note of the rankings and, importantly, use them in decision
making on public policy, highlighting the need for consistent estimates.122 Kindig et al. (2008) note
that many of the health rankings done by states and localities suffer from data and weighting issues,
as well as a lack of clearly quantifiable and achievable outcomes.123
3.3 Data
Data for this study come from the 2010 Census Statistical Abstract, the Center for Disease Control
(CDC) “Health, US, 2010” research publication, Kaiser State Health Facts, and from the Measure
of America website, which aggregates its data from a wide variety of sources (such as the American
121For example, smoking, which is a determinant, accounts for 7.5-percent of the total health score for a state.
122Peppard et al. (2003) find that county health officers utilize more localized versions of health care ranking reports,
such as the Wisconsin County Health Rankings. These were developed as a more micro-level version of America’s
Health Rankings.
123For instance, America’s Health Rankings uses binge drinking as a determinant of public health. While it affects
the health population of a state, it is likely not something that can be used effectively by state health officials to guide
policy.
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Community Survey (ACS), National Center for Education Statistics, etc.).124 The data from the
2011 Census Statistical abstract, the CDC “Health, US, 2010” research publication, and Kaiser State
Health Facts are aggregated into one dataset (dataset (1)). Dataset (1) includes observations from
all 50 states and the District of Columbia (DC) from the years 2002-2007. The data from the
Measure of America website comprises the second dataset used (dataset (2)). Dataset (2) includes
observations from all 50 states and DC in the years 2005 and 2008. Using both aggregated datasets,
I compile several different input-output bundles, which are described in detail in Table 3.1. Table
3.2 provides definitions for the input-output variables.
I estimate efficiency for each state using the hyperbolic DEA and hyperbolic order-α estimators.
I then compare estimated efficiency (for any state) between any 2 years, decomposing changes in
productivity using a Malmquist Index. I cannot simply use the difference between efficiency scores in
adjacent years as a measure of technological growth, because the change in efficiency scores could be
due to a number of causes. It could be that there is the same input-output combination but different
technologies; the same technology but different input-output combinations; or some combinations of
different technologies and different input-output combinations.
One problem with the data is that, with at most 51 observations per year, and using two to three
output and three to five input measures, this will lead to perhaps substantial estimation error in the
estimates. Thus, the convergence rate of the DEA estimator will be slower than the convergence
rate of parametric estimators (Kneip et al., 1998). From Kneip et al. (1998), the convergence rate
of the DEA estimator is n−
2
(p+q+1) , where p is the number of inputs and q is the number of outputs,
while the convergence rate of parametric estimators is n− 12 .125 A second problem with the data is
one of the proposed output measures. I use life expectancy as an output measure in several models.
One deficiency using life expectancy is that it is an unconditional measure, and does not take into
account quality of life.126
There is no suitable conditional measure of life expectancy calculated for each state as it is
for each country by the WHO, something which also affects America’s Health Rankings between
124The dataset is located on the internet at http://www.measureofamerica.org/
125The convergence rates of the DEA estimator will run from n−
1
3 to n−
1
4 . This is analogous to having 51−
1
4 = m−
1
2 ,
or m = 7.14, to 51−
1
3 = m−
1
2 , or m = 13.75, observations per year with a parametric estimator.
126This is analogous to looking at the survival rates of patients across hospitals, but not controlling for the types of
patients that enter the hospital for treatment. Thus, a hospital that is a cancer center will have a lower survival rate
than a hospital that specializes in GI disorders. What may seem to be differences in efficiency (due to differences in
the survival rates) may simply be due to heterogeneity among the patients, which any output measure (such as the
survival rate) needs to be conditioned on.
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2002 and 2008.127 This means that efficiency rankings may be biased. For instance, one state
may appear to be more efficient than another, simply because life expectancy is higher in the other
country. Without correcting for some measure of quality of life, the outcome may be deceiving. Even
though life expectancy may be longer, if the quality of life is lower (for instance, sizable amounts of
the population have low qualities of life; e.g., a vegetative state), we may falsely conclude that the
state with a longer life expectancy is more efficient, and apply erroneous policy conclusions from
this.
3.4 Estimators
Parametric estimators, like those used by Evans et al. (2000) require potentially untenable specifica-
tion assumptions or have other serious drawbacks. Stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), a parametric
estimator based on the ideas of Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and von den Broeck (1977),
involves estimation of a function with a composite error term. This composite error term consists of
both inefficiency and noise components, making empirical distinction between the two quite hard.
Likewise, use of SFA estimators require assumptions about the distribution of this composite error
term, often by a half-normal or truncated normal distribution.
Non-parametric estimators are often used by researchers because they do not require an a priori
specification of the functional relationship that is being estimated. Certain non-parametric esti-
mators, such as the DEA estimator, suffer from well-known problems. First, DEA estimators are
sensitive to outliers in the data. Second, DEA estimators suffer from the curse of dimensionality,
where the number of observations required to obtain meaningful estimates increases with the num-
ber of production inputs and outputs used in the estimation.128 Alternatives to DEA estimators
have been developed which alleviate many of these problems. Aragon et al. (2005) and Daouia and
Simar (2007) estimate input- and output-oriented conditional quantiles of order-α. This involves
estimating a partial frontier lying “close” to the true production frontier. The order-α estimator is
not only robust to outliers, as it allows some observations to lie above the estimated partial frontier,
but it achieves the classical, parametric root-n rate of convergence, even though it is a fully non-
127Note, however, there are subjective limitations using available life expectancy measures that take into account
morbidity and ill health that do not make these measures strictly better than a simple measure of average life
expectancy.
128The curse of dimensionality is a well-known phenomenon suffered by most non-parametric estimators.
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parametric estimator (Wheelock and Wilson, 2009). This means that the order-α estimator does
not suffer from the curse of dimensionality.
Unfortunately, having to choose between an input-orientation and an output-orientation leads
to an issue surrounding the order-α estimator. Relative efficiencies can be different when viewed
from either the input-orientation or the output-orientation and, as noted in Wheelock and Wilson
(2009), the choice between input- or output-orientation is often arbitrary. Wheelock and Wilson
(2008) offer a way out of this dilemma. They describe an unconditional hyperbolic order-α quantile
estimator that shares the advantages of the estimators described in Aragon et al. (2005) and Daouia
and Simar (2007), but which avoids the third problem of choosing the orientation of the estimator.
Since I am outside the context of a regression framework, the choice of direction function (input,
output, or hyperbolic) does not have behavioral implications as it does in regression analysis; I
thus use the hyperbolic distance function. This allows for input contraction at a given output level,
output expansion at a given input level, or a combination of input contraction and output expansion.
I have a vector of inputs, x ∈ Rp+ , and a vector of outputs, y ∈ R q+ , and define the production
set P as
P =
￿
(x, y) ∈ Rp+q+ |x can produce y
￿
(3.1)
However, in practice, P , the true production set, as defined in equation (3.1), is unknown, and so has
to be estimated from a random sample of production units, the observed data points Sn = {(xi, yi)}ni=1 ,
using the convex hull of the free disposal hull (Daouia and Simar, 2007). This estimate is defined to
be
￿PDEA,n = ￿(x,y)∈ Rp+q+ |y ≤ n￿
i=1
δiyi, x ≥
n￿
i=1
δixi,
n￿
i=1
δi = 1, δi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, ..., n
￿
(3.2)
The hyperbolic distance function is defined as
γ (x, y|P ) = sup￿γ| ￿γ−1x, γy￿ ∈ P￿ ≥ 1 (3.3)
where γ ≥ 1 . Since the true production set P in equation (3.1) is unknown, we replace P by
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PˆDEA,n in equation (3.3), which yields
￿γDEA ￿x, y| ￿PDEA,n￿ = sup￿γ| ￿γ−1x, γy￿ ∈ ￿PDEA,n￿ ≥ 1 (3.4)
which is the hyperbolic DEA estimator (Wilson 2011). Use Wilson (2011) for an in-depth discussion
of the properties, algorithm, and other features of the hyperbolic DEA estimator.
The efficiency scores that are obtained can take ranges of values in the hyperbolic direction. If
γˆDEA > 1 the firms are inefficient, and could either expand output at the current level of inputs,
contract inputs at the current level of output, or both contract inputs and expand outputs. If
γˆDEA = 1 , the firms are efficient and cannot expand output production without increasing input
usage or can not contract input usage without decreasing output production.
The hyperbolic DEA estimator in equation (3.4) is a full frontier estimator, which means the
estimator envelopes all data points in the study. The DEA estimator incorporates an assumption
of convexity of the production set (it is the convex hull of the production set). DEA is an extreme
point method, which means that each data point is compared to a “best” producer, which is termed
the efficient producer. There are problems with the DEA estimator that make validity and inference
a problem. The problems include the DEA estimator having less than root-n convergence due to the
curse of dimensionality, the estimator having estimation error, and the estimator being sensitive to
outliers (Kneip et al. 1998).
A second non-parametric estimator that I use is the order-α estimator. The input and out-
put order-α estimator and its properties were developed by Aragon et al. (2005) and Daouia and
Simar (2007), while the hyperbolic order-α estimator and its properties was developed by Wheelock
and Wilson (2008). The hyperbolic order-α estimator is a partial frontier estimator. The order-α
estimator was developed as an alternative to the order-m frontier estimator, where α ∈ (0, 1] corre-
sponds to the level of an appropriate non-standard conditional quantile frontier. The choice of α is
continuous on the interval (0, 1] .
Wheelock and Wilson (2008) define the hyperbolic order-α estimator as
γα (x, y) = sup
￿
γ > 0|H ￿γ−1x, γy￿ > (1− α)￿ (3.5)
using the Shephard (1970) metric, where H(x, y) = Pr(X ≤ x, Y ≥ y) , which represents the prob-
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ability that a unit operating at (x, y) is dominated (producing more output with the same level of
inputs; producing the same level of output with less inputs; or producing more outputs using less
inputs). I estimate H(x, y) by Hˆ (x, y) =
￿n
i=1
￿
I(Xi≤x,Yi≥y)
n
￿
, where I (·) represents the indicator
function. We estimate γα by
γˆα,n (x, y) = sup
￿
γ > 0|Hˆ ￿γ−1x, γy￿ > (1− α)￿ (3.6)
Wheelock &Wilson (2008) establish the consistency of the hyperbolic order-α estimator. If γα (x, y) = 1 ,
the point is said to lie on the hyperbolic order-α quantile and is dominated by firms that produce
the same output with less inputs with a probability of (1− α) (Simar and Wilson, 2008). Some
important properties of the order-α estimator include the estimator having an asymptotic normal
distribution and exhibiting root-n convergence, the same rate as parametric estimators (Wheelock
& Wilson, 2008).
I use the Malmquist Index decomposition proposed in Wheelock and Wilson (1999), which helps
to determine changes in productivity, efficiency, scale, and technology over time. Malmquist Indices
are estimated using the DEA Shephard (1970) hyperbolic, output, or input distance functions. I use
the hyperbolic distance function because of problems caused when calculating a Malmquist Index in
the input or output direction. The problem is that the Malmquist Indices are calculated using DEA
estimates and, because of the way that they are constructed, the estimates may not have values.
This happens when, due to a technological shock that shifts the production frontier, the observed
data point may lie outside of the estimated frontier. When this happens, the DEA estimate will be
indeterminate and cannot be calculated. This problem occurs in the input or output directions, and
is eliminated through the use of the Shephard (1970) hyperbolic distance function.
The Malmquist Index decomposition proposed by Wheelock & Wilson (1999), between any two
years t1 and t2 , where t1 < t2 is found to be
M (t1, t2) =
￿
Dt2|t2i
Dt1|t1i
￿
·
￿
Dt2|t2i,CRS
Dt2|t2i
· D
t1|t1
i
Dt1|t1i,CRS
￿
·
￿
Dt2|t1i
Dt2|t2i
· D
t1|t1
i
Dt1|t2i
￿ 1
2
·
￿
Dt2|t1i,CRS
Dt2|t1i
· D
t2|t2
i
Dt2|t2i,CRS
· D
t1|t1
i,CRS
Dt1|t1i
· D
t1|t2
i
Dt1|t2i,CRS
￿ 1
2
(3.7)
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I define Dtj |tki ∀ j, k to be the hyperbolic distance function from the i th country’s position in
the input/output space at time tj to the boundary of the production set at time tk , while defin-
ing Dtj |tki,CRS ∀ j, k to be the hyperbolic distance function from the i th country’s position in the
input/output space at time tj to the convex cone of the production set at time tk.
The total value M = Mi (t1, t2) represents the change in productivity for the i th country be-
tween any two years; the value PE =
￿
D
t2|t2
i
D
t1|t1
i
￿
represents the change in pure efficiency for the i th
country between any two years (captures how the production input-output combination changes);
the value S =
￿
D
t2|t2
i,CRS
D
t2|t2
i
· D
t1|t1
i
D
t1|t1
i,CRS
￿
represents the change in scale for the i th country between any
two years; the value PT =
￿
D
t2|t1
i
D
t2|t2
i
· D
t1|t1
i
D
t1|t2
i
￿ 1
2
represents the change in pure technology for the
i th country between any two years (captures how the production frontier changes); and the value
ST =
￿
D
t2|t1
i,CRS
D
t2|t1
i
· D
t2|t2
i
D
t2|t2
i,CRS
· D
t1|t1
i,CRS
D
t1|t1
i
· D
t1|t2
i
D
t1|t2
i,CRS
￿ 1
2
represents the change in the scale of technology for the
i th country between any two years (captures how technology becomes flatter, i.e., the production
frontier exhibits more CRS, or becomes more curved, i.e., the production frontier exhibits more
VRS). I define M to be the Malmquist Index (productivity), PE to be pure efficiency, S to be
scale, PT to be pure technology, and ST to be scale technology. In the hyperbolic direction, when
the measures (M,PE, S, PT, ST ) take the range of values < (=, >) 1 this indicates improvement
(no change, regression) in the measurement. One problem with the inference of the Malmquist Index
is that, because it uses a kernel density estimator when bootstrapping values, it suffers from the
curse of dimensionality (Simar and Wilson, 1999).
3.5 Results
In empirical applications, for the hyperbolic order-α estimator, a value for α must be chosen.
Efficiency estimates seem to be robust to the choice of α , as shown in Figure 1, which details
order−α efficiency rankings for model (a) in 2007.129 Figure 1 plots the hyperbolic α -quantile
efficiency estimates for three values of α–0.85 , 0.90 , and 0.95–against each other; each individual
scatterplot compares estimates for a pair of values for α . There are similar efficiency estimates of
states across different values of α due to the fact that most points fall on (or near) a straight line. I
129Figures for other years and other models are available upon request from the author.
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thus use a value of α = 0.90. That these results seems to be robust with respect to the choice of α
is seen in other studies (Daouia and Simar 2007; Gearhart 2013a; Wheelock and Wilson 2004, 2008,
2009).
In Table 3.3, I highlight how efficiency rankings differ, in 2005, across the 5 models using the
hyperbolic order-α estimator.130 I find that DC is highly variable, going from worst in terms of
efficiency in model (a) to best in terms of efficiency in model (b). Tennessee also shows a wide range
of efficiency rankings, going from 49th in model (b) to 8th in model (e). This variability in efficiency
rankings for certain observations holds for all years that I observe. This variability also manifests
itself in the average efficiency rankings, by model, across the time range, found in Tables 3.6 and
3.7. Tennessee ranks, on average, from 11th in the country (between 2005 and 2008 in model (e))
to 44th in the country (from 2002-2007 in model (b)).
A better representation of Table 3.3 is given by Figure 3.2. This is a graphical comparison of
hyperbolic order−α efficiency rankings in 2005 across models.131 The most important result in
Figure 2 is the upward trend in each scatterplot between models. This means that more efficient
states in one model will tend to be more efficient in other models. The trend is strongest within
datasets. This means that the correlation between efficiency rankings in Figure 3.2 is highest between
models (a), (b), and (c) (which all use dataset (1)), or between models (d) and (e) (which use dataset
(2)). For instance, the correlation of efficiency rankings between models (a) and (b), (a) and (c),
and (b) and (c) are 0.76, 0.99, and 0.77 respectively.132 The upward trend is much less pronounced
(but still apparent) when comparing models that use dataset (1) and dataset (2) (when comparing
models (a), (b), or (c) with models (d) or (e)).133
This general upward trend between efficiency rankings across models holds in all years I ob-
serve.134 I also compare efficiency rankings in a year with per capita health care expenditures
within a state. I find that there is no general trend between efficiency rankings in a year and per
capita health care expenditures incurred by the average household in a year.135 Models (a) and (c)
provide evidence that more efficient states have citizens who spend less, per capita, on health care.
In models (b) and (e), citizens who spend less, per capita, on health care live in states with less
130Tables for other years are available upon request from the author.
131Figures for other years are available upon request from the author.
132The District of Columbia appears to be an outlier. Removing it from the efficiency calculations yields correlations
between models (a) and (b), (a) and (c), and (b) and (c) of 0.87, 0.99, and 0.88 respectively.
133The correlation between models (a) and (d) is 0.31.
134Available upon request from the author.
135The figures of individual scatterplots, of efficiency rankings in a year against per capita costs in a year, with a
line of best fit interposed on them are available upon request from the author.
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efficient health care delivery systems. Figure 3.3 compares the efficiency rankings for models (a)-(c)
from 2002-2007 while Figure 3.4 compares the efficiency rankings for models (d) and (e) between
2005 and 2008.
An important factor in using efficiency rankings to help guide public policy is looking at the
Malmquist Indices to determine how productivity changes over time. A value for the Malmquist
Index (and its components) of less than 1 indicates improvement over time. Table 3.4 shows the
Malmquist Index, between 2002 and 2007, for model (c)136. The main result is that no states
show productivity improvement over the time frame. All states show productivity regression (i.e.,
worsening efficiency over time), except for Tennessee and California in model (b).
Table 3.5 shows the Malmquist Index (between 2005 and 2008) for model (d). Thirty four out of
the 51 observations have shown productivity improvement over the time span. Massachusetts shows
considerable productivity improvement over the time span; more so than any other state. Much
of the productivity improvement Massachusetts shows takes the form of pure technology. Pure
technology measures how the production frontier changes across time, which means that productive
capabilities in Massachusetts have expanded. Alaska showcases the highest level of productivity
regression, but nowhere near the magnitude of productivity regression found in Table 3.4.
Figures 5 and 6 compare the efficiency rankings between the five models and self-reported exercise
rates. In Figure 5, for models (a)-(c), higher self-reported exercise rates are found in states with
more efficient health care delivery systems. In Figure 6, model (e) shows that higher self-reported
exercise rates are found in states with less efficient health care delivery systems. Figures 7 and 8
compare the efficiency rankings between the five models and obesity rates in states, measured by
Body Mass Index (BMI). In Figure 7, for models (a)-(c), higher obesity rates are found in states
with less efficient health care delivery systems; the opposite is true for models (d) and (e) in Figure
8.
In Appendix F, I show that though the rankings I collect for each state between 2002 and 2008
differ from those in America’s Health Rankings in the same year, I do find a positive relationship
between the rankings. Worse ranked states from my methodology are likelier to be worse ranked
states using America’s Health Rankings. This provides a robustness check; my simplified versions of
what comprises the health care sector of a state may be an appropriate reduced-form specification
that can be used in a frontier estimation framework or other statistical formulations.
136Malmquist Indices for Models (a) and (b) are available upon request from the author.
87
3.6 Conclusion
One important conclusion from the finding that efficiency rankings, across models, show a general
upward trend is that this shows that more efficient states using one model will tend to be more
efficient in other models. This means that, across datasets and across input-output combinations,
more efficient states will likely remain that way. This shows that policy conclusions that allow less
efficient states to model themselves on more efficient states may not be sensitive to slight alterations
in the structure of the model. However, when comparing across datasets, there tends to be more
variability in the scatterplots (and across wholly different input-output combinations). This means
that care must still be taken when looking at state level health care data. Minor changes to the
input-output bundles may not have much effect; large changes in input-output bundles may skew
efficiency rankings and lead to erroneous conclusions.
A second finding is the lack of a clear relationship between hyperbolic order−α efficiency rankings
and per capita health care costs. This presents a unique problem; much of health care reform
is predicated on “bending the cost curve”, reducing the rate of growth in health care spending.
Without a model that is uniquely superior to other models, this may point towards the potential for
unintended consequences of health care reform. Reducing health care expenditures, per capita, may
worsen health care efficiency, leading to worse outcomes in terms of important health outcomes, such
as life expectancy and the infant survival rate.137 It may also explain why Massachusetts showed
productivity regression between 2002 and 2007 from the results in Table 3.4. Attempts to slow
health care spending may have had adverse impacts on the productivity of the health care being
delivered.
The findings of general productivity regression in efficiency, in Table 3.4, using dataset (1) (mod-
els (a), (b), and (c)) differ from the findings of Gearhart (2013a), who found that health care
productivity change in the U.S. did not occur, when comparing across countries. The differences in
results may be due to the input-output measures being used. Gearhart (2013a) used a conditional
measure of life expectancy, disability adjusted life years (DALY), whereas I do not, as it was not
available for the states over the relevant time frame. I must use an unconditional measure of life
expectancy instead. Thus, differences in outputs and inputs used may help to explain the why all
states (except for Tennessee and California in model (b)) showed productivity regression over the
137Conversely, in certain models, bending the cost curve may improve efficiency.
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relevant time frame. Another reason for the difference is that Gearhart (2013a) used 1997 to 2005
as his time frame. Using similar time frames may show that the results complement each other.
However, the findings that a majority of the states showed productivity improvement using
dataset (2) (models (d) and (e)) correspond to the findings of Gearhart (2013a). In fact, Mas-
sachusetts, in Table 3.5, provides an interesting result. Health care reform, Chapter 58 of the Acts
of 2006, was instituted in 2006, and it’s likely that the behavioral and structural changes would
have been implemented by 2008. This leads to two different possible theories on the productivity
improvement. The first is that the health care reform revamped a distorted and inefficient health
care system, and helped make the sector more efficient. This may have important implications for
national health care, due to the reforms implemented by the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010.
This may showcase the need to implement changes on a local scale rather than a national scale.
The second theory is that behavioral and structural changes made in 2005, in anticipation of the
change-over in 2006, may have led actors to change the timing of their health care decisions. This
could have led to worsening outcomes in 2005 (as they changed how they behaved in anticipation
of the reformed health care sector). This means that the improvements shown from 2005 to 2008
may be artificial, a one-time change due to the reforms in the health care sector. This means that
productivity improvement is only a product of behavioral changes on the part of the actors involved
in Massachusetts, and not a change in the productivity in the underlying structure of health care.
This means that the reform, other than altering the timing of decisions, may have had no impact
on the health care sector itself.
The important result is the general positive relation between hyperbolic order−α efficiency rank-
ings, in each year, across similar input-output bundles.138 This tends to validate the conclusion
of Gearhart (2013a), that a study of health care efficiency on the intensive margin is more reliable
and leads to better policy conclusions than a study of health care efficiency on the extensive mar-
gin. I hypothesize that, so long as newer measurements will not be developed to more adequately
measure health care inputs and outputs within states, policy prescriptions will be more reliable,
based on more robust efficiency rankings when looking between states rather than across countries.
However, care must still be taken; large changes in input-output bundles on efficiency rankings may
show a larger degree of variability, similar to that found in Gearhart (2013a), that can bias policy
138The correlations between efficiency rankings in models (a)-(c) are all higher than 0.77 with D.C. included, and
higher than 0.87 with D.C. excluded. These are highly positive correlations.
89
results. An optimal model (the best combination of inputs and outputs) is still desirable, from both
a theoretical and empirical standpoint.
I also find that higher obesity rates and lower self-reported exercise rates in a state can lead to
more efficient state health care delivery systems (models (d) and (e)) or less efficient state health
care delivery systems (models (a)-(c)). Both have plausible interpretations. This can lead to more
efficient health care delivery systems if one believes the conclusion drawn from Gearhart (2013b).
In his story, individuals are willing to suffer from the health consequences of obesity and diabetes
because improved future medical technology will allow them to offset the costs of their choices. In
this model, individuals spend less time on preventive medicine and use the ever-more productive
reactive medicine. Individuals in more efficient states are willing to suffer higher obesity rates and
spend less time on exercise because they believe that their health care delivery systems will be able
to provide productive care when they need it.139 Highly efficient states may have medical centers
with state-of-the-art medical technology. If consumers anticipate that this trend will continue, they
believe that the diffusion of medical technology within their state allows them to mitigate the worst
consequences of their choices.140
Higher obesity and lower self-reported exercise rates may lead to a less efficient health care
delivery system, as shown in models (a)-(c). This will happen if individuals who are obese use more
health care inputs to obtain the same health output as individuals with lower BMI’s.141 These
differences are important because health care expenditures, obesity rates, and preventive measures
(such as exercise) are popular targets for policymakers. Determining which model provides better
predictors will help policymakers decide if combating obesity and health care costs are worthwhile
endeavors for improving on health care delivery systems in the United States. The benefits provided
by combating these measures may lead to unintended costs that may be attributed to other changes
in the health care delivery system, leading to mal-informed choices about what (or what not) to
reform.
Last, I find that the hyperbolic order-α efficiency rankings derived in this paper are positively
correlated with state health rankings from United Health Foundation’s America’s Health Rankings
139This interpretation has limitations. More efficient states may simply be using lower levels of inputs than less
efficient states. This says nothing about the relative medical technology of that state, and makes the conclusion
drawn from Gearhart (2013b) less likely to hold.
140These consequences are a significantly lowered life expectancy or less “healthy” life expectancy when obese or
diabetic.
141This does seem to occur; Gearhart (2013b) mentions that higher BMI levels increases the use of medical services.
This explanation seems to be the more plausible interpretation.
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from 2002-2008.142 There are several explanations as to why the rankings between the two measures
are different, however. These include America’s Health Rankings using weighting procedures that
have been criticized in the literature (Kindig et al., 2008); the rankings from America’s Health
Rankings not using a statistical framework; and America’s Health Rankings using 24 “inputs” and
“outputs” for each year for the 50 states, limiting the predictive power of the measures used. This
means that there are many limitations of the analysis conducted in America’s Health Rankings,
highlighting the need for adequate statistical comparisons of state health care rankings. In essence,
my model may potentially be considered as an appropriate reduced-form version of America’s Health
Rankings, though efforts should be made to see if changes to the input-output combinations in my
analysis will yield answers different to those found here.
142In other words, more efficient states in my paper are better providers of health care based on America’s Health
Rankings.
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Table 3.1: Descriptions of Models Used
Dataset Used Model Outputs Used Inputs Used
(1) (a)
Vaccine
Citizens/Hospital
Infant Survival Rate (ISR) Inpatient Days
Teen Survival Rate (TSR) Hospital Beds
Cost
(1) (b)
Vaccine
ISR Citizens/Hospital
TSR Hospital Beds
Inpatient Days Cost
(1) (c)
Vaccine
ISR Citizens/Hospital
TSR Hospital Beds
Cost
(2) (d)
Median Personal Earnings
% High School Diploma
ISR Child Immunization %
Life Expectancy (LE) Practicing Physicians
% Uninsured
(2) (e)
Median Personal Earnings
ISR % High School Diploma
LE % Uninsured
NOTE: Dataset (1) refers to the aggregated dataset from individual sources of the 2011 Census
Statistical Abstract, Kaiser State Health Facts, and the CDC “Health, US, 2010” research
publication. Dataset (2) refers to the dataset obtained at the Measure of America website, who
uses the Census ACS survey to construct their data.
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Table
3.2:
D
escription
ofV
ariables
U
sed
D
A
T
A
SE
T
(1)
V
ariable
D
escription
of
V
ariable
ISR
R
epresents
the
fraction
of
infants,for
every
1,000
live
births,w
ho
survive
untiltheir
1st
birthday.
T
he
m
easure
excludes
fetaldeaths.
T
SR
R
epresents
the
fraction
of
teenagers
betw
een
the
ages
of
15
and
19,per
100,000
teens
in
this
age
group,w
ho
survive
to
their
20th
birthday.
T
his
m
easure
includes
deaths
from
allcauses.
C
ost
T
he
average
cost
of
a
hosptialvisit
per
individualper
day.
C
itizen/H
ospital
M
easured
to
be
the
population
of
the
state
divided
by
the
totalnum
ber
of
com
m
unity
hospitals
in
the
state
(a
com
m
unity
hospitalis
allnon-federal,short-term
general,and
specialty
hospitals
w
hose
facilities
and
services
are
available
to
the
public;this
excludes
federalhospitals,long-term
care
hospitals,psychiatric
hospitals,institutions
for
the
m
entally
retarded,and
alcoholism
and
other
chem
icaldependency
hospitals).
H
ospitalB
eds
T
he
totalnum
ber
of
hospitalbeds
in
com
m
unity
hospitals
per
1,000
population
in
the
state.
Inpatient
D
ays
T
he
totalnum
ber
of
inpatient
days
in
com
m
unity
hospitals
per
1,000
population
in
the
state
V
accine
P
ercent
of
children
19-35
m
onths
of
age
w
ith
4:3:1:3:3:1
vaccination
series.
T
he
4:3:1:3:3:1
vaccination
series
consists
of
4
or
m
ore
doses
of
diptheria
and
tetanus
toxoids
and
pertussis
vaccine
(D
T
P
),diptheria
and
tetanus
toxoids
(D
T
)
or
diptheria
and
tetanus
toxoids
and
acellular
pertussis
vaccine
(D
T
aP
);3
or
m
ore
doses
of
any
poliovirus
vaccine;1
or
m
ore
doses
of
a
m
easles-
containing
vaccine
(M
C
V
);3
or
m
ore
doses
of
H
aem
ophilus
influenzae
type
b
vaccine
(H
ib)
regardless
of
vaccine
brand
type;3
or
m
ore
doses
of
hepatitis
B
vaccine;and
1
or
m
ore
doses
of
varicella
vaccine.
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D
A
T
A
SE
T
(2)
V
ariable
D
escription
of
V
ariable
ISR
R
epresents
the
fraction
of
infants,for
every
1,000
live
births,w
ho
survive
untiltheir
1st
birthday.
T
he
m
easure
excludes
fetaldeaths.
L
E
L
ife
expectancy
at
birth
using
C
D
C
m
ortality
counts
M
edian
P
ersonalE
arnings
T
he
m
edian
personalearnings
based
on
A
m
erican
C
om
m
unity
Survey
(A
C
S)
data,in
2009
dollars.
%
H
igh
SchoolD
iplom
a
P
ercent
of
students
in
public
high
schools
w
ho
graduate
w
ith
a
high
schooldiplom
a.
P
racticing
P
hysicians
A
ctive
physicians
(includes
active
doctors
of
m
edicine
(M
D
s)
and
active
doctors
of
osteopathy
(D
O
s))
per
10,000
population.
%
U
ninsured
P
ercent
of
individuals
lacking
either
individualor
job-related
insurance
coverage.
C
hild
Im
m
unization
%
P
ercent
of
children
19-35
m
onths
of
age
w
ith
4:3:1:3:3:1
vaccination
series.
T
he
4:3:1:3:3:1
series
is
described
in
D
A
T
A
SE
T
(1).
N
O
T
E
:D
ataset
(1)
refers
to
the
aggregated
dataset
from
individualsources
of
the
2011
C
ensus
StatisticalA
bstract,K
aiser
State
H
ealth
Facts,and
the
C
D
C
“H
ealth,U
S,2010”
research
publication.
D
ataset
(2)
refers
to
the
dataset
obtained
at
the
M
easure
of
A
m
erica
w
ebsite,w
ho
uses
the
C
ensus
A
C
S
survey
to
construct
their
data.
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Table 3.3: 2005 Comparison of Hyperbolic Order−α Efficiency
Rankings
Order−α Efficiency Rankings
State Model (a) Model (b) Model (c) Model (d) Model (e)
AL 34 45 32 14 13
AK 1 4 2 16 51
AZ 28 42 27 34 35
AR 20 24 20 17 15
CA 36 37 34 37 23
CO 22 31 30 51 50
CT 43 32 43 11 25
DE 48 26 48 3 3
DC 51 1 51 24 18
FL 44 48 46 49 40
GA 16 17 15 28 27
HI 19 15 18 2 2
ID 4 8 6 5 9
IL 49 47 49 45 38
IN 28 38 27 32 31
IA 7 10 9 4 5
KS 6 7 5 18 42
KY 30 39 29 13 12
LA 32 34 31 21 46
ME 12 13 12 27 20
MD 37 35 35 39 45
MA 47 46 47 22 11
MI 35 51 41 41 44
MN 24 22 21 1 1
MS 31 25 33 9 7
MO 41 44 39 40 24
MT 9 5 7 15 16
NE 10 11 10 31 34
NV 17 14 16 6 48
NH 18 23 19 33 43
NJ 40 39 38 50 47
NM 11 12 11 36 22
NY 45 19 44 48 32
NC 27 30 26 44 39
ND 5 3 3 25 17
OH 50 50 50 47 36
OK 21 29 24 30 37
OR 15 20 17 42 41
PA 46 43 45 23 19
RI 42 32 42 38 21
SC 39 36 37 26 28
SD 2 2 1 8 6
TN 38 49 36 19 8
TX 33 41 40 29 30
UT 13 16 13 12 14
95
VT 8 9 8 43 26
VA 26 26 25 35 29
WA 14 18 14 46 49
WV 23 28 23 20 10
WI 25 21 22 7 4
WY 3 6 4 10 33
NOTE: Models (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) are described in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.4: 2002/2007 Model (c) Malmquist Index
Individual Components
of the Malmquist Index
State M PE S PT ST
AL 1.0546 1.0000 0.9717 1.0043 1.0807
AK 1.0329 1.0000 1.0000 1.0662 0.9688
AZ 1.0479 1.0004 1.0297 1.0604 0.9593
AR 1.0394 1.0000 0.9769 1.0147 1.0486
CA 1.0064 0.9999 1.0004 1.0126 0.9935
CO 1.0742 1.0002 1.0405 1.0808 0.9551
CT 1.0490 1.0000 1.0230 1.0138 1.0115
DE 1.0961 0.9999 1.0316 1.0062 1.0561
DC 1.0923 0.9992 0.9651 1.0000 1.1327
FL 1.0771 1.0001 0.9932 1.0086 1.0752
GA 1.0427 0.9998 0.9510 1.0605 1.0340
HI 1.0603 1.0000 0.9928 1.0551 1.0121
ID 1.0715 1.0000 1.0000 1.1146 0.9613
IL 1.1056 1.0001 1.0109 1.0508 1.0407
IN 1.0976 1.0001 1.0044 1.0482 1.0424
IA 1.0421 1.0000 0.9812 1.0967 0.9685
KS 1.0402 1.0001 0.9826 1.0868 0.9740
KY 1.0769 1.0000 0.9953 1.0264 1.0542
LA 1.0477 0.9999 0.9723 1.0216 1.0548
ME 1.0378 1.0000 0.9839 1.0328 1.0212
MD 1.0704 1.0000 1.0541 1.0366 0.9796
MA 1.0676 1.0000 1.0118 1.0001 1.0551
MI 1.0776 1.0000 1.0122 1.0227 1.0410
MN 1.0697 0.9999 0.9996 1.0488 1.0204
MS 1.1251 1.0001 1.0150 1.0998 1.0078
MO 1.1078 1.0001 1.0054 1.0357 1.0638
MT 1.1025 1.0000 1.0000 1.2161 0.9066
NE 1.0483 0.9999 0.9892 1.0845 0.9773
NV 1.0265 0.9997 0.9913 1.0446 0.9916
NH 1.0489 1.0001 1.0055 1.0501 0.9933
NJ 1.0744 1.0000 1.0088 1.0019 1.0631
NM 1.0265 1.0003 1.0008 1.0524 0.9742
NY 1.0850 0.9999 0.9849 1.0002 1.1014
NC 1.0536 1.0000 0.9726 1.0458 1.0359
ND 1.0508 1.0000 1.0000 1.1041 0.9518
OH 1.0930 1.0000 0.9987 1.0155 1.0776
OK 1.0315 1.0001 0.9682 1.0467 1.0178
OR 1.0163 1.0000 1.0032 1.0298 0.9838
PA 1.0895 1.0000 0.9937 1.0049 1.0911
RI 1.0765 0.9999 1.0279 1.0206 1.0263
SC 1.0946 0.9999 1.0151 1.0432 1.0337
SD 1.1555 1.0000 1.0000 1.3356 0.8652
TN 1.0722 0.9999 0.9772 1.0023 1.0947
TX 1.0671 0.9999 1.0061 1.0147 1.0454
UT 1.0030 1.0000 1.0000 1.0064 0.9966
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VT 1.0712 1.0000 1.0000 1.1163 0.9596
VA 1.0875 1.0001 1.0180 1.0821 0.9872
WA 1.0281 1.0000 1.0000 1.0571 0.9725
WV 1.0616 0.9997 0.9732 1.0281 1.0614
WI 1.0801 1.0001 1.0125 1.0559 1.0102
WY 1.0817 1.0000 1.0000 1.1437 0.9457
NOTE: The Malmquist Index (M) is decomposed into
several parts;pure efficiency (PE), scale (S), pure
technology (PT), and scale technology (ST).
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Table 3.5: 2005/2008 Model (d) Malmquist Index
Individual Components
of the Malmquist Index
State M PE S PT ST
AL 0.9888 1.0000 1.0000 0.9767 1.0123
AK 1.0196 1.0009 1.0227 0.9998 0.9961
AZ 0.9982 0.9991 0.9978 0.9980 1.0033
AR 0.9976 1.0000 1.0000 0.9951 1.0025
CA 0.9998 1.0000 1.0000 1.0010 0.9987
CO 1.0027 1.0004 1.0022 1.0000 1.0002
CT 1.0030 1.0000 1.0028 0.9999 1.0004
DE 1.0103 1.0034 1.0064 1.0091 0.9915
DC 1.0068 1.0052 1.0004 1.0030 0.9981
FL 0.9930 0.9990 0.9942 0.9986 1.0012
GA 0.9927 0.9999 0.9984 0.9978 0.9966
HI 0.9960 1.0000 1.0000 0.9879 1.0082
ID 0.9910 1.0000 1.0000 0.9827 1.0084
IL 0.9927 0.9996 0.9937 0.9997 0.9997
IN 0.9895 0.9996 1.0000 0.9929 0.9969
IA 0.9751 1.0000 1.0000 0.9556 1.0204
KS 1.0009 1.0006 1.0119 0.9996 0.9890
KY 1.0008 1.0000 1.0000 1.0022 0.9986
LA 1.0193 1.0033 1.0050 1.0194 0.9916
ME 0.9684 1.0000 0.9946 0.9593 1.0150
MD 1.0189 1.0008 1.0181 0.9997 1.0001
MA 0.8973 1.0000 0.9914 0.8233 1.0993
MI 0.9939 1.0002 1.0034 0.9953 0.9949
MN 1.0080 1.0000 1.0043 1.0092 0.9945
MS 1.0008 1.0000 1.0000 1.0009 0.9999
MO 0.9875 0.9994 0.9968 0.9937 0.9976
MT 0.9917 1.0000 1.0000 0.9832 1.0086
NE 0.9974 1.0000 1.0060 0.9992 0.9923
NV 1.0065 1.0000 1.0000 1.0130 0.9936
NH 1.0053 1.0002 1.0075 1.0000 0.9976
NJ 0.9981 0.9996 0.9969 0.9998 1.0019
NM 1.0067 1.0000 1.0000 1.0097 0.9971
NY 0.9912 0.9989 0.9898 1.0001 1.0025
NC 0.9931 1.0001 0.9950 0.9998 0.9982
ND 0.9866 1.0000 1.0000 0.9785 1.0083
OH 0.9964 1.0006 1.0053 0.9990 0.9917
OK 0.9801 0.9993 0.9824 0.9918 1.0066
OR 1.0002 1.0003 1.0040 0.9998 0.9962
PA 0.9902 1.0000 0.9974 0.9971 0.9957
RI 0.9996 1.0000 1.0000 0.9998 0.9998
SC 0.9985 1.0000 1.0004 1.0000 0.9981
SD 0.9882 1.0000 1.0000 0.9841 1.0041
TN 1.0053 1.0025 1.0057 1.0010 0.9961
TX 1.0035 1.0000 1.0000 1.0090 0.9946
UT 0.9871 1.0000 1.0027 0.9896 0.9947
99
VT 0.9711 1.0000 0.9865 0.9721 1.0127
VA 0.9970 1.0007 0.9986 0.9995 0.9982
WA 0.9889 0.9998 0.9933 0.9998 0.9959
WV 0.9909 1.0000 0.9975 0.9853 1.0081
WI 0.9853 1.0001 0.9999 0.9776 1.0078
WY 0.9789 1.0000 1.0000 0.9584 1.0214
NOTE: The Malmquist Index (M) is decomposed into
several parts; pure efficiency (PE), scale (S), pure
technology (PT), and scale technology (ST).
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Table 3.6: Average State Efficiency Rankings Across Models
Model A B C D E
Year Range 2002-2007 2002-2007 2002-2007 2005/2008 2005/2008
State
AL 33.2 43.2 33.3 14.5 11.0
AK 3.0 5.7 4.5 32.5 50.5
AZ 28.5 33.8 27.7 33.5 29.0
AR 22.7 31.5 24.0 15.0 11.5
CA 39.5 37.3 40.7 34.5 22.5
CO 20.7 25.3 21.8 49.5 44.5
CT 44.2 32.3 43.7 28.0 30.5
DE 46.0 29.7 45.3 15.5 17.0
DC 51.0 1.3 51.0 27.5 19.5
FL 45.7 49.0 45.7 43.0 34.5
GA 18.8 17.8 16.7 27.5 35.0
HI 22.5 18.3 20.5 2.5 2.0
ID 5.3 8.5 7.3 5.0 13.5
IL 39.0 42.7 37.8 40.0 37.5
IN 30.5 37.0 31.7 27.5 28.0
IA 8.0 9.2 8.2 3.0 4.5
KS 5.2 6.2 4.2 32.5 44.0
KY 32.8 44.2 31.8 15.0 11.5
LA 33.8 37.5 34.0 35.5 45.5
ME 13.2 11.5 11.7 18.0 12.5
MD 40.7 35.3 39.3 45.0 47.0
MA 45.2 42.8 45.0 11.5 6.0
MI 36.5 48.2 38.2 43.5 39.0
MN 22.7 20.3 21.2 4.0 2.0
MS 26.3 20.7 28.0 7.5 10.0
MO 39.5 42.5 42.5 38.0 25.5
MT 7.8 4.8 6.7 13.5 14.0
NE 8.3 9.2 8.3 35.0 41.0
NV 19.0 19.3 17.2 11.0 45.0
NH 16.8 22.7 18.8 25.5 43.5
NJ 42.2 42.2 41.5 47.0 43.5
NM 11.5 13.8 12.3 30.0 19.0
NY 44.3 18.7 44.0 44.0 29.0
NC 29.2 32.7 28.0 43.0 35.5
ND 3.8 2.7 3.0 19.5 15.5
OH 44.8 48.2 44.0 45.0 33.0
OK 17.0 19.3 16.3 26.0 32.5
OR 16.2 21.2 16.7 40.0 39.5
PA 46.7 40.8 46.2 24.0 19.5
RI 43.0 33.5 42.0 34.0 20.0
SC 35.8 38.8 34.3 27.5 30.5
SD 1.5 1.5 1.2 13.5 11.5
TN 39.2 43.8 39.3 22.5 11.5
TX 29.7 33.3 31.7 25.0 27.0
UT 11.3 19.8 15.2 11.0 24.5
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VT 10.8 10.7 9.3 27.0 16.0
VA 24.5 28.8 23.8 34.5 35.0
WA 13.8 22.7 17.3 43.5 48.0
WV 28.7 23.3 28.8 20.0 10.0
WI 21.8 19.8 20.0 5.5 5.5
WY 2.8 4.8 3.2 9.0 42.0
NOTE: Models (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) are described in Table 3.1. Efficiency
rankings use hyperbolic order-α estimator.
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Table 3.7: Average State Efficiency Ranks Across Models
Ranking Model (a) Model (b) Model (c) Model (d) Model (e)
1 SD DC SD HI HI
2 WY SD ND IA MN
3 AK ND WY MN IA
4 ND MT KS ID WI
5 KS WY AK WI MA
6 ID AK MT MS MS
7 MT KS ID WY WV
8 IA ID IA NV AL
9 NE IA NE UT AR
10 VT NE VT MA KY
11 UT VT ME MT SD
12 NM ME NM SD TN
13 ME NM UT AL ME
14 WA GA OK AR ID
15 OR HI GA KY MT
16 NH NY OR DE ND
17 OK NV NV ME VT
18 GA OK WA ND DE
19 NV UT NH WV NM
20 CO WI WI TN DC
21 WI MN HI PA PA
22 HI MS MN TX RI
23 AR OR CO NH CA
24 MN NH VA OK UT
25 VA WA AR VT MO
26 MS WV AZ DC TX
27 AZ CO MS GA IN
28 WV VA NC IN AZ
29 NC DE WV SC NY
30 TX AR IN CT CT
31 IN CT TX NM SC
32 KY NC KY AK OK
33 AL TX AL KS OH
34 LA RI LA AZ FL
35 SC AZ SC RI GA
36 MI MD IL CA VA
37 IL IN MI VA NC
38 TN CA MD NE IL
39 CA LA TN LA MI
40 MO SC CA MO OR
41 MD PA NJ IL NE
42 NJ NJ RI OR WY
43 RI MO MO FL NH
44 CT IL CT NC NJ
45 NY MA NY MI KS
46 OH AL OH WA CO
47 MA TN MA NY NV
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48 FL KY DE MD LA
49 DE MI FL OH MD
50 PA OH PA NJ WA
51 DC FL DC CO AK
NOTE: Models (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) are described in Table 3.1. Efficiency
rankings use
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Figure 3.1: Comparison of Different Values of α, Model (a), 2007
NOTE: Efficiency rankings use hyperbolic order-α estimator
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of Hyperbolic Order-α Efficiency Rankings, 2005
NOTE: Comparison of hyperbolic order-α efficiency rankings across models, as well as a
comparison with 2005 per capita health care costs.
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Figure 3.3: Efficiency Rankings and Per Capita Health Costs, Models (a)-(c)
NOTE: This compares the efficiency rankings computed each year, from 2002-2007, for Models (a),
(b), and (c), with per capita health care expenditures per person; this measures spending for all
privately and publicly funded personal health care services and products (hospital care, physician
services, nursing home care, prescription drugs, etc.) by state of residence. Hospital spending is
included and reflects the total net revenue (gross charges less contractual adjustments, bad debts,
and charity care). Costs such as insurance program administration, research, and construction
expenses are not included in this total.
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Figure 3.4: Efficiency Rankings and Per Capita Health Costs, Models (d)-(e)
NOTE: This compares the efficiency rankings computed each year, between 2005 and 2008, for
Models (d) and (e), with per capita health care expenditures per person; this measures spending
for all privately and publicly funded personal health care services and products (hospital care,
physician services, nursing home care, prescription drugs, etc.) by state of residence. Hospital
spending is included and reflects the total net revenue (gross charges less contractual adjustments,
bad debts, and charity care). Costs such as insurance program administration, research, and
construction expenses are not included in this total.
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Figure 3.5: Efficiency Rankings and Exercise, Models (a)-(c)
NOTE: This compares the efficiency rankings computed each year, from 2002-2007, for Models (a),
(b), and (c), with the percent of individuals in a state who performed any exercise, where exercise
is the response to the question “during the past month, other than your regular job, did you
participate in any physical activities or exercises such as running, calisthenics, golf, gardening, or
walking for exercise?”.
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Figure 3.6: Efficiency Rankings and Exercise, Models (d)-(e)
NOTE: This compares the efficiency rankings computed each year, between 2005 and 2008, for
Models (d) and (e), with the percent of individuals in a state who performed any exercise, where
exercise is the response to the question “during the past month, other than your regular job, did
you participate in any physical activities or exercises such as running, calisthenics, golf, gardening,
or walking for exercise?”.
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Figure 3.7: Efficiency Rankings and BMI, Models (a)-(c)
NOTE: This compares the efficiency rankings computed each year, from 2002-2007, for Models (a),
(b), and (c), with the percent of individuals in a state who are obese, which is defined as a BMI of
30+.
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Figure 3.8: Efficiency Rankings and BMI, Models (d)-(e)
NOTE: This compares the efficiency rankings computed each year, between 2005 and 2008, for
Models (d) and (e), with the percent of individuals in a state who are obese, which is defined as a
BMI of 30+.
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A Glossary of Terms (Dynamic Model)
Table A.1: Glossary of Terms Used in Dynamic Model
Term Definition
n Total Length of Life
t Age of individual (time period)
t∗j Calendar Year j
H0 Inherited stock of health
Ht Stock of health at age t
ht Total number of healthy days at age t
Xt Consumption of an aggregate commodity at age t
It Gross investment in health at age t
TPt Time spend on preventive medical care at age t
CRt Consumption of reactive medical care at age t
φt Rate of depreciation of health stock at age t
ρt+1 Rate of depreciation of preventive medical care at
age (t+ 1)
1− ρt+1 Productivity of preventive medical care at age (t+ 1)
νt+1 Rate of depreciation of reactive medical care at age
(t+ 1)
1− νt+1 Productivity of reactive medical care at age (t+ 1)
g − TPt+1
CRt
gR Marginal product of reactive medical investment in gross
investment production function
gP Marginal product of preventive medical investment in
gross investment production function
PRt Price of reactive medical care/services at age t
Wt Wage rate at age t
A0 Initial assets
δ Discounted price of medical care due to health insurance
τ Lump-sum insurance payment
TWt Hours of work at age t
TLt Sick time at age t
T Constant length of the period
R Full wealth
Gt Marginal product of total health capital at age t
U t Marginal utility of healthy days at age t
λ Marginal utility of wealth
πt Marginal cost of gross investment in health at age t
P¯Rt Percentage rate of change in price of reactive care at age t
W¯t Percent rate of change in wage at age t
γPt Monetary rate of return on preventive investment in health
or marginal efficiency of preventive health capital
αPt Psychic rate of return on preventive investment in health
γRt Monetary rate of return on reactive investment in health or
marginal efficiency of reactive health capital
αRt Psychic rate of return on reactive investment in health
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B Proofs of Propositions
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1:
I use the assumption that [1− νt+1]t∗2000 > [1− νt+1]t∗1990 and [1− ρt+1]t∗2000≈ [1− ρt+1]t∗1990 . Pro-
vided that consumption of reactive care and time spent on preventive care are not perfect substitutes,
the supply prices do not have to be equated. I take the ratio of the left-hand sides of (21) and (22)
￿￿
r − P¯Rt + νt+1
￿￿
r − W¯t + ρt+1
￿ ￿
t∗2000
<
￿￿
r − P¯Rt + νt+1
￿￿
r − W¯t + ρt+1
￿ ￿
t∗1990
. (B.1)
If the interest rate, the percent change in the wage, and the percent change in the price of reactive
care have been constant across calendar periods
￿
t∗j
￿
, (B.1) reduces to
￿
[1− νt+1]t∗2000 [1− νt+1]t∗1990
￿ ￿
r − W¯t + ρt+1
￿
> 0. (B.2)
By assumption,
￿
[1− νt+1]t∗2000 − [1− νt+1]t∗1990
￿
> 0. So long as the lifetime supply price of preven-
tive care is positive, then
￿
r − W¯t + ρt+1
￿
> 0. This means that (B.1) holds. If the percent change
in the wage and the real interest rate are constant over time, then (B.1) reduces to
￿￿
P¯Rt
￿
t∗2000
− ￿P¯Rt ￿t∗1990￿+ ￿[1− νt+1]t∗2000 − [1− νt+1]t∗1990￿ > 0. (B.3)
By assumption,
￿
[1− νt+1]t∗2000 − [1− νt+1]t∗1990
￿
> 0. For (B.3) to hold, the price of reactive care
at age t relative to the price of reactive care at age (t + 1) cannot decrease much. If this were
to happen, it would make sense for the individual, even with improvements in the productivity of
reactive care, to delay consumption until reactive care is cheaper.143 If only the real interest rate is
constant across calendar periods, (B.1) reduces to
￿￿
P¯Rt − νt+1
￿ ￿
r − W¯t + ρ
￿￿
t∗2000
+ r
￿￿
W¯t
￿
t∗1990
− ￿W¯t￿t∗2000￿
>
￿￿
P¯Rt − νt+1
￿ ￿
r − W¯t + ρ
￿￿
t∗1990
. (B.4)
143This makes the consumption of reactive care at age t more attractive to the individual than consuming it at age
(t + 1), because it is relatively more expensive later on in life as calendar time increases. For example, if in 1900
PRt = P
R
t+1 = 1, then P¯
R
t = 0. Except for the impact of the discount rate, it does not matter in terms of the price
if an individual buys reactive care at age t or age (t+ 1). If, in 2000, the price of reactive care at later ages is much
more expensive, so P¯Rt > 0, then an individual will choose to consume it much earlier in life.
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Equation (B.4) has a similar interpretation as (B.3). Along with the substitution effect based on the
price of reactive care at age t relative to the price of reactive care at age (t+ 1), the inter-temporal
substitution effect for time spent on preventive care must be considered, based on changes in the
wage across age. Time spent on preventive care becomes more attractive to consume at age t if the
wage at age t, which is the “price” of preventive care, is lower than the wage at age (t+1). Then, if￿￿
W¯t
￿
t∗1990
− ￿W¯t￿t∗2000￿ < 0, it must be the case that time spent on preventive care is more attractive
to an individual in 2000 than in 1990. This effect helps negate the increase in the productivity of
reactive care, and makes (B.1) more difficult to occur. ￿
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
I use the results in Proposition 1. If PR is the lifetime supply price of reactive medical care and
PP is the lifetime supply price of preventive medical care, this means that
￿
PR
PP
￿
decreases. Using
standard consumer theory, this results in
PR
PP
=
U
￿
R
U
￿
P
, (B.5)
where U
￿
R is the marginal utility of reactive medical care and U
￿
P is the marginal utility of preventive
medical care. If I assume that U ￿i > 0 and Uii” < 0 ∀i = R,P , then, as
￿
U ￿R
U ￿P
￿
decreases, this means
that
￿
CRt
TPt
￿
increases. ￿
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C Numerical Illustration
C.1 Numerical Illustration over Calendar Time
This appendix describes the specific formulae underlying the numerical illustrations of the paper.
Look at a representative individual, aged t, across different calendar periods.144 I use the first-order
conditions for reactive care and preventive care, given by the equations
πt
￿
r − W¯t + ρt+1
￿
= (1− ρt+1)Gt+1Wt+1 (C.1)
and
πt
￿
r − P¯Rt + νt+1
￿
= (1− νt+1)Gt+1Wt+1. (C.2)
The parameter values used as a standard are
W0 = P
R
0 = 1, r = 0.03
and
Gt+1 = 0.25, πt =
PRt
Wt
, W¯t =
Wt+1 −Wt
Wt
, P¯Rt =
PRt+1 − PRt
PRt
, ρt+1 = 0.9 ∀ t = 0, ..., n.
I also assume that the productivity of reactive care has exhibited something similar to Moore’s Law
over calendar time. Figure C.1 shows the growth in the productivity of reactive care over calendar
time.
To determine the optimal values given in (C.1) and (C.2), I approximate the marginal benefits
of reactive and preventive care using simple linear curves, given by
MBReactive = a− bCRt (C.3)
and
MBPreventive = h− iTPt . (C.4)
144So, for example, it looks at a 35 year old male in 1900, 1945, 1978, and 1995.
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The parameters used as a standard for these curves are
a = h = 2.5; b = i = 0.4.
To measure changes in the health stock, I use the equation
Ht+1 = (1− φt)Ht + It
￿
CRt , T
P
t
￿
(C.5)
Since I am comparing one identical individual over different calendar periods, I select one value
for the non-depreciated health stock. I choose the parameter value
(1− φt)Ht = 5.
For (C.5), a functional form for the gross investment production function is needed. I choose to use
a CRS Cobb-Douglas production function; i.e.,
It
￿
CRt , T
P
t
￿
=
￿
CRt
￿ϑ ￿
TPt
￿￿
. (C.6)
I elect to use two different parameter values for ϑ and ￿ in (C.6), where the selected values are
ϑ1 = 0.5, ￿1 = 0.5; ϑ2 = 0.75, ￿2 = 0.25.
Selected parameter values were then altered as appropriate to provide the Table 2 and Figures 4-
12 in the paper. The difference between the five versions of the numerical illustration depends on
nominal wage inflation and the inflation rate of reactive medical care.
C.1.1 Assumption 1 - Numerical Illustration 1
Wage inflation and the inflation rate of reactive medical care grow at a constant rate over calendar
time
￿
W¯1990 = W¯2000 = 0.03; P¯1990 = P¯2000 = 0.06
￿
. This means that the price of reactive care
relative to the ’price’ of preventive care (the nominal wage rate) increases over time. The individual
is becoming relatively less wealthy.
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C.1.2 Assumption 2 - Numerical Illustration 2
The inflation rate of reactive medical care is higher than wage inflation over calendar time (W¯1990 =
P¯1990 = 0.01; W¯2018 = 0.038; P¯2018 = 0.094). This means that the price of reactive care relative to
the ’price’ of preventive care (the nominal wage rate) increases over time. The individual is becoming
relatively less wealthy.
C.1.3 Assumption 3 - Numerical Illustration 3
Wage inflation is maintained at the same rate as in the 2nd numerical simulation, while the inflation
rate for reactive medical care varies across time being, on average, 5-percent per calendar year.145
C.1.4 Assumption 4 - Numerical Illustration 4
Wage inflation is higher than the inflation rate of reactive medical care over calendar time (W¯1990 =
P¯1990 = 0.01; W¯2018 = 0.094; P¯2018 = 0.038). This means that the price of reactive care relative
to the ’price’ of preventive care (the nominal wage rate) decreases over time. The individual is
becoming relatively wealthier.
C.1.5 Assumption 5 - Numerical Illustration 5
Wage inflation and the inflation rate of reactive medical care grow at the same increasing rate over
calendar time
￿
W¯1990 = P¯1990 = 0.01; W¯1991 = P¯1991 = 0.011
￿
. This means that the price of reactive
care relative to the “price” of preventive care (the nominal wage rate) remains constant over time.
145However, the inflation rate of reactive medical care fluctuates widely, going from a low of 2-percent during one
calendar year to a high of 8.5-percent during one calendar year.
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Figure C.1: Changes in the Productivity of Reactive Care over Time
NOTE: As calendar time increases, the productivity of reactive care increases at an increasing
rate, exhibiting something analogous to Moore’s Law from computing. Calendar time means
looking at an identical individual in different years (i.e., in 1900, in 1950, and in 2000).
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D Supplementary Math for Dynamic Model
D.1 Utility Maximization
To maximize utility subject to the full wealth and production function constraints, form the La-
grangian expression
L =
n￿
t=0
U (ht (Ht) , Xt)
(1 + r)t
+ λ
￿
R−
n￿
t=0
￿
Xt + C +Wt
￿
Lt + TLt
￿
(1 + r)t
￿￿
, (D.1)
where C = PRt CRt +WtTPt and R =
￿n
t=0
￿
WtT
(1+r)t
￿
+A0.
D.1.1 Preventive Medical Care
Differentiating (D.1) with respect to preventive care at age t and setting the partial derivative equal
to zero, one obtains the first-order condition (FOC)
∂L
∂TPt
=
∂U
∂ht+1
∂ht+1
∂Ht+1
∂Ht+1
∂It
∂It
∂TPt
(1 + r)t+1
+ ...+
∂U
∂hn
∂hn
∂Hn
∂Hn
∂It
∂It
∂TPt
(1 + r)n
= λ
 ∂C∂It ∂It∂TPt
(1 + r)t
+
Wt+1
∂TLt+1
∂Ht+1
∂Ht+1
∂It
∂It
∂TPt
(1 + r)t+1
+ ...+
Wn
∂TLn
∂Hn
∂Hn
∂It
∂It
∂TPt
(1 + r)n
 . (D.2)
I simplify the FOC for preventive care where Gt+1 = ∂ht+1∂Ht+1 = −
∂TLt+1
∂Ht+1
; ∂Ht+1∂It = (1− ρt+1); ...;
∂Hn
∂It
=
￿n
j=t+1 (1− ρj); and ∂C∂It = πt. The FOC for preventive medical care becomes
∂C
∂It
∂It
∂TPt
(1 + r)t
=
￿
Wt+1Gt+1
∂It
∂TPt
(1− ρt+1)
(1 + r)t+1
+ ...+
WnGn
∂It
∂TPt
(1− ρt+1) · · · (1− ρn)
(1 + r)n
￿
+
1
λ
￿
Gt+1
∂U
∂ht+1
∂It
∂TPt
(1− ρt+1)
(1 + r)t+1
+ ...+
Gn
∂U
∂hn
∂It
∂TPt
(1− ρt+1) · · · (1− ρn)
(1 + r)n
￿
, (D.3)
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which simplifies to
πt
(1 + r)t
=
￿
Wt+1Gt+1 (1− ρt+1)
(1 + r)t+1
+ ...+
WnGn (1− ρt+1) · · · (1− ρn)
(1 + r)n
￿
+
1
λ
￿
Gt+1
∂U
∂ht+1
(1− ρt+1)
(1 + r)t+1
+ ...+
Gn
∂U
∂hn
(1− ρt+1) · · · (1− ρn)
(1 + r)n
￿
. (D.4)
This further reduces to
πt
(1 + r)t
=
￿
Wt+1Gt+1 (1− ρt+1)
(1 + r)t+1
+ ...+
WnGn (1− ρt+1) · · · (1− ρn)
(1 + r)n
￿
+
1
λ
￿
Gt+1
∂U
∂ht+1
(1− ρt+1)
(1 + r)t+1
+ ...+
Gn
∂U
∂hn
(1− ρt+1) · · · (1− ρn)
(1 + r)n
￿
. (D.5)
So long as gross investment is positive at age (t+ 1), bump (D.5) ahead one period, which yields
πt+1
(1 + r)t+1
=
￿
Wt+2Gt+2 (1− ρi+2)
(1 + r)t+2
+ ...+
WnGn (1− ρi+2) · · · (1− ρn)
(1 + r)n
￿
+
1
λ
￿
Gt+2
∂U
∂ht+2
(1− ρi+2)
(1 + r)t+2
+ ...+
Gn
∂U
∂hn
(1− ρi+2) · · · (1− ρn)
(1 + r)n
￿
. (D.6)
I plug (D.6) into (D.5) and simplify; i.e.,
πt
(1 + r)t
=
Wt+1Gt+1 (1− ρt+1)
(1 + r)t+1
+
Gt+1
∂U
∂ht+1
(1− ρt+1)
λ (1 + r)t+1
+
(1− ρt+1)πt+1
(1 + r)t+1
. (D.7)
Note that ∂U∂ht+1 = U
￿
t+1 and re-arrange; I obtain
(πt − πt+1) + rπt + ρt+1πt+1 = (1− ρt+1)Gt+1
￿
Wt+1 +
U
￿
t+1
λ
￿
. (D.8)
If I assume, similar to Grossman (1972a,b), that ρt+1πt+1 ≈ ρt+1πt, and turning (πt − πt+1) into
percentage terms, where π¯t = πt+1−πtπt , the FOC for preventive care becomes
πt [r − π¯t + ρt+1] = (1− ρt+1)Gt+1
￿
Wt+1 +
U
￿
t+1
λ
￿
, (D.9)
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which is the optimal equilibrium path for preventive medical care. Equation (D.9) can be re-
written as
πt
￿
r − W¯t + ρt+1
￿
= (1− ρt+1)Gt+1
￿
Wt+1 +
U
￿
t+1
λ
￿
, (D.10)
where W¯t = Wt+1−WtWt .
D.1.2 Reactive Medical Care
Differentiating (D.1) with respect to reactive care at age t and setting the partial derivative equal
to zero, one obtains the FOC
∂L
∂CRt
=
∂U
∂ht+1
∂ht+1
∂Ht+1
∂Ht+1
∂It+1
∂It+1
∂CRt
(1 + r)t+1
+ · · ·+
∂U
∂hn
∂hn
∂Hn
∂Hn
∂It+1
∂It+1
∂CRt
(1 + r)n
= λ
 ∂C∂It ∂It+1∂CRt
(1 + r)t
+
Wt+1
∂TLt+1
∂Ht+1
∂Ht+1
∂It+1
∂It+1
∂CRt
(1 + r)t+1
+ · · ·+
Wn
∂TLn
∂Hn
∂Hn
∂It+1
∂It+1
∂CRt
(1 + r)n
 . (D.11)
I simplify the FOC for reactive care where Gt+1 = ∂ht+1∂Ht+1 = −
∂TLt+1
∂Ht+1
; ∂Ht+1∂It+1 = (1− νt+1); ...;
∂Hn
∂It+1
=
￿n
j=t+1 (1− νj); and dCdIt = πt. The FOC for reactive medical care becomes
∂C
∂It
∂It+1
∂CRt
(1 + r)t
=
Wt+1Gt+1 (1− νt+1) ∂It+1∂CRt
(1 + r)t+1
+ ...+
WnGn (1− νt+1) · · · (1− νn) ∂It+1∂CRt
(1 + r)n

+
1
λ
Gt+1 ∂U∂ht+1 (1− νt+1) ∂It+1∂CRt
(1 + r)t+1
+ ...+
Gn
∂U
∂hn
(1− νt+1) · · · (1− νn) ∂It+1∂CRt
(1 + r)n
 , (D.12)
which simplifies to
πt
(1 + r)t
=
￿
Wt+1Gt+1 (1− νt+1)
(1 + r)t+1
+ ...+
WnGn (1− νt+1) · · · (1− νn)
(1 + r)n
￿
+
1
λ
￿
Gt+1
∂U
∂ht+1
(1− νt+1)
(1 + r)t+1
+ ...+
Gn
∂U
∂hn
(1− νt+1) · · · (1− νn)
(1 + r)n
￿
. (D.13)
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This further reduces to
πt
(1 + r)t
=
￿
Wt+1Gt+1 (1− νt+1)
(1 + r)t+1
+ ...+
WnGn (1− νt+1) · · · (1− νn)
(1 + r)n
￿
+
1
λ
￿
Gt+1
∂U
∂ht+1
(1− νt+1)
(1 + r)t+1
+ ...+
Gn
∂U
∂hn
(1− νt+1) · · · (1− νn)
(1 + r)n
￿
. (D.14)
So long as gross investment is positive at age (t+ 1), bump (D.14) ahead one period, yielding
πt+1
(1 + r)t+1
=
￿
Wt+2Gt+2 (1− νt+2)
(1 + r)t+2
+ ...+
WnGn (1− νt+2) · · · (1− νn)
(1 + r)n
￿
+
1
λ
￿
Gt+2
∂U
∂ht+2
(1− νt+2)
(1 + r)t+2
+ ...+
Gn
∂U
∂hn
(1− νt+2) · · · (1− νn)
(1 + r)n
￿
. (D.15)
I plug (D.15) into (D.14) and simplify
πt
(1 + r)t
=
Wt+1Gt+1 (1− νt+1)
(1 + r)t+1
+
Gt+1
∂U
∂ht+1
(1− νt+1)
λ (1 + r)t+1
+
(1− νt+1)πt+1
(1 + r)t+1
. (D.16)
Note that ∂U∂ht+1 = U
￿
t+1; I re-arrange and obtain
(πt − πt+1) + rπt + νt+1πt+1 = (1− νt+1)Gt+1
￿
Wt+1 +
U
￿
t+1
λ
￿
. (D.17)
If I assume that νt+1πt+1 ≈ νt+1πt and turning (πt − πt+1) into percentage terms, where π¯t =
πt+1−πt
πt
, the FOC for reactive care becomes
πt [r − π¯t + νt+1] = (1− νt+1)Gt+1
￿
Wt+1 +
U
￿
t+1
λ
￿
, (D.18)
which is the optimal equilibrium path for reactive medical care. Equation (D.18) can be re-written
as
πt
￿
r − P¯Rt + νt+1
￿
= (1− νt+1)Gt+1
￿
Wt+1 +
U
￿
t+1
λ
￿
, (D.19)
where P¯Rt =
PRt+1−PRt
PRt
.
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D.2 Comparative Statics
D.2.1 Impact of Changes in the Depreciation Rates on the Stock of Health
Assume that I look only at the pure investment model, where the only benefits to reactive and
preventive medical care are the marginal monetary benefits to health investment. The psychic
benefits are 0, which means that the marginal utility of increased healthy time or decreased sick
time is 0
￿
U
￿
t = U
￿
t+1 = 0
￿
.
I use a simplified version of (D.10)
πt
￿
r − W¯t + ρt+1
￿
= (1− ρt+1)Gt+1Wt+1. (D.20)
Take the natural logarithm of both sides
ln
￿
r − W¯t + ρt+1
￿
= ln (1− ρt+1) + lnWt+1 + lnGt+1 − lnπt. (D.21)
Differentiate (D.21) with respect to d ln ρt+1 which yields
d ln
￿
r − W¯t + ρt+1
￿
dρt+1
dρt+1
d ln ρt+1
=
ln (1− ρt+1)
dρt+1
dρt+1
d ln ρt+1
+
d lnGt+1
d lnHt+1
d lnHt+1
d ln ρt+1
. (D.22)
This simplifies to
d ln
￿
r − W¯t + ρt+1
￿
dρt+1
￿
d ln ρt+1
dρt+1
￿−1
=
ln (1− ρt+1)
dρt+1
￿
d ln ρt+1
dρt+1
￿−1
+
d lnGt+1
d lnHt+1
d lnHt+1
d ln ρt+1
. (D.23)
Then, noting that d ln ρt+1dρt+1 =
1
ρt+1
, that d lnGt+1d lnHt+1 =
1
et+1
is the elasticity of the the marginal efficiency
of preventive health capital (MEPC) curve (e < 0), and that d lnHt+1d lnHt > 0, (D.23) reduces to
ρt+1
r − W¯t + ρt+1 =
1
et+1
d lnHt+1
d ln ρt+1
− ρt+1
(1− ρt+1) . (D.24)
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Solving for d lnHt+1d ln ρt+1 yields
d lnHt+1
d ln ρt+1
= et+1
￿
ρt+1
r − W¯t + ρt+1 +
ρt+1
(1− ρt+1)
￿
< 0, (D.25)
which is the impact of a change in the depreciation rate of preventive medical care at age (t+ 1)
on the stock of health at age (t+ 1). This will have an immediate impact because preventive care
investment affects the stock of health immediately. Changing (D.23) slightly yields
d ln
￿
r − W¯t + ρt+1
￿
dρt+1
￿
d ln ρt+1
dρt+1
￿−1
=
ln (1− ρt+1)
dρt+1
￿
d ln ρt+1
dρt+1
￿−1
+
d lnGt+1
d lnHt+1
￿
d lnHt+2
d lnHt+1
￿−1 d lnHt+2
d ln ρt+1
. (D.26)
Then, solving for d lnHt+2d ln ρt+1 gives
d lnHt+2
d ln ρt+1
= et+1
￿
d lnHt+2
d lnHt+1
￿￿
ρt+1
r − W¯t + ρt+1 +
ρt+1
(1− ρt+1)
￿
< 0, (D.27)
which does not change the sign found in (D.25).
For reactive care, I use a simplified version of (D.19)
πt
￿
r − P¯Rt + νt+1
￿
= (1− νt+1)Gt+1Wt+1. (D.28)
Take the natural logarithm of both sides
ln
￿
r − P¯Rt + νt+1
￿
= ln (1− νt+1) + lnWt+1 + lnGt+1 − lnπt. (D.29)
Differentiate (D.29) with respect to d ln νt+1 which yields
d ln
￿
r − P¯Rt + νt+1
￿
dνt+1
dνt+1
d ln νt+1
+
d ln
￿
r − P¯Rt + νt+1
￿
dPRt+1
dPRt+1
d ln νt+1
=
d ln (1− νt+1)
dνt+1
dνt+1
d ln νt+1
+
d lnGt+1
d lnHt+1
d lnHt+1
d ln νt+1
. (D.30)
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This simplifies to
d ln
￿
r − P¯Rt + νt+1
￿
dνt+1
￿
d ln νt+1
dνt+1
￿−1
+
d ln
￿
r − P¯Rt + νt+1
￿
dPRt+1
dPRt+1
d ln νt+1
=
d ln (1− νt+1)
dνt+1
￿
d ln νt+1
dνt+1
￿−1
+
d lnGt+1
d lnHt+1
d lnHt+1
d ln νt+1
. (D.31)
Then, noting that d ln νt+1dνt+1 =
1
νt+1
, that d lnGt+1d lnHt+1 =
1
et+1
is the elasticity of the the marginal
efficiency of reactive health capital (MERC) curve (e < 0), and that d lnHt+1d lnHt+1 > 0, (D.31) reduces to
νt+1
r − P¯Rt + νt+1
−
dP¯Rt
dPRt+1
dPRt+1
d ln νt+1
r − P¯Rt + νt+1
= −
￿
νt+1
1− νt+1
￿
+
1
et+1
d lnHt+1
d ln νt+1
. (D.32)
Since dP¯
R
t
dPRt+1
=
d
￿
PRt+1−PRt
PRt
￿
dPRt
= 1
PRt
, solving for d lnHt+1d ln νt+1 gives
d lnHt+1
d ln νt+1
= et+1
νt+1 − 1PRt dPRt+1d ln νt+1
r − P¯Rt + νt+1
+
νt+1
1− νt+1
 ￿ 0, (D.33)
which is the impact of a change in the depreciation rate of reactive medical care at age (t+ 1) on
the stock of health at age (t+ 1). Solving for the impact of a change in the depreciation rate of
reactive medical care at age (t+ 1) on the stock of health at age (t+ 2), (D.31) becomes
d ln
￿
r − P¯Rt + νt+1
￿
dνt+1
dνt+1
d ln νt+1
+
d ln
￿
r − P¯Rt+1 + νt+1
￿
dPRt+1
dPRt+1
d ln νt+1
=
d ln (1− νt+1)
dνt+1
dνt+1
d ln νt+1
+
d lnGt+1
d lnHt+1
￿
d lnHt+2
d lnHt+1
￿−1 d lnHt+2
d ln νt+1
. (D.34)
Solving for d lnHt+2d ln νt+1 yields
d lnHt+2
d ln νt+1
= et+1
￿
d lnHt+2
d lnHt+1
￿νt+1 − 1PRt dPRt+1d ln νt+1
r − P¯Rt + νt+1
+
νt+1
1− νt+1
 ￿ 0. (D.35)
To solve for preventive care and reactive care and the effect on the stock of health simultaneously,
differentiate the stock of health equation; i.e.,
Ht+1 = (1− φt)Ht + It
￿
CRt , T
P
t
￿
. (D.36)
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Allow both time spent on preventive care and the consumption of reactive care to change, which
gives
dHt+1
d ln νt
=
dIt
dTPt
dTPt
d lnTPt
d lnTPt
d ln νt
+
dIt
dCRt
dCtR
d lnCRt
d lnCRt
d ln νt
. (D.37)
Noting that ∂It
∂TPt
= g
￿
P
￿
TPt
CRt
￿
and ∂It
∂CRt
= g
￿
TPt
CRt
￿
− TPt
CRt
g
￿
R
￿
TPt
CRt
￿
, then (D.37) reduces to
dHt+1
d ln νt
= TPt g
￿
P
￿
TPt
CRt
￿
d lnTPt
d ln νt
+ CRt
￿
g
￿
TPt
CRt
￿
−T
P
t
CRt
g
￿
R
￿
TPt
CRt
￿￿
d lnCRt
d ln νt
. (D.38)
Using the cost-minimization conditions, where g
￿
P
￿
TPt
CRt
￿
= Wtπt and g
￿
TPt
CRt
￿
− TPt
CRt
g
￿
R
￿
TPt
CRt
￿
= P
R
t
πt
,
(D.38) reduces to
dHt+1
d ln νt
=
WtTPt
πt
d lnTPt
d ln νt
+
PRt C
R
t
πt
d lnCRt
d ln νt
. (D.39)
Now, suppose that the price of reactive care can change. Then (D.37) becomes
dHt+1
d ln νt
=
dIt
dTPt
dTPt
d lnTPt
￿
d lnTPt
d ln νt
+
d lnTPt
d lnPRt
d lnPRt
d ln νt
￿
+
dIt
dCRt
dCRt
d lnCRt
￿
d lnCRt
d ln νt
+
d lnCRt
d lnPRt
d lnPRt
d ln νt
￿
. (D.40)
This reduces to
dHt+1
d ln νt
= TPt g
￿
P
￿
TPt
CRt
￿￿
d lnTPt
d ln νt
+
d lnTPt
d lnPRt
d lnPRt
d ln νt
￿
+ CRt
￿
g
￿
TPt
CRt
￿
−T
P
t
CRt
g
￿
R
￿
TPt
CRt
￿￿￿
d lnCRt
d ln νt
+
d lnCRt
d lnPRt
d lnPRt
d ln νt
￿
. (D.41)
Then, (D.41) reduces to
dHt+1
d ln νt
=
WtTPt
πt
￿
d lnTPt
d ln νt
+
d lnTPt
d lnPRt
d lnPRt
d ln νt
￿
+
PRt C
R
t
πt
￿
d lnCRt
d ln νt
+
d lnCRt
d lnPRt
d lnPRt
d ln νt
￿
. (D.42)
D.2.2 Impact of Changes in the Depreciation Rate of Reactive Medical Capital on
Quantities of Reactive and Preventive Medical Care
I analyze changes in the quantities of reactive and preventive medical care due to changes in the
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depreciation rate of reactive medical care. The two equations that I use are
Ht+1 = (1− φt)Ht + It
￿
TPt , C
R
t
￿
(D.43)
and
Wt+1 = πt+1g
￿
P
￿
TPt
CRt
￿
, (D.44)
where the first is how the health stock at age (t+ 1) is updated and the last equation is the cost
minimization condition. Differentiating (D.43) and (D.44) with respect to d ln νt yields
￿
∂ lnHt+1
∂Ht+1
￿−1 ∂ lnHt+1
∂ ln νt
=
￿
∂It
∂CRt
∂CRt
∂ lnCRt
∂ lnCRt
∂ ln νt
+
∂It
∂TPt
∂TPt
∂ lnTPt
∂ lnTPt
∂ ln νt
￿
(D.45)
and
dWt+1
d ln νt
= πt+1
￿
∂g￿P
∂CRt
∂CRt
∂ lnCRt
∂ lnCRt
∂ ln νt
+
∂g￿P
∂TPt
∂TPt
∂ lnTPt
∂ lnTPt
∂ ln νt
￿
. (D.46)
Assuming that the wage rate is invariant to the depreciation rate of reactive medical care￿
∂Wt+1
d ln νt
= 0
￿
and noting that
￿
∂It
∂CRt
= g (·)− TPt
CRt
g
￿
R (·)
￿
,
￿
∂It
∂TPt
= g
￿
P (·)
￿
,
∂g￿P￿ TPtCRt ￿
∂CRt
=
−
￿
TPt
(CRt )
2
￿
g
￿￿
PR (·)
￿
, and
∂g￿P￿ TPtCRt ￿
∂TPt
=
￿
1
CRt
￿
g
￿￿
PP (·)
, (D.45) and (D.46) reduce to
Ht+1
∂ lnHt+1
∂ ln νt
=
￿
CRt
￿
g − T
P
t
CRt
g
￿
R
￿
∂ lnCRt
∂ ln νt
+ g
￿
PT
P
t
∂ lnTPt
∂ ln νt
￿
(D.47)
and
0 = πt+1
￿
−T
P
t
CRt
g
￿￿
RP
∂ lnCRt
∂ ln νt
+ g
￿￿
PP
TPt
CRt
∂ lnTPt
∂ ln νt
￿
, (D.48)
Equations (D.47) and (D.48) factor, in matrix form, to

￿
g
￿
P
￿
TPt (g)C
R
t − TPt g
￿
R
g
￿￿
PP −g
￿￿
RP

 ∂ lnTPt∂ ln νt
∂ lnCRt
∂ ln νt
 =
 Ht+1 ∂ lnHt+1∂ ln νt
0
 . (D.49)
Use Cramer’s Rule to solve this system of two unknowns in two equations. Solving first for ∂ lnT
P
t
∂ ln νt
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produces
∂ lnTPt
∂ ln νt
=
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Ht+1
∂ lnHt+1
∂ ln νt
(g)CRt − TPt g
￿
R
0 −g￿￿RP
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
g
￿
P
￿
TPt (g)C
R
t − TPt g
￿
R
g
￿￿
PP −g
￿￿
RP
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
. (D.50)
This reduces to
∂ lnTPt
∂ ln νt
=
−Ht+1g￿￿RP ∂ lnHt+1∂ ln νt
TPt
￿￿
g
￿
R
￿ ￿
g
￿￿
PP
￿− ￿g￿P ￿ ￿g￿￿RP ￿￿− CRt (g) ￿g￿￿PP ￿ ￿ 0. (D.51)
Solving next for ∂ lnC
R
t
∂ ln νt
produces
∂ lnCRt
∂ ln νt
=
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
g
￿
PT
P
t Ht+1
∂ lnHt+1
∂ ln νt
g
￿￿
PP 0
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
g
￿
P
￿
TPt (g)C
R
t − TPt g
￿
R
g
￿￿
PP −g
￿￿
RP
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
. (D.52)
This reduces to
∂ lnCRt
∂ ln νt
=
−Ht+1g￿￿PP ∂ lnHt+1∂ ln νt
TPt
￿￿
g
￿
R
￿ ￿
g
￿￿
PP
￿− ￿g￿P ￿ ￿g￿￿RP ￿￿− CRt (g) ￿g￿￿PP ￿ ￿ 0. (D.53)
Now, suppose that I allow the price of reactive medical care to be influenced by the productivity
of reactive care. Equations (D.45) and (D.46) now become
￿
∂ lnHt+1
∂Ht+1
￿−1 ∂ lnHt+1
∂ ln νt
=
￿
∂It
∂CRt
∂CRt
∂ lnCRt
￿
∂ lnCRt
∂ lnPRt
∂ lnPRt
∂ ln νt
+
∂ lnCRt
∂ ln νt
￿
+
∂It
∂TPt
∂TPt
∂ lnTPt
￿
d lnTPt
d ln νt
+
d lnTPt
d lnPRt
d lnPRt
d ln νt
￿￿
(D.54)
and
dWt+1
d ln νt
= πt+1
￿
∂g￿P
∂CRt
∂CRt
∂ lnCRt
￿
∂ lnCRt
∂ lnPRt
∂ lnPRt
∂ ln νt
+
∂ lnCRt
∂ ln νt
￿
+
∂g￿P
∂TPt
∂TPt
∂ lnTPt
￿
d lnTPt
d ln νt
+
d lnTPt
d lnPRt
d lnPRt
d ln νt
￿￿
. (D.55)
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Then, in matrix form, (D.54) and (D.55) reduce to

￿
g
￿
P
￿
TPt (g)C
R
t − TPt g
￿
R
g
￿￿
PP −g
￿￿
RP

 ∂ lnTPt∂ ln νt
∂ lnCRt
∂ ln νt

=
 ∂ lnCRt∂ lnPRt ∂ lnPRt∂ ln νt
￿
g
￿
RT
P
t − gCRt
￿
+Ht+1
∂ lnHt+1
∂ ln νt
g
￿￿
RP
∂ lnCRt
∂ lnPRt
∂ lnPRt
∂ ln νt
+ g
￿￿
PP
d lnTPt
d lnPRt
d lnPRt
d ln νt
 . (D.56)
Using Cramer’s Rule to solve for ∂ lnT
P
t
∂ ln νt
yields
∂ lnTPt
∂ ln νt
=
g
￿￿
PP
d lnTPt
d lnPRt
d lnPRt
d ln νt
￿
g
￿
RT
P
t − gCRt
￿
TPt
￿￿
g
￿
R
￿ ￿
g
￿￿
PP
￿− ￿g￿P ￿ ￿g￿￿RP ￿￿− CRt (g) ￿g￿￿PP ￿
− Ht+1g
￿￿
RP
∂ lnHt+1
∂ ln νt
TPt
￿￿
g
￿
R
￿ ￿
g
￿￿
PP
￿− ￿g￿P ￿ ￿g￿￿RP ￿￿− CRt (g) ￿g￿￿PP ￿ ￿ 0. (D.57)
Equation (D.57) states that, in addition to the technology effect of higher productivity reactive
care on time spent on preventive care, there is a cross-price effect. Solving next for ∂ lnC
R
t
∂ ln νt
yields
∂ lnCRt
∂ ln νt
=
∂ lnCRt
∂ lnPRt
∂ lnPRt
∂ ln νt
￿
TPt
￿
g
￿
P g
￿￿
RP − g
￿
Rg
￿￿
PP
￿
+ CRt
￿
(g)
￿
g
￿￿
PP
￿￿￿
TPt
￿￿
g
￿
R
￿ ￿
g
￿￿
PP
￿− ￿g￿P ￿ ￿g￿￿RP ￿￿− CRt (g) ￿g￿￿PP ￿
− Ht+1g
￿￿
PP
∂ lnHt+1
∂ ln νt
TPt
￿￿
g
￿
R
￿ ￿
g
￿￿
PP
￿− ￿g￿P ￿ ￿g￿￿RP ￿￿− CRt (g) ￿g￿￿PP ￿ ￿ 0. (D.58)
Thus, there is a price effect that is coupled with the technology effect.
D.3 Alternative Dynamic Model
Suppose that I keep same the maximization problem, so that I have
L =
n￿
t=0
U (ht (Ht) , Xt)
(1 + r)t
+ λ
￿
R−
n￿
t=0
￿
Xt + C +Wt
￿
Lt + TLt
￿
(1 + r)t
￿￿
, (D.59)
where C = PRt CRt +WtTPt and R =
￿n
t=0
￿
WtT
(1+r)t
￿
+ A0. However, suppose now that preventive
care not only influences the stock of health through the gross investment production function, but
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that time spent on preventive care negatively influences the depreciation rate of the health stock,
φt (TtP ), so that
dφt(TPt )
dTPt
< 0. This means that the health stock equation takes the form
Ht+1 =
￿
1− φt
￿
TPt
￿￿
+ It
￿
CRt , T
P
t
￿
. (D.60)
I will only derive what changes with this new formulation.
D.3.1 First-Order Condition for Preventive Care
Differentiating (D.59) with respect to time spent on preventive care yields
∂L
∂TPt
=
∂U
∂ht+1
∂ht+1
∂Ht+1
￿
∂Ht+1
∂It
∂It
∂TPt
+ ∂Ht+1∂φt
∂φt
∂TtP
￿
(1 + r)t+1
+ ...+
∂U
∂hn
∂hn
∂Hn
￿
∂Hn
∂It
∂It
∂TPt
+ ∂Hn∂φt
∂φt
∂TtP
￿
(1 + r)n
= λ
 ∂C∂It ∂It∂TPt
(1 + r)t
+
Wt+1
∂TLt+1
∂Ht+1
￿
∂Ht+1
∂It
∂It
∂TPt
+ ∂Ht+1∂φt
∂φt
∂TtP
￿
(1 + r)t+1
+...+
Wn
∂TLn
∂Hn
￿
∂Hn
∂It
∂It
∂TPt
+ ∂Hn∂φt
∂φt
∂TtP
￿
(1 + r)n
 . (D.61)
It can be shown that (D.61) reduces to
πt
￿
g
￿
P
￿
=
Gt+1
(1 + r)
￿
Wt+1 +
U
￿
t+1
λ
￿￿
g
￿
P (1− ρt+1)−Ht
∂φt
∂TPt
￿
+ ...+
Gn
(1 + r)n−t
￿
Wn +
U
￿
t+1
λ
￿g￿P n￿
h=t+1
(1− ρh)−Ht ∂φt
∂TPt
n￿
j=t+1
(1− φj)
 (D.62)
D.3.2 Simultaneous Changes in the Consumption of Reactive Care, Time Spent on
Preventive Care
The two equations that I use are
Ht+1 =
￿
1− φt
￿
TPt
￿￿
Ht + It
￿
TPt , C
R
t
￿
(D.63)
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and
Wt+1 = πt+1g
￿
P
￿
TPt
CRt
￿
, (D.64)
where the first is how the health stock at age (t+ 1) is updated and the last equation is the cost
minimization condition. Differentiating (63) and (64) with respect to d ln νt yields
Ht+1
∂ lnHt+1
∂ ln νt
=
￿
∂It
∂CRt
∂CRt
∂ lnCRt
∂ lnCRt
∂ ln νt
+
￿
∂It
∂TPt
−Ht ∂φt
∂TPt
￿
∂TPt
∂ lnTPt
∂ lnTPt
∂ ln νt
￿
(D.65)
and
dWt+1
d ln νt
= πt+1
￿
∂g￿P
∂CRt
∂CRt
∂ lnCRt
∂ lnCRt
∂ ln νt
+
∂g￿P
∂TPt
∂TPt
∂ lnTPt
∂ lnTPt
∂ ln νt
￿
. (D.66)
Assuming that the wage rate is invariant to the depreciation rate of reactive medical care￿
∂Wt+1
d ln νt
= 0
￿
and noting that
￿
∂It
∂CRt
= g (·)− TPt
CRt
g
￿
R (·)
￿
,
￿
∂It
∂TPt
= g
￿
P (·)
￿
,
∂g￿P￿ TPtCRt ￿
∂CRt
=
−
￿
TPt
(CRt )
2
￿
g
￿￿
PR (·)
￿
, and
∂g￿P￿ TPtCRt ￿
∂TPt
=
￿
1
CRt
￿
g
￿￿
PP (·)
, (D.65) and (D.66) reduce to
Ht+1
∂ lnHt+1
∂ ln νt
=
￿￿
CRt (g)− TPt g
￿
R
￿ ∂ lnCRt
∂ ln νt
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￿
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￿
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￿
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∂ lnTPt
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￿
(D.67)
and
0 = πt+1
￿
−T
P
t
CRt
g
￿￿
RP
∂ lnCRt
∂ ln νt
+
TPt
CRt
g
￿￿
PP
∂ lnTPt
∂ ln νt
￿
. (D.68)
In matrix form, (D.67) and (D.68) reduce to

￿
CRt (g)− TPt g
￿
R
￿
TPt
￿
g
￿
P −Ht ∂φt∂TPt
￿
−g￿￿RP g
￿￿
PP

 ∂ lnCRt∂ ln νt
∂ lnTPt
∂ ln νt
 =
 Ht+1 ∂ lnHt+1∂ ln νt
0
 . (D.69)
I solve (D.69) using Cramer’s Rule. Solving for ∂ lnC
R
t
∂ ln νt
yields, after some algebra:
∂ lnCRt
∂ ln νt
=
Ht+1
∂ lnHt+1
∂ ln νt
g
￿￿
PP
g
￿￿
PP
￿
CRt (g)− TPt g￿R
￿
+ TPt g
￿￿
RP
￿
g
￿
P −Ht ∂φt∂TPt
￿ ￿ 0. (D.70)
132
It can be shown that the solution for ∂ lnT
P
t
∂ ln νt
is
∂ lnTPt
∂ ln νt
=
Ht+1
∂ lnHt+1
∂ ln νt
g
￿￿
RP
g
￿￿
PP
￿
CRt (g)− TPt g￿R
￿
+ TPt g
￿￿
RP
￿
g
￿
P −Ht ∂φt∂TPt
￿ ￿ 0. (D.71)
It is apparent that (D.70) and (D.71) will have opposite signs.
D.3.3 Changes in the Stock of Health
Differentiating the stock of health equation
Ht+1 =
￿
1− φt
￿
TPt
￿￿
+ It
￿
CRt , T
P
t
￿
(D.72)
with respect to preventive and reactive care yields
∂Ht+1
∂ ln νt
=
∂It
∂TPt
∂TPt
∂ lnTPt
∂ lnTPt
∂ ln νt
+
∂It
∂CRt
∂CRt
∂ lnCRt
∂ lnCRt
∂ ln νt
−Ht ∂φt
∂TPt
∂TPt
∂ lnTPt
∂ lnTPt
∂ ln νt
. (D.73)
Denoting ∂It
∂TPt
= Wtπt and
∂It
∂CRt
= P
R
t
πt
from the cost-minimization condition and ΞRTechnology =
∂ lnCRt
∂ ln νt
and ΞPTechnology =
∂ lnTPt
∂ ln νt
, after algebra (D.73) reduces to
∂Ht+1
∂ ln νt
=
PRt C
R
t
R
+
ΞPTechnologyπt
ΞRTechnology
￿
WtTPt
πtR
− HtT
P
t
R
∂φt
∂TPt
￿
. (D.74)
The condition that ensures that the stock of health falls as the productivity of reactive care increases
is given by:
PRt C
R
t
R
WtTPt
R
>
ΞPTechnology
ΞRTechnology
￿
πtHt
Wt
∂φt
∂TPt
− 1
￿
. (D.75)
D.4 Obesity as a “Rich Man’s” Disease in Developing Countries
This section describes how (D.42) may be applicable to developing countries. In developing countries,
obesity is a “rich-man’s” disease.146 Rich individuals in poor developing countries are more likely
to have access to reactive medical care (better and more doctors, more hospital facilities) than
poor individuals (Audibert & Mathonnat, 2012; Harris et al., 2011; Mathonnat, 2010; Stuckler
146French and Crabbe (2010) find that obesity prevalence in China is higher among higher income and higher
education groups. Ziraba et al. (2009) find that obesity prevalence in Africa is higher among higher income groups.
Both, however, find that growth rates in obesity are higher among low income groups in the past several years.
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et al., 2011). Rich individuals are likely to consume a large portion of their budget on reactive
care, relative to that spent on preventive care, meaning that they are likely to suffer from high
levels of obesity and diabetes. However, as access to reactive care improves, through domestic and
international measures, these trends in developing countries will slow.147
In low income countries, the more affluent are more likely to be obese (Dinsa et al., 2012).148 In
South Africa, high out-of-pocket payments for care, as well as low infrastructure and high travel costs
for rural residents, have limited access of low income individuals to reactive medical care (Harris et
al., 2011). In countries such as Ethiopia, Chad, and Cameroon, there are significant differences in
vaccination rates across the richest income quintile and the poorest. Poor women in many African
countries have little access to delivery assistance by health care professionals (Mutangadura et
al., 2009). In general, low income individuals in sub-Saharan Africa have little access to reactive
medical care (Audibert and Mathonnat, 2012; Harris et al., 2011; Mathonnat, 2010; Stuckler et al.,
2011).149 In many developing countries, high income individuals are the ones with access to reliable
medical care. They consume large amounts of their budget on reactive care relative to that spent
on preventive care. As such, they suffer from higher obesity and diabetes rates than the rest of
the population.150 Note that the lack of access to care for low income individuals may also have
another effect; if it significantly reduces the life expectancy of these individuals, they may not be
alive enough to acquire obesity or diabetes.
In response to this, African nations have pushed to increase access to medical care facilities for
rural and low income individuals. As access to reactive medical care has increased over calendar
time, obesity growth trends in developing countries have changed. Monteiro et al. (2004) find
that lower income individuals have had higher obesity growth rates than high income individuals
in the developing world. More access to medical care facilities have made it easier for low income
individuals in developing countries, through domestic and international initiatives, to spend a large
portion of their budget on reactive care relative to that spent on preventive care. This suggests that,
in the developing world, obesity may soon no longer be the domain of the elite.
147Over time, obesity and diabetes will become less of a rich man’s disease in these countries.
148Note, however, that diagnosis may play a role. Diabetes may not be diagnosed in large portions of low-income
populations with little access to medical care. Though the stated rates are low, the true rates are likely higher.
149Also note that higher mortality rates in these low income populations preclude the onset of obesity later on in
life, as many low income individuals do not live long enough to develop these illnesses.
150These individuals are able, by virtue of their access to medical care, to push off the consequences of their actions
and offset some of the health harms that obesity and diabetes can cause.
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D.5 Figures and Tables on the Developing World
The United States is not the only country experiencing rapid growth trends in obesity. These
growth trends are found in developing countries as well. Heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC)
are developing countries with high levels of poverty and debt overhang who are eligible for special
assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These countries are
seen as 39 of the poorest countries in the world.151 Using data from Stevens et al. (2012), Table
D.1 highlights the growth in obesity in these countries, while Table D.2 highlights the growth in
individuals who are overweight in these countries. Most of the HIPC countries show growth in the
percent of individuals who are overweight and the percent of individuals who are obese with few
exceptions.152
Figures D.1-D.4 highlight the changes in obesity and individuals who are overweight between
1980 and 2000 in the HIPC countries. The main takeaway is that obesity is rapidly becoming a
worldwide phenomenon, found in both developing and developed countries, and is likely to have
potentially significant cost impacts that puts more pressure on the world’s poorest countries. While
the growth in obesity in these developing countries is not at the same levels as those found in the
U.S., this may highlight how increased reliance on reactive care rather than preventive care may
continue to become more of a worldwide trend. This will lead to continued increases in the growth
in obesity rates even in developing countries. My model may provide a reasonable framework to
help understand the mechanism behind future growth in obesity trends in developing countries.
As shown in Tables D.1 and D.2, these trends in obesity and diabetes are becoming a worldwide
problem. Between 2000 and 2008, there has been a rapid rise in obesity rates in developing countries.
My model provides an appealing framework for expected future trends in developing countries, since
these countries expect medical technology improvements to spill over from developed countries.153 As
individuals in developing countries become more aware of the technological diffusion from developed
15136 countries have taken advantage of this program. They are: Afghanistan, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger,
Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia. An explanation of HIPC
is given at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm.
152These exceptions are: (i) the percent of male Afghans who are both overweight and obese, between 1980 and
2000; (ii) the percent of males in the Central African Republic who are both overweight and obese, between 1980 and
2000; (iii) the percent of males in the Democratic Republic of Congo who are overweight, between 1980 and 2008;
and (iv) the percent of males in the Democratic Republic of Congo who are obese, between 1980 and 2000.
153As an example, the impact of AIDS in Africa led French President Jacques Chirac, at the end of 1997, to call
upon wealthy nations to create an AIDS therapy support fund to improve AIDS treatment through purchasing drugs
(Bunce, 1997). The rapid deployment of AIDS drugs in Africa after this allowed native Africans to witness significant
medical technological advances.
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countries, they will be more likely to follow the pattern of behavior exhibited in developed countries.
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Figure D.1: Growth in Female Overweight 1980-2008, Developing Countries
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Figure D.2: Growth in Female Obese 1980-2008, Developing Countries
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Figure D.3: Growth in Male Overweight 1980-2008, Developing Countries
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Figure D.4: Growth in Male Obese 1980-2008, Developing Countries
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E Life Cycle Profile Derived from Dynamic Model
E.1 Numerical Illustration as an Individual Ages
This describes additional numerical simulations detailing how the consumption of reactive care and
time spent on preventive care change as an individual ages. The parameter values used as a standard
are the same as in Appendix C.1. I modify my assumptions on how the productivity of preventive
and reactive care change over age years. I assume that the productivity of preventive care decreases
at an increasing rate as an individual ages. This means that, to use preventive care to maintain
good health, it will take more and more preventive care to accomplish this.154
I assume that the productivity of reactive care initially increases at an increasing rate, then starts
to increase at a decreasing rate. Eventually, at some age, reactive care is as productive as it will ever
be. After this age, the productivity of reactive care falls at a constant rate. This means that, while
young, reactive care as a curative measure is highly effective and, as medical technology advances,
will continue to be more and more effective. Eventually, at a certain age, the aging process overcomes
any additional productivity found as reactive medical technology improves.155 Figure E.1 highlights
the paths in the productivity of preventive and reactive care as an individual ages. This matches a
result in Hall and Jones (2007), as to how the marginal productivity of health care spending changes
as an individual ages.
E.1.1 Assumption 1 - Numerical Illustration 1
Figure E.2 shows an intuitive pattern as to how the consumption of reactive care and time spent
on preventive care change as an individual ages. As an individual ages, he will spend more time
working to build up income during the peak-earning years and so time spent on preventive care
will fall at an increasing rate. Eventually, because of the age of the individual, the time needed to
maintain one’s health using preventive care is so high that the individual chooses to spend even less
154This assumption means that the productivity of exercise is many times more productive at age 18 than at age 50;
the same holds true between ages 50 and 75. This seems to be a reasonable assumption for most individuals.
155This assumption means that the use of reactive care may actually harm the individual, even if it is better
technology; this is because, at a certain age, the body does become frail and cannot take advantage of the more
productive reactive care.
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time on it. This means that time spent on preventive care will rapidly decrease for an individual at
later ages.
Consumption of reactive care shows a different pattern. During his peak-earning years, the
individual will choose to consume reactive care at an increasing rate, choosing to offset illnesses
after they occur rather than preventing them before they occur; he values his time for work rather
than for preventive care, knowing he can offset the health impacts of this decision through more
productive reactive care. At a certain age, the benefits of using reactive care in increasing quantities
ends; as an individual ages, his ability to ’bounce back’ from illness diminishes. The consumption of
reactive care starts to decline; the depreciation of the existing stock of health (φ) makes it not worth
it to invest as much in the stock of health.156 These are the years near retirement age, when the
individual does not have to spend as much time in good health to maintain earnings power. As the
individual reaches advanced ages, consumption of reactive care and time spent on preventive care
both decrease. This signals an individual nearing the end of his life; consumption of non-medical
care goods and increased leisure time are worth more, on the margin, to the high age individual.
This decline signals that, in this model, an individual will not choose to live forever. The
depreciation of the health stock increases the costs of maintaining an extra year of life. It is more
valuable to the individual to consume non-medical goods and leisure, foregoing increased life spans.
E.1.2 Assumption 2 - Numerical Illustration 2
Figure E.3 shows how the consumption of reactive care and time spent on preventive care change
as an individual ages. Again, this yields the same trends as in all previous sections. The decrease
in time spent on preventive care and the consumption of reactive care at later ages is very large,
similar to that found in the first numerical simulation. This occurs because the nominal wage grows
slowly. The benefits of living longer, in terms of higher wages, are muted. Similarly, the costs of
extending life based on the use of reactive care are reduced as individuals face higher and higher
reactive care prices as they age. Note, however, the continued use of reactive care; even as its price
increases at a faster rate than the price of time spent on preventive care, the wage, individuals will
still choose to consume relatively large amounts of it. At advanced ages, it is still the best action an
156For instance, getting cancer at age 88 and then aggressively treating it with chemotherapy is not a choice most
individuals will make.
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individual can take to live longer.
E.1.3 Assumption 3 - Numerical Illustration 3
Figure E.4 shows how the consumption of reactive care and time spent on preventive care change as
an individual ages. As before, time spent on preventive care decreases uniformly while consumption
of reactive care initially declines, then follows the similar trends found earlier; high over what is
assumed to be the peak earnings years for an individual, then decreases steadily as the individual
reaches an advanced age. The figure is less ’smooth’ than those found in the other four numerical
simulations, but this is due to the rapid changes that are assumed for the inflation rate of reactive
medical care.
E.1.4 Assumption 4 - Numerical Illustration 4
Figure E.5 shows how the consumption of reactive care and time spent on preventive care change
as an individual ages. Again, this yields the same trends as in previous sections. The decrease in
time spent on preventive care and the consumption of reactive care at later ages, however, is very
small. This occurs because, as the wage continues to increase, the benefits of living longer include
very high potential earnings. Individuals will choose to work longer and live longer simply because
they will earn higher and higher income levels over time.
E.1.5 Assumption 5 - Numerical Illustration 5
Figure E.6 shows how the consumption of reactive care and time spent on preventive care change
as an individual ages. Note that this yields the same conclusions as in the previous section, but the
changes in the consumption of reactive care and time spent on preventive care are muted.157
157In other words, the increase in the consumption of reactive care at early ages is less, while the decrease in time
spent on preventive care over the whole lifespan is less pronounced.
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E.2 Numerical Illustration as an Individual Ages: Figures
Figure E.1: Productivity of Reactive and Preventive Care by Age
NOTE: As an individual ages, the productivity of preventive care decreases at an increasing rate.
The productivity of reactive care exhibits Moore’s Law when the individual is young, then starts
increasing at a decreasing rate. At some age, changes in medical technology in reactive care are no
longer effective; the productivity of reactive care will decrease at a constant rate. This looks over
the life cycle of an individual.
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Figure E.2: Age Numerical Illustration 1
NOTE: This uses numerical illustration assumption 1. An individual becomes relatively poorer
(price of reactive care increases relative to wage).
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Figure E.3: Age Numerical Illustration 2
NOTE: This uses numerical illustration assumption 2. An individual becomes relatively poorer
(price of reactive care increases relative to wage).
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Figure E.4: Age Numerical Illustration 3
NOTE: This uses numerical illustration assumption 3. The relative income of individual fluctuates
(price of reactive care is volatile relative to wage).
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Figure E.5: Age Numerical Illustration 4
NOTE: This uses numerical illustration assumption 4. An individual becomes relatively richer
(price of reactive care decreases relative to wage).
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Figure E.6: Age Numerical Illustration 5
NOTE: This uses numerical illustration assumption 5. The relative income of individual remains
the same (price of reactive care remains constant relative to wage).
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Figure E.7: Age Summary of Numerical Illustrations
NOTE: This figure plots all the changes in the consumption of reactive care and time spent on
preventive care using all five numerical illustration assumptions.
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Figure E.8: Changes in Consumption of Reactive Care as an Individual Ages
NOTE: This figure plots all the changes in the consumption of reactive care using all five
numerical illustration assumptions. Reactive k refers to the consumption of reactive care based on
the kth numerical illustration assumption.
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Figure E.9: Changes in Time Spent on Preventive Care as an Individual Ages
NOTE: This figure plots all the changes in the time spent on preventive care using all five
numerical illustration assumptions. Preventive k refers to the time spent on preventive care based
on the kth numerical illustration assumption.
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Figure E.10: Changes in Stock of Health as an Individual Ages 1
NOTE: This figure plots all the changes in the stock of health as consumption of reactive care and
time spent on preventive care change, using all five numerical illustration assumptions. The
specific form of the health production function that is used is
Ht+1 = (1− φt)Ht +
￿
CRt
￿0.75 ￿
TPt
￿0.25, where H0 = 25.
157
Figure E.11: Changes in Stock of Health as an Individual Ages 2
NOTE: This figure plots all the changes in the stock of health as consumption of reactive care and
time spent on preventive care change, using all five numerical illustration assumptions. Health k
refers to the stock of health based on the kth numerical illustration assumption. The specific form
of the health production function that is used is Ht+1 = (1− φt)Ht +
￿
CRt
￿0.75 ￿
TPt
￿0.25, where
H0 = 25.
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F Glossary of Terms (Static Model)
Table F.1: Glossary of Terms Used in Static Model
Term Definition
H Stock of health
TP Time spent on preventive medical care
CR Consumption of reactive medical care
ρ Productivity of preventive care
ν Productivity of reactive care
LE Life expectancy of an individual
X Consumption of an aggregate commodity
TL Leisure time
Y Income of an individual
W Market wage
TW Time spent working
PR Market price of reactive care
T Total time
λ Marginal utility of wealth
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G Static Model
G.1 General Static Model
Precise definitions for reactive care and preventive care are needed.158 Preventive care is defined to
be one hour of time spent on a bundle of goods that reduces the probability of incurring diabetes or
obesity by τ -percent.159 Reactive care is defined to be the percent of the health stock restored, ε, by
the bundle of goods provided during 1 unit of medical services after illness occurs.160 Simply put,
preventive care is the medical care and services used to attempt to remain healthy while reactive
care is the medical care and services used to attempt to return to good health after illness occurs.
The static model is based on previous work by Murphy and Topel (2006) and Hall and Jones
(2007), where consumers derive utility from consumption, leisure, and the stock of health. The stock
of health (H) depends on the time spent on preventive medical care
￿
TP
￿
and the consumption of
reactive medical care
￿
CR
￿
; i.e.,
H = f
￿
TP , CR
￿
. (G.1)
I assume that all individuals are identical with unchanging preferences over time, which reduces the
problem to looking at a representative individual. As in Hall and Jones (2007), the mortality rate
for the individual is the inverse of his stock of health, 1H . Since each individual is identical, each
faces the same mortality rate meaning that the stock of health is equal to life expectancy
￿
LE
￿
LE = H = f
￿
TP , CR
￿
. (G.2)
Similar to Rosen (1998), the representative individual faces two states of the world. If a health
shock does not occur, the individual survives and enjoys utility U(X,TL), where X denotes an
aggregate consumption good and TL represents the leisure time of an individual. The person dies
if a health shock occurs, so there will be no consumption in this state. Instead, utility in this state
158I will choose to follow how the urban housing literature defines housing services. In hedonic pricing models,
arbitrary units of measurement are defined to normalize a housing service, which allows researchers to compare
different houses based on common services or features that they provide.
159The bundle of goods that an individual spends time on includes time spent going to the doctor, time spent dieting
and exercising, and time spent on education to reduce bad behaviors that lead to these illnesses.
160This bundle of goods includes diagnostic treatments for diabetes, statins and insulin used, and other medical
services used to reduce the health impacts of diabetes and obesity.
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takes the value of a constant, M , where M ￿ 0. I can designate expected lifetime utility as
E (U) = pU(X,TL) + (1− p)M, (G.3)
where p denotes the probability of survival from a health shock. Since preferences are state-
dependent, a linear transformation of the expected utility function is acceptable so long as the
same transformation is applied to each state of the world. Subtracting M from the utility in each
state means that utility of non-survival is normalized to zero
E
￿￿U￿ = p ￿U(X,TL)−M￿+ (1− p) [M −M ] = p￿U(X,TL), (G.4)
where the difference in utility between life and death is given by ￿U(X,TL) = U(X,TL)−M . Since
each individual faces the same mortality rate, the lifetime probability of survival is given by that
individual’s life expectancy
￿
LE
￿
. Using the same normalization found in Rosen (1998), lifetime
utility
￿
LU
￿
is per-period utility, ￿U(X,TL), multiplied by life expectancy
LU = LE ￿U(X,TL). (G.5)
The consumer faces a resource constraint, where his income, earned in the labor market, is spent
on the numeraire aggregate consumption good and reactive medical care
WTW = X + PRCR, (G.6)
where W denotes the market wage, TW denotes the time an individual spends working, and PR
is the market price of reactive care. I assume that time spent working will be held constant. An
individual also faces a time constraint, where his total amount of time (T ) is spent on leisure
￿
TL
￿
,
work
￿
TW
￿
, and preventive care
￿
TP
￿
T = TL + TW + TP . (G.7)
Re-writing (G.7) in terms of leisure time yields
TL = T − TW − TP . (G.8)
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Maximizing (G.5) subject to (G.6) and (G.8) yields the optimization problem
L = f ￿TP , CR￿ ￿U(X,T − TW − TP ) + λ ￿WTW −X − PRCR￿ , (G.9)
where λ represents the marginal utility of income. An individual maximizes equation (G.9) with
respect to preventive care, reactive care, and the aggregate consumption good.
The FOC’s of (G.9) with respect to preventive care, reactive care, and the aggregate consumption
good are
LP = fP ￿U(X,T − TW − TP )− ￿ULf ￿TP , CR￿ = 0, (G.10)
LR = fR ￿U(X,T − TW − TP )− λPR = 0, (G.11)
and
LX = ￿UXf ￿TP , CR￿− λ = 0, (G.12)
where fP = ∂f∂TP is the marginal product of preventive care, ￿UL = ∂ ￿U∂TL is the marginal utility of
leisure time, fR = ∂f∂CR is the marginal product of reactive care, and ￿UX = ∂ ￿U∂X refers to the marginal
utility of the aggregate consumption good. From (G.12), solve for the marginal utility of wealth,
￿UXf (·) = λ. (G.13)
Taking the ratio of (G.10) and (G.11) and using (G.13) yields
fR
fP
=
￿UX￿UL PR. (G.14)
Equation (G.14) states that the marginal rate of technical substitution between reactive and preven-
tive care must equal the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, multiplied
by the price of reactive care.
Empirical evidence suggests that reactive medical technology has improved over calendar time
while preventive medical technology has changed very little over calendar time.161 For instance,
Cutler and Meara (2000) present evidence that the decrease in mortality for low-birthweight infants,
as well as the overall increase in life expectancy at birth, is due to medical technology improvements.
161One method of purely preventive care for sexually transmitted diseases (STD’s) is abstinence. The productivity
of abstinence has not changed over the course of human history
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Similarly, Jena and Philipson (2008) have found that each patient with HIV now lives 15 years longer
than they would have in the 1980s.162 The productivity of time spent on preventive care, however,
has rarely changed over calendar time.
For example, while expensive gym equipment can be purchased today, physical activity today is
not fundamentally different from physical activity 50 years ago.163 There has been no fundamental
change that allows an identical individual to burn more energy in an hour of strenuous physical
exercise in 2000 than in 1900. Durnin and Passmore (1967), the FAO/WHO/UNO (1981), and
Floud et al. (2011) estimate the energy requirements for various physical activities. The estimates
assume that an hour of strenuous physical activity in the 18th century is the same, for an identical
individual (same body weight, height, and BMI), in the 21st century. The authors assume that the
efficacy of physical activity, which is preventive care, has not changed in over three centuries.164 This
suggests that, in general, technology improvements in preventive care occur over much longer time
spans than technology improvements in reactive care. Subsequently, I conclude that the productivity
of reactive care relative to preventive care, (1−ν)(1−ρ) , has increased over calendar time.
I also assume that both preventive and reactive care exhibit decreasing marginal productivity,
i.e.,
∂ (fP )
∂TP
≡ fPP < 0 (G.15)
and
∂ (fR)
∂CR
≡ fRR < 0 (G.16)
while the aggregate consumption good and leisure time exhibit diminishing marginal utility, i.e.,
∂ ￿UX
∂X
≡ ￿UXX < 0 (G.17)
and
∂ ￿UL
∂TL
≡ ￿ULL < 0. (G.18)
162Other evidence of technological improvements in reactive care can be found for antibiotics and cancer treatments,
to name a few.
163The types of physical activity may have changed. In the 18th and 19th centuries, physical activity was typically
accomplished through work tasks. Today, physical activity is typically accomplished as an alternative to sedentary
leisure activities.
164They assume that only characteristics of the individuals themselves, such as height and weight due to nutritional
changes, affect the caloric intake needed to perform the same levels of physical activity. For example, the average
individual in 1785 needed 2,600 calories to perform 3 hours of strenuous manual activity; the average individual in
1995 needed 3,200 calories to perform the same strenuous exercise, as he was taller and had a higher body weight.
163
Lastly, I assume that higher levels of preventive care improve the productivity of reactive care, where
∂2H
∂CR∂TP
≡ ∂fP
∂CR
≡ ∂fR
∂TP
≡ fRP > 0, (G.19)
meaning that a person who is in better health from using more preventive medicine will be more
likely, when coupled with reactive care, to survive a medical shock.
I can attempt to determine when an individual will choose to consume more reactive care relative
to time spent on preventive care as the productivity of reactive care increases.
ln
￿
f
￿
R
￿
− ln
￿
f
￿
P
￿
= ln ￿UX + lnPR − ln ￿UL. (G.20)
Taking the derivative of (G.20) with respect to ν yields
fRR
fR
dCR
dν
+
fRP
fR
dTP
dν
− fRP
fP
dCR
dν
− fPP
fP
dTP
dν
= −
￿UXX￿UX PR dC
R
dν
−
￿UXX￿UX CR dP
R
dCR
dCR
dν
−
￿UXX￿UX CR dP
R
dTP
dTP
dν
+
1
PR
dPR
dCR
dCR
dν
+
1
PR
dPR
dTP
dTP
dν
+
￿ULL￿UL dT
P
dν
. (G.21)
Combining like terms in (G.21) produces
dCR
dν
￿
fRP
fP
− fRP
fR
+
1
PR
dPR
dCR
−
￿UXX￿UX PR −
￿UXX￿UX CR dP
R
dCR
￿
=
dTP
dν
￿
fRP
fR
− fPP
fP
− 1
PR
dPR
dTP
−
￿ULL￿UL −
￿UXX￿UX CR dP
R
dTP
￿
. (G.22)
Since this is one equation in two unknowns, there will be an infinite number of solutions. However,
the condition that ensures that the representative individual chooses to consume relatively more
reactive care to time spent on preventive care is when
￿ ￿
dCR
dν
￿
￿
dTP
dν
￿ > 1
￿
. The condition that ensures
this is when, from (G.22)
fR
fP
>
 fR
￿ ￿ULL￿UL + dPRdTP ￿ ￿UXX￿UX CR − 1PR ￿￿− (fRP + fRR)
fP
￿ ￿UXXPR￿UX + dPRdCR ￿CR dPRdCR − 1PR ￿￿− (fRP + fPP )
 . (G.23)
This provides limits where the relative consumption of reactive care to time spent on preventive care
increases.
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Using a general health production function
H = f
￿
CR, TP
￿
(G.24)
I can show that even if the productivity of reactive care increases, the health stock of an individual,
in a static model, may decrease. Differentiate with respect to the productivity of reactive care, ν,
yields
dH
dν
=
∂f
∂CR
￿
∂CR
∂ν
+
∂CR
∂PR
∂PR
∂ν
+
∂CR
∂PP
∂PP
∂ν
￿
+
∂f
∂TP
￿
∂CP
∂ν
+
∂CP
∂PP
∂PP
∂ν
+
∂CP
∂PR
∂PR
∂ν
￿
(G.25)
Then, the only terms that can be signed definitively are the marginal products of reactive care
and preventive care, fR = ∂f∂CR > 0 and fP =
∂f
∂TP > 0, and the laws of demand,
∂CR
∂PR < 0 and
∂TP
∂PP < 0.
165 This means that (G.25) may be negative with the increase in the productivity of
reactive care, in a static model.
G.2 Cobb-Douglas Static Model
For simplicity, assume that the health production function in (G.1) is Cobb-Douglas, i.e.,
LE =
￿
TP
￿ρ ￿
CR
￿ν
, (G.26)
where ρ and ν represent the output elasticities of time spent on preventive care
￿
TP
￿
and the
consumption of reactive care
￿
CR
￿
, respectively. These values are based on available technology.
When the available technology for preventive care or reactive care change over calendar time, the
value of these parameters may change.166 Also assume that the utility function is Cobb-Douglas,
165This assumes that reactive care and preventive care are not Giffen goods
166For example, with current technological levels, the values of the parameters may be ρ1 and ν1. However, suppose
that a new medical drug is created, to be used after the onset of illness, that can heal 95% of all known illnesses. This
means that the technology of reactive medical care has improved. It is likely we will have a second realization of these
parameters, namely ρ2 and ν2. Since these are based on the new technology, and tell us how reactive and preventive
care are transformed into the health stock, this means that it will be the case that ν2 > ν1.
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i.e., ￿U(X,TL) = Xα ￿TL￿β . (G.27)
Substituting (G.26) and (G.27) into (G.5) yields
LU =
￿
TP
￿ρ ￿
CR
￿ν
Xα
￿
TL
￿β
. (G.28)
The representative individual faces a resource constraint, where his income, earned in the labor
market, is spent on the numeraire aggregate consumption good and reactive medical care
WTW = X + PRCR, (G.29)
where W denotes the market wage, TW denotes the time an individual spends working, and PR
is the market price of reactive care. Assuming that time spent working will be held constant, an
individual also faces a time constraint, where his total available time, T , is spent on leisure
￿
TL
￿
,
work
￿
TW
￿
, and preventive care
￿
TP
￿
T = TL + TW + TP . (G.30)
Maximizing (G.28) subject to (G.29) and (G.30) yields the optimization problem
L = ￿TP ￿ρ ￿CR￿ν Xα ￿T − TW − TP ￿β + λ ￿WTW −X − PRCR￿ , (G.31)
where λ represents the marginal utility of income. An individual maximizes (G.31) with respect to
preventive care, reactive care, and the aggregate consumption good, yielding the FOC’s
ρ￿U ￿X,TL￿LE
TP
=
β ￿U ￿X,TL￿LE
TL
, (G.32)
ν ￿U ￿X,TL￿LE
CR
= λPR, (G.33)
and
α￿U ￿X,TL￿LE
X
= λ. (G.34)
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The demand curves for preventive care, reactive care, and the aggregate consumption good are given
by
TP∗ =
ρ
￿
T − TW ￿
ρ+ β
, (G.35)
CR∗ =
νWTW
PR (ν + α)
, (G.36)
and
X∗ =
αWTW
(ν + α)
. (G.37)
In order to see how the consumption of reactive care changes as the productivity of reactive care
changes, differentiate (G.36) with respect to the productivity of reactive care, which yields
∂CR∗
∂ν
=
αPRWTW
[PR (ν + α)]2
> 0. (G.38)
As the productivity of reactive care increases, the consumption of reactive care for an individual
increases. This result is likely subject to satiation.167 At some point, increases in the productivity of
reactive care will induce consumers to consume less reactive care, due to the increased curative power
of more productive reactive care. This is likely to happen with a significant technological advance
for reactive care and not a marginal increase. Consumers will be able to consume less reactive
care and still receive the same curative benefits from this lesser amount.168 However, incredibly
productive reactive care may come with a high price, which may still allow for increased health care
expenditures even with a reduction in the consumption of reactive care.
Equation (G.38) does not take into account the price change induced by a change in the con-
sumption of reactive care. This substitution effect may outweigh the technology effect induced by a
change in the productivity of reactive care, leading to an individual consuming relatively less reactive
care. Differentiate (G.36) with respect to the productivity of reactive care, noting that the price of
167Note, however, that in some instances a change in productivity will not be a marginal change but will be, instead,
a discrete change. For instance, with the development of open heart surgery in 1952, this was not a marginal change
from previous technologies, but a discrete advance in technology from the previous procedures.
168For instance, if a drug is created that instantly cures all diseases, consumption of reactive care will likely decrease
to 1 unit.
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reactive care will change as the consumption of reactive care changes
∂CR∗
∂ν
=
WTW
PR (ν + α)
− νWT
W ∂PR
∂CR
(PR)2 (ν + α)
− νWT
W
PR (ν + α)2
. (G.39)
Combine terms in (G.39); i.e.,
∂CR∗
∂ν
=
PR (ν + α)WTW − νWTW
￿
PR + (ν + α) ∂P
R
∂CR
∂CR∗
∂ν
￿
[PR (ν + α)]2
. (G.40)
Multiply both the numerator and denominator by C
R
WTWPR and solve (G.40) for
∂CR∗
∂ν
∂CR∗
∂ν
=
αCR
(ν + α)
￿
(ν + α) P
RCR
WTW +
ν
ηR
￿ . (G.41)
while noting that the own price elasticity of demand for reactive care is given by ηR = ∂C
R
∂PR
PR
CR =
−1.169 Simplify (G.41) to obtain
dCR∗
dν
=
αCR
(ν + α)
￿
αP
RCR
WTW + ν
￿
PRCR
WTW − 1
￿￿ ￿ 0. (G.42)
The sign of (G.42) depends on the sign of the denominator. Even with an increase in the price
of reactive care, consumers will consume more reactive care as the productivity of reactive care
increases when
α
PRCR
WTW
> ν
￿
WTW − PRCR
WTW
￿
. (G.43)
From (G.29), since X = WTW − PRCR, (G.35) reduces to
￿
PRCR
WTW
￿
￿
X
WTW
￿ > ν
α
. (G.44)
Note that
￿
PRCR
WTW
￿
is the share of income spent on reactive care and
￿
X
WTW
￿
is the share of income
spent on the aggregate consumption good. Provided that the ratio of the income share spent on
reactive care to that on the aggregate consumption good is larger than the ratio of the productivity
of reactive care (ν) to the preference parameter of the aggregate consumption good (α), then an
individual will choose to consume more reactive care as the productivity of reactive care increases,
169This result comes from using a Cobb-Douglas lifetime utility function.
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even as the price of reactive care increases. In other words, if consumers spend a large enough portion
of their income on reactive medical care, the technology effect of more productive reactive care will
likely outweigh the negative substitution effect of higher priced reactive care, and the consumption
of reactive care will increase.
A main hypothesis in this paper is that, as the productivity of reactive care increases, the
consumption of reactive care increases relative to time spent on preventive care. In order to see this
change, divide (G.36) by (G.35) and then differentiate with respect to the productivity of reactive
care, which yields
d
￿
CR∗
TP∗
￿
dν
=
(ρ+ β)WTW
ρ (T − TW )
￿
αPR − ν ∂PR∂CR ∂C
R
∂ν
[PR (ν + α)]2
￿
￿ 0. (G.45)
Multiply the term in brackets in (G.45) by C
R
CR and simplify, again noting that η
R = ∂C
R
∂PR
PR
CR = −1;
i.e.,
d
￿
CR∗
TP∗
￿
dν
=
(ρ+ β)WTW
ρ (T − TW )
￿
αCR + ν ∂C
R
∂ν
PRCR (ν + α)2
￿
￿ 0. (G.46)
This reveals that, as the productivity of reactive care increases, individuals will take advantage
of the more productive reactive care and choose to consume more of it, relative to time spent on
preventive care, provided that (G.44) continues to hold.170 Individuals choose to offset health shocks
by alleviating shocks after they occur, instead of attempting to mitigate shocks before they occur.
An important implication of the comparative statics is what happens to the stock of health as
the productivity of reactive care increases. Differentiate (G.26) with respect to the productivity of
reactive care to obtain
∂H∗
∂ν
= lnCR +
ν
CR
+
∂CR
∂PR
PR
CR
CR
PR
∂PR
∂ν ν
CR
. (G.47)
Re-arranging and noting that κ = ∂P
R
∂ν
ν
PR > 0, (G.47) becomes
∂H∗
∂ν
= lnCR +
ν
CR
− κ ￿ 0. (G.48)
The sign of (G.48) depends on how much the price of reactive care changes in response to an increase
in the productivity of reactive care. If the price of reactive care is highly responsive to a change
170Note that even if (G.34) does not hold, it may still be the case that
d
￿
CR∗
TP∗
￿
dν > 0. This means that my hypothesis
will continue to hold under a wide variety of parameter ranges.
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in the productivity of reactive care, it is likely that ∂H
∗
∂ν < 0, and the health stock will fall even
as reactive care becomes more productive.171 When the substitution effect of higher reactive prices
outweighs the technological effect of more productive reactive care, it is possible that an individual
will consume significantly less reactive care and allow his health stock to decrease.
I solve for how the consumption of reactive care changes as the productivity of reactive care
changes, when the price of reactive care may change as well. Using the demand curve for reactive
care
CR∗ =
νWTW
PR (ν + α)
. (G.49)
I differentiate (G.49) with respect to the productivity of reactive care
dCR∗
dν
=
PR (ν + α)WTW − νWTW
￿
PR + (ν + α) dP
R
dCR
dCR∗
dν
￿
[PR (ν + α)]2
. (G.50)
Solving for dC
R∗
dν yields
dCR∗
dν
=
αCRWTW
(ν + α)
￿
(ν + α) (PR)2 + νWTW dP
R
dCR
￿ . (G.51)
Then, multiplying the numerator and the denominator by C
R
PR and denoting the inverse of the own
price elasticity of demand as ηR = dP
R
dCR
CR
PR , (G.51) reduces to
dCR∗
dν
=
αCRWTW
(ν + α)
￿
(ν + α)PRCR + νWT
W
ηR
￿ . (G.52)
Since the own price elasticity of demand is −1 for a Cobb-Douglas function, ηR = −1. Simplifying
(G.52) further, by multiplying both the numerator and denominator by 1WTW yields
dCR∗
dν
=
αCR
(ν + α)
￿
(ν + α) P
RCR
WTW − ν
￿ . (G.53)
171The results found above: (i) In (G.45), that the consumption of reactive care relative to preventive care may
increase as the productivity of reactive care increases and (ii) in (G.47), that the stock of health may decrease even
if the productivity of reactive care increase, are not the result of using Cobb-Douglas functions for health and utility.
These results can be obtained using general utility and health production functions.
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Therefore (G.53) is positive only if
￿
(ν + α) P
RCR
WTW − ν
￿
> 0. This happens when
α
PRCR
WTW
> ν
￿
WTW − PRCR
WTW
￿
. (G.54)
Then (G.54) reduces to the condition that allows (G.53) to be positive
￿
PRCR
WTW
￿
￿
X
WTW
￿ > ν
α
. (G.55)
I also want to derive the health production function with respect to the productivity of reactive
care. Taking logs yields
H∗ = ρ lnTP + ν lnCR. (G.56)
Then, because of the Cobb-Douglas formulation, time spent on preventive care does not depend on
the productivity of reactive care. Deriving (G.56) with respect to the productivity of reactive care
yields
∂H∗
∂ν
= lnCR +
ν
CR
+
ν ∂C
R
∂PR
∂PR
∂ν
CR
. (G.57)
Then, multiplying the last term by C
RPR
CRPR , and noting that η =
∂CR
∂PR
PR
CR = −1, I have
∂H∗
∂ν
= lnCR +
ν
CR
− ν
∂PR
∂ν
PR
. (G.58)
Lastly, denote the own-depreciation elasticity of the price of reactive care as κ = ∂P
R
∂ν
ν
PR . Then
(G.58) reduces to
∂H∗
∂ν
= lnCR +
ν
CR
− κ. (G.59)
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H State Ranking Comparison Figures
Figure E.12: Gearhart Efficiency and America’s Health Rankings, Models (a)
NOTE: This compares the estimated hyperbolic order-α efficiency rankings derived in this paper
to the rankings obtained in America’s Health Rankings from the United Health Foundation, using
model (a).
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Figure E.13: Gearhart Efficiency and America’s Health Rankings, Models (b)
NOTE: This compares the estimated hyperbolic order-α efficiency rankings derived in this paper
to the rankings obtained in America’s Health Rankings from the United Health Foundation, using
model (b).
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Figure E.14: Gearhart Efficiency and America’s Health Rankings, Models (c)
NOTE: This compares the estimated hyperbolic order-α efficiency rankings derived in this paper
to the rankings obtained in America’s Health Rankings from the United Health Foundation, using
model (c).
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Figure E.15: Gearhart Efficiency and America’s Health Rankings, Models (d)-(e)
NOTE: This compares the estimated hyperbolic order-α efficiency rankings derived in this paper
to the rankings obtained in America’s Health Rankings from the United Health Foundation, using
models (d) and (e).
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